Electronic health records contain detailed information about the medical condition of patients, but they are difficult for patients to understand even if they have access to them. We explore whether ChatGPT (GPT 4) can help explain multidisciplinary team (MDT) reports to colorectal and prostate cancer patients. These reports are written in dense medical language and assume clinical knowledge, so they are a good test of the ability of ChatGPT to explain complex medical reports to patients. We asked clinicians and lay people (not patients) to review explanations and responses of ChatGPT. We also ran three focus groups (including cancer patients, caregivers, computer scientists, and clinicians) to discuss output of ChatGPT. Our studies highlighted issues with inaccurate information, inappropriate language, limited personalization, AI distrust, and challenges integrating large language models (LLMs) into clinical workflow. These issues will need to be resolved before LLMs can be used to explain complex personal medical information to patients.

Deep automation provided by self-organizing network (SON) features and their emerging variants such as zero touch automation solutions is a key enabler for increasingly dense wireless networks and pervasive Internet of Things (IoT). To realize their objectives, most automation functionalities rely on the Minimization of Drive Test (MDT) reports. The MDT reports are used to generate inferences about network state and performance, thus dynamically change network parameters accordingly. However, the collection of MDT reports from commodity user devices, particularly low cost IoT devices, make them a vulnerable entry point to launch an adversarial attack on emerging deeply automated wireless networks. This adds a new dimension to the security threats in the IoT and cellular networks. Existing literature on IoT, SON, or zero touch automation does not address this important problem. In this paper, we investigate an impactful, first of its kind adversarial attack that can be launched by exploiting the malicious MDT reports from the compromised user equipment (UE). We highlight the detrimental repercussions of this attack on the performance of common network automation functions. We also propose a novel Malicious MDT Reports Identification framework (MRIF) as a countermeasure to detect and eliminate the malicious MDT reports using Machine Learning and verify it through a use-case. Thus, the defense mechanism can provide the resilience and robustness for zero touch automation SON engines against the adversarial MDT attacks