Precisely defining consciousness and identifying the mechanisms that effect it is a long-standing question, particularly relevant with advances in artificial intelligence. The scientific community is divided between physicalism and natural dualism. Physicalism posits consciousness is a physical process that can be modeled computationally; natural dualism rejects this hypothesis. Finding a computational model has proven elusive, particularly because of conflation of consciousness with other cognitive capabilities exhibited by humans, such as intelligence and physiological sensations. Here we show such a computational model that precisely models consciousness, natural or artificial, identifying the structural and functional mechanisms that effect it, confirming the physicalism hypothesis. We found such a model is obtainable when including the underlying (biological or digital) substrate and accounting for reactive behavior in substrate sub-systems (e.g., autonomous physiological responses). Results show that, unlike all other computational processes, consciousness is not independent of its substrate and possessing it is an evolutionary advantage for intelligent entities. Our result shows there is no impediment to the realization of fully artificial consciousness but, surprisingly, that it is also possible to realize artificial intelligence of arbitrary level without consciousness whatsoever, and that there is no advantage in imbuing artificial systems with consciousness.

With the significant progress of artificial intelligence (AI) and consciousness science, artificial consciousness (AC) has recently gained popularity. This work provides a broad overview of the main topics and current trends in AC. The first part traces the history of this interdisciplinary field to establish context and clarify key terminology, including the distinction between Weak and Strong AC. The second part examines major trends in AC implementations, emphasising the synergy between Global Workspace and Attention Schema, as well as the problem of evaluating the internal states of artificial systems. The third part analyses the ethical dimension of AC development, revealing both critical risks and transformative opportunities. The last part offers recommendations to guide AC research responsibly, and outlines the limitations of this study as well as avenues for future research. The main conclusion is that while AC appears both indispensable and inevitable for scientific progress, serious efforts are required to address the far-reaching impact of this innovative research path.

In its pragmatic turn, the new discipline of AI ethics came to be dominated by humanity's collective fear of its creatures, as reflected in an extensive and perennially popular literary tradition. Dr. Frankenstein's monster in the novel by Mary Shelley rising against its creator; the unorthodox golem in H. Leivick's 1920 play going on a rampage; the rebellious robots of Karel \v{C}apek -- these and hundreds of other examples of the genre are the background against which the preoccupation of AI ethics with preventing robots from behaving badly towards people is best understood. In each of these three fictional cases (as well as in many others), the miserable artificial creature -- mercilessly exploited, or cornered by a murderous mob, and driven to violence in self-defense -- has its author's sympathy. In real life, with very few exceptions, things are different: theorists working on the ethics of AI completely ignore the possibility of robots needing protection from their creators. The present book chapter takes up this, less commonly considered, ethical angle of AI.

We are witnessing a surge in artificial systems, from autonomous robots to self-driving cars, all of which already display features of autonomy, agency, and goal-directed behavior. With the advent of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) it is plausible that such artificial autonomous agents (AAA) will display behaviors similar to human autonomous agents consciously pursuing their own goals. The more those agents develop complex and human-like capacities, the more the impetus towards granting them consciousness and associated mental capacities (such as intrinsic motivations and intentions) analogous to humans will grow (Dehaene et al., 2017). In the pervasive functionalist Zeitgeist this is a forgone conclusion; it is only a matter of how rapidly AAA will develop and how sophisticated they will be. Because, once they show the same traits we do, what possibly could be missing?