In simple perceptual decisions the brain has to identify a stimulus based on noisy sensory samples from the stimulus. Basic statistical considerations state that the reliability of the stimulus information, i.e., the amount of noise in the samples, should be taken into account when the decision is made. However, for perceptual decision making experiments it has been questioned whether the brain indeed uses the reliability for making decisions when confronted with unpredictable changes in stimulus reliability. We here show that even the basic drift diffusion model, which has frequently been used to explain experimental findings in perceptual decision making, implicitly relies on estimates of stimulus reliability. We then show that only those variants of the drift diffusion model which allow stimulus-specific reliabilities are consistent with neurophysiological findings. Our analysis suggests that the brain estimates the reliability of the stimulus on a short time scale of at most a few hundred milliseconds.

The degree of confidence in one's choice or decision is a critical aspect of perceptual decision making. Attempts to quantify a decision maker's confidence by measuring accuracy in a task have yielded limited success because confidence and accuracy are typically not equal. In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian framework to model confidence in perceptual decision making. We show that this model, based on partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), is able to predict confidence of a decision maker based only on the data available to the experimenter. We test our model on two experiments on confidence-based decision making involving the well-known random dots motion discrimination task. In both experiments, we show that our model's predictions closely match experimental data. Additionally, our model is also consistent with other phenomena such as the hard-easy effect in perceptual decision making.

Too many technical details for simulations are missing-e.g., sure rewards, cost of sampling, discount factor. As noted on line 256, coherence is observable to the experimenter, but not to the subject. The virtues of normativity for modeling human behaviour are not adequately defended here. Why would normativity be good in and of itself? Does the model make any clear, testable predictions?

The degree of confidence in one's choice or decision is a critical aspect of perceptual decision making. Attempts to quantify a decision maker's confidence by measuring accuracy in a task have yielded limited success because confidence and accuracy are typically not equal. In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian framework to model confidence in perceptual decision making. We show that this model, based on partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), is able to predict confidence of a decision maker based only on the data available to the experimenter. We test our model on two experiments on confidence-based decision making involving the well-known random dots motion discrimination task. In both experiments, we show that our model's predictions closely match experimental data. Additionally, our model is also consistent with other phenomena such as the hard-easy effect in perceptual decision making.

In simple perceptual decisions the brain has to identify a stimulus based on noisy sensory samples from the stimulus. Basic statistical considerations state that the reliability of the stimulus information, i.e., the amount of noise in the samples, should be taken into account when the decision is made. However, for perceptual decision making experiments it has been questioned whether the brain indeed uses the reliability for making decisions when confronted with unpredictable changes in stimulus reliability. We here show that even the basic drift diffusion model, which has frequently been used to explain experimental findings in perceptual decision making, implicitly relies on estimates of stimulus reliability. We then show that only those variants of the drift diffusion model which allow stimulus-specific reliabilities are consistent with neurophysiological findings.

In simple perceptual decisions the brain has to identify a stimulus based on noisy sensory samples from the stimulus. Basic statistical considerations state that the reliability of the stimulus information, i.e., the amount of noise in the samples, should be taken into account when the decision is made. However, for perceptual decision making experiments it has been questioned whether the brain indeed uses the reliability for making decisions when confronted with unpredictable changes in stimulus reliability. We here show that even the basic drift diffusion model, which has frequently been used to explain experimental findings in perceptual decision making, implicitly relies on estimates of stimulus reliability. We then show that only those variants of the drift diffusion model which allow stimulusspecific reliabilities are consistent with neurophysiological findings. Our analysis suggests that the brain estimates the reliability of the stimulus on a short time scale of at most a few hundred milliseconds.

The degree of confidence in one's choice or decision is a critical aspect of perceptual decision making. Attempts to quantify a decision maker's confidence by measuring accuracy in a task have yielded limited success because confidence and accuracy are typically not equal. In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian framework to model confidence in perceptual decision making. We show that this model, based on partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), is able to predict confidence of a decision maker based only on the data available to the experimenter. We test our model on two experiments on confidence-based decision making involving the well-known random dots motion discrimination task. In both experiments, we show that our model's predictions closely match experimental data. Additionally, our model is also consistent with other phenomena such as the hard-easy effect in perceptual decision making.

The degree of confidence in one's choice or decision is a critical aspect of perceptual decision making. Attempts to quantify a decision maker's confidence by measuring accuracy in a task have yielded limited success because confidence and accuracy are typically not equal. In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian framework to model confidence in perceptual decision making. We show that this model, based on partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), is able to predict confidence of a decision maker based only on the data available to the experimenter. We test our model on two experiments on confidence-based decision making involving the well-known random dots motion discrimination task.

In simple perceptual decisions the brain has to identify a stimulus based on noisy sensory samples from the stimulus. Basic statistical considerations state that the reliability of the stimulus information, i.e., the amount of noise in the samples, should be taken into account when the decision is made. However, for perceptual decision making experiments it has been questioned whether the brain indeed uses the reliability for making decisions when confronted with unpredictable changes in stimulus reliability. We here show that even the basic drift diffusion model, which has frequently been used to explain experimental findings in perceptual decision making, implicitly relies on estimates of stimulus reliability. We then show that only those variants of the drift diffusion model which allow stimulus-specific reliabilities are consistent with neurophysiological findings. Our analysis suggests that the brain estimates the reliability of the stimulus on a short time scale of at most a few hundred milliseconds.

In simple perceptual decisions the brain has to identify a stimulus based on noisy sensory samples from the stimulus. Basic statistical considerations state that the reliability of the stimulus information, i.e., the amount of noise in the samples, should be taken into account when the decision is made. However, for perceptual decision making experiments it has been questioned whether the brain indeed uses the reliability for making decisions when confronted with unpredictable changes in stimulus reliability. We here show that even the basic drift diffusion model, which has frequently been used to explain experimental findings in perceptual decision making, implicitly relies on estimates of stimulus reliability. We then show that only those variants of the drift diffusion model which allow stimulus-specific reliabilities are consistent with neurophysiological findings. Our analysis suggests that the brain estimates the reliability of the stimulus on a short time scale of at most a few hundred milliseconds.