Persistent monitoring using robot teams is of interest in fields such as security, environmental monitoring, and disaster recovery. Performing such monitoring in a fully on-line decentralised fashion has significant potential advantages for robustness, adaptability, and scalability of monitoring solutions, including, in principle, the capacity to effectively adapt in real-time to a changing environment. We examine this through the lens of multi-robot patrol, in which teams of patrol robots must persistently minimise time between visits to points of interest, within environments where traversability of routes is highly dynamic. These dynamics must be observed by patrol agents and accounted for in a fully decentralised on-line manner. In this work, we present a new method of monitoring and adjusting for environment dynamics in a decentralised multi-robot patrol team. We demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms realistic baselines in highly dynamic scenarios, and also investigate dynamic scenarios in which explicitly accounting for environment dynamics may be unnecessary or impractical.

Abstract-- Simulating hostile attacks of physical autonomous systems can be a useful tool to examine their robustness to attack and inform vulnerability-aware design. In this work, we examine this through the lens of multi-robot patrol, by presenting a machine learning-based adversary model that observes robot patrol behavior in order to attempt to gain undetected access to a secure environment within a limited time duration. Such a model allows for evaluation of a patrol system against a realistic potential adversary, offering insight into future patrol strategy design. We show that our new model outperforms existing baselines, thus providing a more stringent test, and examine its performance against multiple leading decentralized multi-robot patrol strategies. Security in automated and robotic systems is of increasing importance as these systems becomes more pervasive and integrated throughout society. Beyond the obvious considerations of cybersecurity and communication security, an important facet of this is physical security -- the robustness of these systems to interference in the real world from a hostile actor.

The problem of decentralized multi-robot patrol has previously been approached primarily with hand-designed strategies for minimization of 'idlenes' over the vertices of a graph-structured environment. Here we present two lightweight neural network-based strategies to tackle this problem, and show that they significantly outperform existing strategies in both idleness minimization and against an intelligent intruder model, as well as presenting an examination of robustness to communication failure. Our results also indicate important considerations for future strategy design.

To enable the computation of effective randomized patrol routes for single- or multi-robot teams, we present RoSSO, a Python package designed for solving Markov chain optimization problems. We exploit machine-learning techniques such as reverse-mode automatic differentiation and constraint parametrization to achieve superior efficiency compared to general-purpose nonlinear programming solvers. Additionally, we supplement a game-theoretic stochastic surveillance formulation in the literature with a novel greedy algorithm and multi-robot extension. We close with numerical results for a police district in downtown San Francisco that demonstrate RoSSO's capabilities on our new formulations and the prior work.

The conservation of key wildlife species such as tigers and elephants are threatened by poaching activities. In many conservation areas, foot patrols are conducted to prevent poaching but they may not be well-planned to make the best use of the limited patrolling resources. While prior work has introduced PAWS (Protection Assistant for Wildlife Security) as a game-theoretic decision aid to design effective foot patrol strategies to protect wildlife, the patrol routes generated by PAWS may be difficult to follow in areas with complex terrain. Subsequent research has worked on the significant evolution of PAWS, from an emerging application to a regularly deployed software. A key advance of the deployed version of PAWS is that it incorporates the complex terrain information and generates a strategy consisting of easy-to-follow routes. In this demonstration, we provide 1) a video introducing the PAWS system; 2) an interactive visualization of the patrol routes generated by PAWS in an example area with complex terrain; and 3) a machine-human competition in designing patrol strategy given complex terrain and animal distribution.

In proof-of-payment transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about the transit system, inspecting the tickets of passengers, who face fines if caught fare evading. The deterrence of fare evasion depends on the unpredictability and effectiveness of the patrols. In this paper, we present TRUSTS, an application for scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems. TRUSTS models the problem of computing patrol strategies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game where the objective is to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. This problem differs from previously studied Stackelberg settings in that the leader strategies must satisfy massive temporal and spatial constraints; moreover, unlike in these counterterrorism-motivated Stackelberg applications, a large fraction of the ridership might realistically consider fare evasion, and so the number of followers is potentially huge. A third key novelty in our work is deliberate simplification of leader strategies to make patrols easier to be executed. We present an efficient algorithm for computing such patrol strategies and present experimental results using real-world ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s department is currently carrying out trials of TRUSTS.

Illegal extraction of forest resources is fought, in many developing countries, by patrols that try to make this activity less profitable, using the threat of confiscation. With a limited budget, officials will try to distribute the patrols throughout the forest intelligently, in order to most effectively limit extraction. Prior work in forest economics has formalized this as a Stackelberg game, one very different in character from the discrete Stackelberg problem settings previously studied in the multiagent literature. Specifically, the leader wishes to minimize the distance by which a profit-maximizing extractor will trespass into the forest---or to maximize the radius of the remaining ``pristine'' forest area. The follower's cost-benefit analysis of potential trespass distances is affected by the likelihood of being caught and suffering confiscation. In this paper, we give a near-optimal patrol allocation algorithm and a 1/2-approximation algorithm, the latter of which is more efficient and yields simpler, more practical patrol allocations. Our simulations indicate that these algorithms substantially outperform existing heuristic allocations.

In proof-of-payment transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about the transit system, inspecting the tickets of passengers, who face fines if caught fare evading. The deterrence of such fines depends on the unpredictability and effectiveness of the patrols. In this paper, we present TRUSTS, an application for scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems. TRUSTS models the problem of computing patrol strategies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game where the objective is to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. This problem differs from previously studied Stackelberg settings in that the leader strategies must satisfy massive temporal and spatial constraints; moreover, unlike in these counterterrorism-motivated Stackelberg applications, a large fraction of the ridership might realistically consider fare evasion, and so the number of followers is potentially huge. A third key novelty in our work is deliberate simplification of leader strategies to make patrols easier to be executed. We present an efficient algorithm for computing such patrol strategies and present experimental results using real-world ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s department has begun trials of TRUSTS.

In some urban transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about through the transit system, inspecting tickets of passengers, who face fines for fare evasion. This setting yields the problem of computing optimal patrol strategies satisfying certain temporal and spacial constraints, to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. In this paper we propose an initial model of this problem as a leader-follower Stackelberg game. We then formulate an LP relaxation of this problem and present initial experimental results using real-world ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system.

Illegal extraction of forest resources is fought, in many developing countries, by patrols through the forest that seek to deter such activity by decreasing its profitability. With limited resources for performing such patrols, a patrol strategy will seek to distribute the patrols throughout the forest, in space and time, in order to minimize the resulting amount of extraction that occurs or maximize the degree of forest protection, according to one of several potential metrics. We pose this problem as a Stackelberg game. We adopt and extend the simple, geometrically elegant model of (Albers 2010). First, we study optimal allocations of patrol density under generalizations of this model, relaxing several of its assumptions. Second, we pose the problem of generating actual schedules whose site visit frequencies are consistent with the analytically computed optimal patrol densities.