policy pair
Bilevel Optimization over Saddle Points of Zero-Sum Markov Games
Zheng, Zihao, King, Irwin, Lu, Songtao
Reinforcement learning (RL) often has a hierarchical structure, where an upper-level (UL) learner selects model parameters and a lower-level (LL) decision-making process responds, naturally leading to a bilevel optimization problem. Most existing bilevel RL methods assume a single-policy LL Markov decision process (MDP), and therefore fail to capture competitive structures arising in applications such as incentive design, where multiple policies interact. We study bilevel optimization problems in which the LL problem is a regularized min-max zero-sum Markov game and the UL objective is optimized through the saddle-point equilibrium induced by the LL game. In this work, we propose penalty-augmented Nikaido-Isoda descent-ascent (PANDA), a penalty-based first-order policy-gradient method based on the Nikaido-Isoda function. By exploiting the min-max game structure, PANDA avoids computing UL hypergradients and does not require second-order information. We prove that PANDA converges to stationary points without convexity assumptions on either the UL or LL objectives. Moreover, PANDA reaches an $ฮต$-stationary point in $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(ฮต^{-1})$ iterations with sample complexity $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(ฮต^{-3})$, matching the best-known rates for bilevel RL with single-policy LL MDPs. Experiments demonstrate the superior performance of PANDA over closely related baselines.
Supplementary Materials for " Model-Based Multi-Agent RL in Zero-Sum Markov Games with Near-Optimal Sample Complexity " A Proofs of the Main Results
We first introduce some additional notations for convenience. Our proof mainly consists of the following steps: 1. Helper lemmas and a crude bound. See A.2, and more precisely, Lemmas A.9 and A.10. 3. Final bound for null -approximate NE value. See A.3. 4. Final bounds for null -NE policy. See A.5. 14 A.1 Important Lemmas We start with the component-wise error bounds.
Achieving Logarithmic Regret in KL-Regularized Zero-Sum Markov Games
Nayak, Anupam, Yang, Tong, Yagan, Osman, Joshi, Gauri, Chi, Yuejie
Reverse Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence-based regularization with respect to a fixed reference policy is widely used in modern reinforcement learning to preserve the desired traits of the reference policy and sometimes to promote exploration (using uniform reference policy, known as entropy regularization). Beyond serving as a mere anchor, the reference policy can also be interpreted as encoding prior knowledge about good actions in the environment. In the context of alignment, recent game-theoretic approaches have leveraged KL regularization with pretrained language models as reference policies, achieving notable empirical success in self-play methods. Despite these advances, the theoretical benefits of KL regularization in game-theoretic settings remain poorly understood. In this work, we develop and analyze algorithms that provably achieve improved sample efficiency under KL regularization. We study both two-player zero-sum Matrix games and Markov games: for Matrix games, we propose OMG, an algorithm based on best response sampling with optimistic bonuses, and extend this idea to Markov games through the algorithm SOMG, which also uses best response sampling and a novel concept of superoptimistic bonuses. Both algorithms achieve a logarithmic regret in $T$ that scales inversely with the KL regularization strength $ฮฒ$ in addition to the standard $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ regret independent of $ฮฒ$ which is attained in both regularized and unregularized settings
Learning Equilibria from Data: Provably Efficient Multi-Agent Imitation Learning
Freihaut, Till, Viano, Luca, Cevher, Volkan, Geist, Matthieu, Ramponi, Giorgia
This paper provides the first expert sample complexity characterization for learning a Nash equilibrium from expert data in Markov Games. We show that a new quantity named the single policy deviation concentrability coefficient is unavoidable in the non-interactive imitation learning setting, and we provide an upper bound for behavioral cloning (BC) featuring such coefficient. BC exhibits substantial regret in games with high concentrability coefficient, leading us to utilize expert queries to develop and introduce two novel solution algorithms: MAIL-BRO and MURMAIL. The former employs a best response oracle and learns an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium with $\mathcal{O}(\varepsilon^{-4})$ expert and oracle queries. The latter bypasses completely the best response oracle at the cost of a worse expert query complexity of order $\mathcal{O}(\varepsilon^{-8})$. Finally, we provide numerical evidence, confirming our theoretical findings.
Supplementary Materials for " Model-Based Multi-Agent RL in Zero-Sum Markov Games with Near-Optimal Sample Complexity " A Proofs of the Main Results
We first introduce some additional notations for convenience. Our proof mainly consists of the following steps: 1. Helper lemmas and a crude bound. See A.2, and more precisely, Lemmas A.9 and A.10. 3. Final bound for null -approximate NE value. See A.3. 4. Final bounds for null -NE policy. See A.5. 14 A.1 Important Lemmas We start with the component-wise error bounds.