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 normative account


Hierarchical VAEs provide a normative account of motion processing in the primate brain

Neural Information Processing Systems

The relationship between perception and inference, as postulated by Helmholtz in the 19th century, is paralleled in modern machine learning by generative models like Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) and their hierarchical variants. Here, we evaluate the role of hierarchical inference and its alignment with brain function in the domain of motion perception. We first introduce a novel synthetic data framework, Retinal Optic Flow Learning (ROFL), which enables control over motion statistics and their causes. We then present a new hierarchical VAE and test it against alternative models on two downstream tasks: (i) predicting ground truth causes of retinal optic flow (e.g., self-motion); and (ii) predicting the responses of neurons in the motion processing pathway of primates. We manipulate the model architectures (hierarchical versus non-hierarchical), loss functions, and the causal structure of the motion stimuli.


Hierarchical VAEs provide a normative account of motion processing in the primate brain

Neural Information Processing Systems

The relationship between perception and inference, as postulated by Helmholtz in the 19th century, is paralleled in modern machine learning by generative models like Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) and their hierarchical variants. Here, we evaluate the role of hierarchical inference and its alignment with brain function in the domain of motion perception. We first introduce a novel synthetic data framework, Retinal Optic Flow Learning (ROFL), which enables control over motion statistics and their causes. We then present a new hierarchical VAE and test it against alternative models on two downstream tasks: (i) predicting ground truth causes of retinal optic flow (e.g., self-motion); and (ii) predicting the responses of neurons in the motion processing pathway of primates. We manipulate the model architectures (hierarchical versus non-hierarchical), loss functions, and the causal structure of the motion stimuli.


A normative account of defeasible and probabilistic inference

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

In this paper, we provide more evidence for the contention that logical consequence should be understood in normative terms. Hartry Field and John MacFarlane covered the classical case. We extend their work, examining what it means for an agent to be obliged to infer a conclusion when faced with uncertain information or reasoning within a non-monotonic, defeasible, logical framework (which allows e. g. for inference to be drawn from premises considered true unless evidence to the contrary is presented).