This paper considers the complexity and properties of KLM-style preferential reasoning in the setting of propositional logic with team semantics and dependence atoms, also known as propositional dependence logic. Preferential team-based reasoning is shown to be cumulative, yet violates System~P. We give intuitive conditions that fully characterise those cases where preferential propositional dependence logic satisfies System~P. We show that these characterisations do, surprisingly, not carry over to preferential team-based propositional logic. Furthermore, we show how classical entailment and dependence logic entailment can be expressed in terms of non-trivial preferential models. Finally, we present the complexity of preferential team-based reasoning for two natural representations. This includes novel complexity results for classical (non-team-based) preferential reasoning.

In this paper, we take first steps toward developing defeasible reasoning on concepts in KLM framework. We define generalizations of cumulative reasoning system C and cumulative reasoning system with loop CL to conceptual setting. We also generalize cumulative models, cumulative ordered models, and preferential models to conceptual setting and show the soundness and completeness results for these models.

This paper considers KLM-style preferential non-monotonic reasoning in the setting of propositional team semantics. We show that team-based propositional logics naturally give rise to cumulative non-monotonic entailment relations. Motivated by the non-classical interpretation of disjunction in team semantics, we give a precise characterization for preferential models for propositional dependence logic satisfying all of System P postulates. Furthermore, we show how classical entailment and dependence logic entailment can be expressed in terms of non-trivial preferential models.

Qualitative and quantitative approaches to reasoning about uncertainty can lead to different logical systems for formalizing such reasoning, even when the language for expressing uncertainty is the same. In the case of reasoning about relative likelihood, with statements of the form $\varphi\succsim\psi$ expressing that $\varphi$ is at least as likely as $\psi$, a standard qualitative approach using preordered preferential structures yields a dramatically different logical system than a quantitative approach using probability measures. In fact, the standard preferential approach validates principles of reasoning that are incorrect from a probabilistic point of view. However, in this paper we show that a natural modification of the preferential approach yields exactly the same logical system as a probabilistic approach--not using single probability measures, but rather sets of probability measures. Thus, the same preferential structures used in the study of non-monotonic logics and belief revision may be used in the study of comparative probabilistic reasoning based on imprecise probabilities.

Qualitative and quantitative approaches to reasoning about uncertainty can lead to different logical systems for formalizing such reasoning, even when the language for expressing uncertainty is the same. In the case of reasoning about relative likelihood, with statements of the form φ 􏰂≥ ψ expressing that φ is at least as likely as ψ, a standard qualitative approach using preordered preferential structures yields a dramatically different logical system than a quantitative approach using probability measures. In fact, the standard preferential approach validates principles of reasoning that are incorrect from a probabilistic point of view. However, in this paper we show that a natural modification of the preferential approach yields exactly the same logical system as a probabilistic approach — not using single probability measures, but rather sets of probability measures. Thus, the same preferential structures used in the study of non-monotonic logics and belief revision may be used in the study of comparative probabilistic reasoning based on imprecise probabilities.

Traditional approaches to non-monotonic reasoning fail to satisfy a number of plausible axioms for belief revision and suffer from conceptual difficulties as well. Recent work on ranked preferential models (RPMs) promises to overcome some of these difficulties. Here we show that RPMs are not adequate to handle iterated belief change. Specifically, we show that RPMs do not always allow for the reversibility of belief change. This result indicates the need for numerical strengths of belief.