node injection
Learning the Structure of Large Networked Systems Obeying Conservation Laws
Many networked systems such as electric networks, the brain, and social networks of opinion dynamics are known to obey conservation laws. Examples of this phenomenon include the Kirchoff laws in electric networks and opinion consensus in social networks. Conservation laws in networked systems are modeled as balance equations of the form $X = B^\ast Y$, where the sparsity pattern of $B^\ast \in \mathbb{R}^{p\times p}$ captures the connectivity of the network on $p$ nodes, and $Y, X \in \mathbb{R}^p$ are vectors of ''potentials'' and ''injected flows'' at the nodes respectively. The node potentials $Y$ cause flows across edges which aim to balance out the potential difference, and the flows $X$ injected at the nodes are extraneous to the network dynamics. In several practical systems, the network structure is often unknown and needs to be estimated from data to facilitate modeling, management, and control.
83b7da3ed13f06c13ce82235c8eedf35-Paper-Conference.pdf
Despite the remarkable capabilities demonstrated by Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) in graph-related tasks, recent research has revealed the fairness vulnerabilities in GNNs when facing malicious adversarial attacks. However, all existing fairness attacks require manipulating the connectivity between existing nodes, which may be prohibited in reality. To this end, we introduce a N ode I njection-based F airness A ttack (NIFA), exploring the vulnerabilities of GNN fairness in such a more realistic setting. In detail, NIFA first designs two insightful principles for node injection operations, namely the uncertainty-maximization principle and homophily-increase principle, and then optimizes injected nodes' feature matrix to further ensure the effectiveness of fairness attacks. Comprehensive experiments on three real-world datasets consistently demonstrate that NIFA can significantly undermine the fairness of mainstream GNNs, even including fairness-aware GNNs, by injecting merely 1% of nodes. We sincerely hope that our work can stimulate increasing attention from researchers on the vulnerability of GNN fairness, and encourage the development of corresponding defense mechanisms.
Are Your Models Still Fair? Fairness Attacks on Graph Neural Networks via Node Injections
Despite the remarkable capabilities demonstrated by Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) in graph-related tasks, recent research has revealed the fairness vulnerabilities in GNNs when facing malicious adversarial attacks. However, all existing fairness attacks require manipulating the connectivity between existing nodes, which may be prohibited in reality. To this end, we introduce a Node Injection-based Fairness Attack (NIFA), exploring the vulnerabilities of GNN fairness in such a more realistic setting. In detail, NIFA first designs two insightful principles for node injection operations, namely the uncertainty-maximization principle and homophily-increase principle, and then optimizes injected nodes' feature matrix to further ensure the effectiveness of fairness attacks. Comprehensive experiments on three real-world datasets consistently demonstrate that NIFA can significantly undermine the fairness of mainstream GNNs, even including fairness-aware GNNs, by injecting merely 1% of nodes. We sincerely hope that our work can stimulate increasing attention from researchers on the vulnerability of GNN fairness, and encourage the development of corresponding defense mechanisms.
Are Your Models Still Fair? Fairness Attacks on Graph Neural Networks via Node Injections
Luo, Zihan, Huang, Hong, Zhou, Yongkang, Zhang, Jiping, Chen, Nuo
Despite the remarkable capabilities demonstrated by Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) in graph-related tasks, recent research has revealed the fairness vulnerabilities in GNNs when facing malicious adversarial attacks. However, all existing fairness attacks require manipulating the connectivity between existing nodes, which may be prohibited in reality. To this end, we introduce a Node Injection-based Fairness Attack (NIFA), exploring the vulnerabilities of GNN fairness in such a more realistic setting. In detail, NIFA first designs two insightful principles for node injection operations, namely the uncertainty-maximization principle and homophily-increase principle, and then optimizes injected nodes' feature matrix to further ensure the effectiveness of fairness attacks. Comprehensive experiments on three real-world datasets consistently demonstrate that NIFA can significantly undermine the fairness of mainstream GNNs, even including fairness-aware GNNs, by injecting merely 1% of nodes. We sincerely hope that our work can stimulate increasing attention from researchers on the vulnerability of GNN fairness, and encourage the development of corresponding defense mechanisms.
Node Injection for Class-specific Network Poisoning
Sharma, Ansh Kumar, Kukreja, Rahul, Kharbanda, Mayank, Chakraborty, Tanmoy
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are powerful in learning rich network representations that aid the performance of downstream tasks. However, recent studies showed that GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks involving node injection and network perturbation. Among these, node injection attacks are more practical as they don't require manipulation in the existing network and can be performed more realistically. In this paper, we propose a novel problem statement - a class-specific poison attack on graphs in which the attacker aims to misclassify specific nodes in the target class into a different class using node injection. Additionally, nodes are injected in such a way that they camouflage as benign nodes. We propose NICKI, a novel attacking strategy that utilizes an optimization-based approach to sabotage the performance of GNN-based node classifiers. NICKI works in two phases - it first learns the node representation and then generates the features and edges of the injected nodes. Extensive experiments and ablation studies on four benchmark networks show that NICKI is consistently better than four baseline attacking strategies for misclassifying nodes in the target class. We also show that the injected nodes are properly camouflaged as benign, thus making the poisoned graph indistinguishable from its clean version w.r.t various topological properties.