Belief change studies how to update knowledge bases used for reasoning. Traditionally belief revision has been based on full propositional logic. However, reasoning with full propositional knowledge bases is computationally hard, whereas reasoning with Horn knowledge bases is fast. In the past several years, there has been considerable work in belief revision theory on developing a theory of belief contraction for knowledge represented in Horn form. Our main focus here is the computational complexity of belief contraction, and, in particular, of various methods and approaches suggested in the literature. This is a natural and important question, especially in connection with one of the primary motivations for considering Horn representation: efficiency. The problems considered lead to questions about Horn envelopes (or Horn LUBs), introduced earlier in the context of knowledge compilation. This work gives a syntactic characterization of the remainders of a Horn belief set with respect to a consequence to be contracted, as the Horn envelopes of the belief set and an elementary conjunction corresponding to a truth assignment satisfying a certain explicitly given formula. This gives an efficient algorithm to generate all remainders, each represented by a truth assignment. On the negative side, examples are given of Horn belief sets and consequences where Horn formulas representing the result of contraction, based either on remainders or on weak remainders, must have exponential size for almost all possible choice functions (i.e., different possible choices of partial meet contraction). Therefore using the Horn framework for belief contraction does not by itself give us computational efficiency. Further work is required to explore the possibilities for efficient belief change methods.

Standard belief change assumes an underlying logic containing full classical propositional logic. However, there are good reasons for considering belief change in less expressive logics as well. In this paper we build on recent investigations by Delgrande on contraction for Horn logic. We show that the standard basic form of contraction, partial meet, is too strong in the Horn case. This result stands in contrast to Delgrandes conjecture that orderly maxichoice is the appropriate form of contraction for Horn logic. We then define a more appropriate notion of basic contraction for the Horn case, influenced by the convexity property holding for full propositional logic and which we refer to as infra contraction. The main contribution of this work is a result which shows that the construction method for Horn contraction for belief sets based on our infra remainder sets corresponds exactly to Hanssons classical kernel contraction for belief sets, when restricted to Horn logic. This result is obtained via a detour through contraction for belief bases. We prove that kernel contraction for belief bases produces precisely the same results as the belief base version of infra contraction. The use of belief bases to obtain this result provides evidence for the conjecture that Horn belief change is best viewed as a 'hybrid' version of belief set change and belief base change. One of the consequences of the link with base contraction is the provision of a representation result for Horn contraction for belief sets in which a version of the Core-retainment postulate features.

A recent direction within belief revision theory is to develop a theory of belief change for the Horn knowledge representation framework. We consider questions related to the complexity aspects of previous work, leading to questions about Horn envelopes (or Horn LUB’s), introduced earlier in the context of knowledge compilation. A characterization is obtained of the remainders of a Horn be- lief set with respect to a consequence to be contracted, as the Horn envelopes of the belief set and an elementary conjunction corresponding to a truth assignment satisfying a certain body building formula. This gives an efficient algorithm to generate all remainders, each represented by a truth assignment. On the negative side, examples are given of Horn belief sets and consequences where Horn formulas representing the result of most contraction operators, based either on remainders or on weak remainders, must have exponential size.

Standard belief contraction assumes an underlying logic containing full classical propositional logic, but there are good reasons for considering contraction in less expressive logics. In this paper we focus on Horn logic. In addition to being of interest in its own right, our choice is motivated by the use of Horn logic in several areas, including ontology reasoning in description logics. We consider three versions of contraction: entailment-based and inconsistency-basedcontraction (e-contraction and i-contraction, resp.), introduced by Delgrande for Horn logic, and package contraction (p-contraction), studied by Fuhrmann and Hansson for the classical case. We show that the standard basic form of contraction, partial meet, is too strong in the Horn case. We define more appropriate notions of basic contraction for all three types above, and provide associated representation results in terms of postulates. Our results stand in contrast to Delgrande's conjectures that orderly maxichoice is the appropriate contraction for both e- and i-contraction. Our interest in p-contraction stems from its relationship with an important reasoning task in ontological reasoning:repairing the subsumption hierarchy in EL. This is closely related to p-contraction with sets of basic Horn clauses (Horn clauses of the form p -> q). We show that this restricted version of p-contraction can also be represented as i-contraction.