Mental representation, characterized by structured internal models mirroring external environments, is fundamental to advanced cognition but remains challenging to investigate empirically. Existing theory hypothesizes that second-order learning -- learning mechanisms that adapt first-order learning (i.e., learning about the task/domain) -- promotes the emergence of such environment-cognition isomorphism. In this paper, we empirically validate this hypothesis by proposing a hierarchical architecture comprising a Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) as a first-order learner and an MLP controller as a second-order learner. The GCN directly maps node-level features to predictions of optimal navigation paths, while the MLP dynamically adapts the GCN's parameters when confronting structurally novel maze environments. We demonstrate that second-order learning is particularly effective when the cognitive system develops an internal mental map structurally isomorphic to the environment. Quantitative and qualitative results highlight significant performance improvements and robust generalization on unseen maze tasks, providing empirical support for the pivotal role of structured mental representations in maximizing the effectiveness of second-order learning.

In explanations, explainers have mental representations of explainees' developing knowledge and shifting interests regarding the explanandum. These mental representations are dynamic in nature and develop over time, thereby enabling explainers to react to explainees' needs by adapting and customizing the explanation. XAI should be able to react to explainees' needs in a similar manner. Therefore, a component that incorporates aspects of explainers' mental representations of explainees is required. In this study, we took first steps by investigating explainers' mental representations in everyday explanations of technological artifacts. According to the dual nature theory, technological artifacts require explanations with two distinct perspectives, namely observable and measurable features addressing "Architecture" or interpretable aspects addressing "Relevance". We conducted extended semi structured pre-, post- and video recall-interviews with explainers (N=9) in the context of an explanation. The transcribed interviews were analyzed utilizing qualitative content analysis. The explainers' answers regarding the explainees' knowledge and interests with regard to the technological artifact emphasized the vagueness of early assumptions of explainers toward strong beliefs in the course of explanations. The assumed knowledge of explainees in the beginning is centered around Architecture and develops toward knowledge with regard to both Architecture and Relevance. In contrast, explainers assumed higher interests in Relevance in the beginning to interests regarding both Architecture and Relevance in the further course of explanations. Further, explainers often finished the explanation despite their perception that explainees still had gaps in knowledge. These findings are transferred into practical implications relevant for user models for adaptive explainable systems.

The conceptualization and categorization of natural objects in the human mind have long intrigued cognitive scientists and neuroscientists, offering crucial insights into human perception and cognition. Recently, the rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs) has raised the attractive question of whether these models can also develop human-like object representations through exposure to vast amounts of linguistic and multimodal data. In this study, we combined behavioral and neuroimaging analysis methods to uncover how the object concept representations in LLMs correlate with those of humans. By collecting large-scale datasets of 4.7 million triplet judgments from LLM and Multimodal LLM (MLLM), we were able to derive low-dimensional embeddings that capture the underlying similarity structure of 1,854 natural objects. The resulting 66-dimensional embeddings were found to be highly stable and predictive, and exhibited semantic clustering akin to human mental representations. Interestingly, the interpretability of the dimensions underlying these embeddings suggests that LLM and MLLM have developed human-like conceptual representations of natural objects. Further analysis demonstrated strong alignment between the identified model embeddings and neural activity patterns in many functionally defined brain ROIs (e.g., EBA, PPA, RSC and FFA). This provides compelling evidence that the object representations in LLMs, while not identical to those in the human, share fundamental commonalities that reflect key schemas of human conceptual knowledge. This study advances our understanding of machine intelligence and informs the development of more human-like artificial cognitive systems.

This paper examines the question of whether Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT possess minds, focusing specifically on whether they have a genuine folk psychology encompassing beliefs, desires, and intentions. We approach this question by investigating two key aspects: internal representations and dispositions to act. First, we survey various philosophical theories of representation, including informational, causal, structural, and teleosemantic accounts, arguing that LLMs satisfy key conditions proposed by each. We draw on recent interpretability research in machine learning to support these claims. Second, we explore whether LLMs exhibit robust dispositions to perform actions, a necessary component of folk psychology. We consider two prominent philosophical traditions, interpretationism and representationalism, to assess LLM action dispositions. While we find evidence suggesting LLMs may satisfy some criteria for having a mind, particularly in game-theoretic environments, we conclude that the data remains inconclusive. Additionally, we reply to several skeptical challenges to LLM folk psychology, including issues of sensory grounding, the "stochastic parrots" argument, and concerns about memorization. Our paper has three main upshots. First, LLMs do have robust internal representations. Second, there is an open question to answer about whether LLMs have robust action dispositions. Third, existing skeptical challenges to LLM representation do not survive philosophical scrutiny.

Many aspects of human learning have been proposed as a process of constructing mental programs: from acquiring symbolic number representations to intuitive theories about the world. In parallel, there is a long-tradition of using information processing to model human cognition through Rate Distortion Theory (RDT). Yet, it is still poorly understood how to apply RDT when mental representations take the form of programs. In this work, we adapt RDT by proposing a three way trade-off among rate (description length), distortion (error), and computational costs (search budget). We use simulations on a melody task to study the implications of this trade-off, and show that constructing a shared program library across tasks provides global benefits. However, this comes at the cost of sensitivity to curricula, which is also characteristic of human learners. Finally, we use methods from partial information decomposition to generate training curricula that induce more effective libraries and better generalization.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Simulating sampling algorithms with people has proven a useful method for efficiently probing and understanding their mental representations. We propose that the same methods can be used to study the representations of Large Language Models (LLMs). While one can always directly prompt either humans or LLMs to disclose their mental representations introspectively, we show that increased efficiency can be achieved by using LLMs as elements of a sampling algorithm. We explore the extent to which we recover human-like representations when LLMs are interrogated with Direct Sampling and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). We found a significant increase in efficiency and performance using adaptive sampling algorithms based on MCMC. We also highlight the potential of our method to yield a more general method of conducting Bayesian inference \textit{with} LLMs.

Horizontal (automatic) and vertical (control) processes have been observed and reported for a long time in translation production. Schaeffer and Carl's Monitor Model integrates these two processes into one framework, assuming that priming mechanisms underlie horizontal/automatic processes, while vertical/monitoring processes implement consciously accessible control mechanisms. The Monitor Model has been criticized in various ways and several misconceptions have accumulated over the past years. In this chapter, I update the Monitor Model with additional evidence and argue that it is compatible with an enactivist approach to cognition. I address several misconceptions related to the Monitor Model.