Goto

Collaborating Authors

 payoff model


Contextual-Bandit Based Personalized Recommendation with Time-Varying User Interests

Xu, Xiao, Dong, Fang, Li, Yanghua, He, Shaojian, Li, Xin

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

A contextual bandit problem is studied in a highly non-stationary environment, which is ubiquitous in various recommender systems due to the time-varying interests of users. Two models with disjoint and hybrid payoffs are considered to characterize the phenomenon that users' preferences towards different items vary differently over time. In the disjoint payoff model, the reward of playing an arm is determined by an arm-specific preference vector, which is piecewise-stationary with asynchronous and distinct changes across different arms. An efficient learning algorithm that is adaptive to abrupt reward changes is proposed and theoretical regret analysis is provided to show that a sublinear scaling of regret in the time length $T$ is achieved. The algorithm is further extended to a more general setting with hybrid payoffs where the reward of playing an arm is determined by both an arm-specific preference vector and a joint coefficient vector shared by all arms. Empirical experiments are conducted on real-world datasets to verify the advantages of the proposed learning algorithms against baseline ones in both settings.


Solving zero-sum extensive-form games with arbitrary payoff uncertainty models

Leni, Juan, Levine, John, Quigley, John

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. Recent breakthroughs Artificial Intelligence (AI) research applied to Poker have resulted in novel approximation approaches such as counterfactual regret minimization, that can successfully deal with large-scale imperfect games. By drawing from these ideas, this work addresses the problem of arbitrary continuous payoff distributions. We propose a method, Harsanyi-Counterfactual Regret Minimization, to solve two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with arbitrary payoff distribution models. Given a game $\Gamma$, using a Harsanyi transformation we generate a new game $\Gamma^\#$ to which we later apply Counterfactual Regret Minimization to obtain $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria. We include numerical experiments showing how the method can be applied to a previously published problem.