An agent will generally have incomplete and possibly inaccurate knowledge about its environment. In addition, such an agent may receive erroneous information, perhaps in being misinformed about the truth of some formula. In this paper we present a general approach to reasoning about action and belief change in such a setting. An agent may carry out actions, but in some cases may inadvertently execute the wrong one (for example, pushing an unintended button). As well, an agent may sense whether a condition holds, and may revise its beliefs after being told that a formula is true. Our approach is based on an epistemic extension to basic action theories expressed in the situation calculus, augmented by a plausibility relation over situations. This plausibility relation can be thought of as characterising the agent's overall belief state; as such it keeps track of not just the formulas that the agent believes to hold, but also the plausibility of formulas that it does not believe to hold. The agent's belief state is updated by suitably modifying the plausibility relation following the execution of an action. We show that our account generalises previous approaches, and fully handles belief revision, sensing, and erroneous actions.

We use an algebraic viewpoint, namely a matrix framework to deal with the problem of resource allocation under uncertainty in the context of a qualitative approach. Our basic qualitative data are a plausibility relation over the resources, a hierarchical relation over the agents and of course the preference that the agents have over the resources. With this data we propose a qualitative binary relation $\unrhd$ between allocations such that $\mathcal{F}\unrhd \mathcal{G}$ has the following intended meaning: the allocation $\mathcal{F}$ produces more or equal social welfare than the allocation $\mathcal{G}$. We prove that there is a family of allocations which are maximal with respect to $\unrhd$. We prove also that there is a notion of simple deal such that optimal allocations can be reached by sequences of simple deals. Finally, we introduce some mechanism for discriminating {optimal} allocations.

Conditional information is an integral part of representation and inference processes of causal relationships, temporal events, and even the deliberation about impossible scenarios of cognitive agents. For formalizing these inferences, a proper formal representation is needed. Psychological studies indicate that classical, monotonic logic is not the approriate model for capturing human reasoning: There are cases where the participants systematically deviate from classically valid answers, while in other cases they even endorse logically invalid ones. Many analyses covered the independent analysis of individual inference rules applied by human reasoners. In this paper we define inference patterns as a formalization of the joint usage or avoidance of these rules. Considering patterns instead of single inferences opens the way for categorizing inference studies with regard to their qualitative results. We apply plausibility relations which provide basic formal models for many theories of conditionals, nonmonotonic reasoning, and belief revision to asses the rationality of the patterns and thus the individual inferences drawn in the study. By this replacement of classical logic with formalisms most suitable for conditionals, we shift the basis of judging rationality from compatibility with classical entailment to consistency in a logic of conditionals. Using inductive reasoning on the plausibility relations we reverse engineer conditional knowledge bases as explanatory model for and formalization of the background knowledge of the participants. In this way the conditional knowledge bases derived from the inference patterns provide an explanation for the outcome of the study that generated the inference pattern.

Plausibility models are Kripke models that agents use to reason about knowledge and belief, both of themselves and of each other. Such models are used to interpret the notions of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief. The logic of conditional belief contains that modality and also the knowledge modality, and similarly for the logic of degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief. With respect to these logics, plausibility models may contain too much information. A proper notion of bisimulation is required that characterises them. We define that notion of bisimulation and prove the required characterisations: on the class of image-finite and preimage-finite models (with respect to the plausibility relation), two pointed Kripke models are modally equivalent in either of the three logics, if and only if they are bisimilar. As a result, the information content of such a model can be similarly expressed in the logic of conditional belief, or the logic of degrees of belief, or that of safe belief. This, we found a surprising result. Still, that does not mean that the logics are equally expressive: the logics of conditional and degrees of belief are incomparable, the logics of degrees of belief and safe belief are incomparable, while the logic of safe belief is more expressive than the logic of conditional belief. In view of the result on bisimulation characterisation, this is an equally surprising result. We hope our insights may contribute to the growing community of formal epistemology and on the relation between qualitative and quantitative modelling.