Efficient exploration in deep cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) still remains challenging in complex coordination problems. In this paper, we introduce a novel Episodic Multi-agent reinforcement learning with Curiosity-driven exploration, called EMC. We leverage an insight of popular factorized MARL algorithms that the "induced" individual Q-values, i.e., the individual utility functions used for local execution, are the embeddings of local actionobservation histories, and can capture the interaction between agents due to reward backpropagation during centralized training. Therefore, we use prediction errors of individual Q-values as intrinsic rewards for coordinated exploration and utilize episodic memory to exploit explored informative experience to boost policy training. As the dynamics of an agent's individual Q-value function captures the novelty of states and the influence from other agents, our intrinsic reward can induce coordinated exploration to new or promising states. We illustrate the advantages of our method by didactic examples, and demonstrate its significant outperformance over state-of-the-art MARL baselines on challenging tasks in the StarCraft II micromanagement benchmark.

In the realm of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), achieving high performance is crucial for a successful multi-agent system.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

The modeling of ideal transition function inI2Q isfully decentralized and independent from the learned policies of other agents, helping I2Q be free from non-stationarity and learn the optimal policy.

Efficient exploration in deep cooperativemulti-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) still remains challenging in complex coordination problems.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently shown great promise as an approach to networked system control. Arguably, one of the most difficult and important tasks for which large scale networked system control is applicable is common-pool resource management. Crucial common-pool resources include arable land, fresh water, wetlands, wildlife, fish stock, forests and the atmosphere, of which proper management is related to some of society's greatest challenges such as food security, inequality and climate change. Here we take inspiration from a recent research program investigating the game-theoretic incentives of humans in social dilemma situations such as the well-known \textit{tragedy of the commons}. However, instead of focusing on biologically evolved human-like agents, our concern is rather to better understand the learning and operating behaviour of engineered networked systems comprising general-purpose reinforcement learning agents, subject only to nonbiological constraints such as memory, computation and communication bandwidth. Harnessing tools from empirical game-theoretic analysis, we analyse the differences in resulting solution concepts that stem from employing different information structures in the design of networked multi-agent systems. These information structures pertain to the type of information shared between agents as well as the employed communication protocol and network topology. Our analysis contributes new insights into the consequences associated with certain design choices and provides an additional dimension of comparison between systems beyond efficiency, robustness, scalability and mean control performance.

Communication is one of the effective means to improve the learning of cooperative policy in multi-agent systems. However, in most real-world scenarios, lossy communication is a prevalent issue. Existing multi-agent reinforcement learning with communication, due to their limited scalability and robustness, struggles to apply to complex and dynamic real-world environments. To address these challenges, we propose a generalized communication-constrained model to uniformly characterize communication conditions across different scenarios. Based on this, we utilize it as a learning prior to distinguish between lossy and lossless messages for specific scenarios. Additionally, we decouple the impact of lossy and lossless messages on distributed decision-making, drawing on a dual mutual information estimatior, and introduce a communication-constrained multi-agent reinforcement learning framework, quantifying the impact of communication messages into the global reward. Finally, we validate the effectiveness of our approach across several communication-constrained benchmarks.

Conflict resolution and consensus building represent critical challenges in multi-agent systems, negotiations, and collaborative decision-making processes. This paper introduces Dialogue Diplomats, a novel end-to-end multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework designed for automated conflict resolution and consensus building in complex, dynamic environments. The proposed system integrates advanced deep reinforcement learning architectures with dialogue-based negotiation protocols, enabling autonomous agents to engage in sophisticated conflict resolution through iterative communication and strategic adaptation. We present three primary contributions: first, a novel Hierarchical Consensus Network (HCN) architecture that combines attention mechanisms with graph neural networks to model inter-agent dependencies and conflict dynamics. second, a Progressive Negotiation Protocol (PNP) that structures multi-round dialogue interactions with adaptive concession strategies; and third, a Context-Aware Reward Shaping mechanism that balances individual agent objectives with collective consensus goals.

Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems. Abstract models of common-pool resource appropriation based on non-cooperative game theory predict that self-interested agents will generally fail to find socially positive equilibria---a phenomenon called the tragedy of the commons. However, in reality, human societies are sometimes able to discover and implement stable cooperative solutions. Decades of behavioral game theory research have sought to uncover aspects of human behavior that make this possible.

Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation.