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 no-regret algorithm


Unified

Neural Information Processing Systems

Policy optimization, i.e. algorithms that learn to make sequential decisions by local search on the agent's policy directly, is a widely used class of algorithms in reinforcement learning [40, 44, 45].





No-regret Algorithms for Fair Resource Allocation

Neural Information Processing Systems

We consider a fair resource allocation problem in the no-regret setting against an unrestricted adversary. The objective is to allocate resources equitably among several agents in an online fashion so that the difference of the aggregate $\alpha$-fair utilities of the agents achieved by an optimal static clairvoyant allocation and the online policy grows sublinearly with time. The problem inherits its difficulty from the non-separable nature of the global $\alpha$-fairness function. Previously, it was shown that no online policy could achieve a sublinear standard regret in this problem. In this paper, we propose an efficient online resource allocation policy, called Online Fair Allocation ($\texttt{OFA}$), that achieves sublinear $c_\alpha$-approximate regret with approximation factor $c_\alpha=(1-\alpha)^{-(1-\alpha)}\leq 1.445,$ for $0\leq \alpha < 1$. Our upper bound on the $c_\alpha$-regret for this problem exhibits a surprising \emph{phase transition} phenomenon -- transitioning from a power-law to a constant at the critical exponent $\alpha=\frac{1}{2}.$


Breaking the Moments Condition Barrier: No-Regret Algorithm for Bandits with Super Heavy-Tailed Payoffs

Neural Information Processing Systems

Despite a large amount of effort in dealing with heavy-tailed error in machine learning, little is known when moments of the error can become non-existential: the random noise $\eta$ satisfies Pr$\left[|\eta| > |y|\right] \le 1/|y|^{\alpha}$ for some $\alpha > 0$. We make the first attempt to actively handle such super heavy-tailed noise in bandit learning problems: We propose a novel robust statistical estimator, mean of medians, which estimates a random variable by computing the empirical mean of a sequence of empirical medians. We then present a generic reductionist algorithmic framework for solving bandit learning problems (including multi-armed and linear bandit problem): the mean of medians estimator can be applied to nearly any bandit learning algorithm as a black-box filtering for its reward signals and obtain similar regret bound as if the reward is sub-Gaussian. We show that the regret bound is near-optimal even with very heavy-tailed noise. We also empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, which further corroborates our theoretical results.


Hardness of Online Sleeping Combinatorial Optimization Problems

Satyen Kale, Chansoo Lee, David Pal

Neural Information Processing Systems

We show that several online combinatorial optimization problems that admit efficient no-regret algorithms become computationally hard in the sleeping setting where a subset of actions becomes unavailable in each round. Specifically, we show that the sleeping versions of these problems are at least as hard as P AC learning DNF expressions, a long standing open problem.


Strategizing against No-regret Learners

Deng, Yuan, Schneider, Jon, Sivan, Balusubramanian

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

How should a player who repeatedly plays a game against a no-regret learner strategize to maximize his utility? We study this question and show that under some mild assumptions, the player can always guarantee himself a utility of at least what he would get in a Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. When the no-regret learner has only two actions, we show that the player cannot get any higher utility than the Stackelberg equilibrium utility. But when the no-regret learner has more than two actions and plays a mean-based no-regret strategy, we show that the player can get strictly higher than the Stackelberg equilibrium utility. We provide a characterization of the optimal game-play for the player against a mean-based no-regret learner as a solution to a control problem. When the no-regret learner's strategy also guarantees him a no-swap regret, we show that the player cannot get anything higher than a Stackelberg equilibrium utility.