Modern-world robotics involves complex environments where multiple autonomous agents must interact with each other and other humans. This necessitates advanced interactive multi-agent motion planning techniques. Generalized Nash equilibrium(GNE), a solution concept in constrained game theory, provides a mathematical model to predict the outcome of interactive motion planning, where each agent needs to account for other agents in the environment. However, in practice, multiple local GNEs may exist. Finding a single GNE itself is complex as it requires solving coupled constrained optimal control problems. Furthermore, finding all such local GNEs requires exploring the solution space of GNEs, which is a challenging task. This work proposes the MultiNash-PF framework to efficiently compute multiple local GNEs in constrained trajectory games. Potential games are a class of games for which a local GNE of a trajectory game can be found by solving a single constrained optimal control problem. We propose MultiNash-PF that integrates the potential game approach with implicit particle filtering, a sample-efficient method for non-convex trajectory optimization. We first formulate the underlying game as a constrained potential game and then utilize the implicit particle filtering to identify the coarse estimates of multiple local minimizers of the game's potential function. MultiNash-PF then refines these estimates with optimization solvers, obtaining different local GNEs. We show through numerical simulations that MultiNash-PF reduces computation time by up to 50\% compared to a baseline approach.

Zero-sum games arise in a wide variety of problems, including robust optimization and adversarial learning. However, algorithms deployed for finding a local Nash equilibrium in these games often converge to non-Nash stationary points. This highlights a key challenge: for any algorithm, the stability properties of its underlying dynamical system can cause non-Nash points to be potential attractors. To overcome this challenge, algorithms must account for subtleties involving the curvatures of players' costs. To this end, we leverage dynamical system theory and develop a second-order algorithm for finding a local Nash equilibrium in the smooth, possibly nonconvex-nonconcave, zero-sum game setting. First, we prove that this novel method guarantees convergence to only local Nash equilibria with a local linear convergence rate. We then interpret a version of this method as a modified Gauss-Newton algorithm with local superlinear convergence to the neighborhood of a point that satisfies first-order local Nash equilibrium conditions. In comparison, current related state-of-the-art methods do not offer convergence rate guarantees. Furthermore, we show that this approach naturally generalizes to settings with convex and potentially coupled constraints while retaining earlier guarantees of convergence to only local (generalized) Nash equilibria.

We propose local symplectic surgery, a two-timescale procedure for finding local Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. We first show that previous gradient-based algorithms cannot guarantee convergence to local Nash equilibria due to the existence of non-Nash stationary points. By taking advantage of the differential structure of the game, we construct an algorithm for which the local Nash equilibria are the only attracting fixed points. We also show that the algorithm exhibits no oscillatory behaviors in neighborhoods of equilibria and show that it has the same per-iteration complexity as other recently proposed algorithms. We conclude by validating the algorithm on two numerical examples: a toy example with multiple Nash equilibria and a non-Nash equilibrium, and the training of a small generative adversarial network (GAN).

Generative adversarial networks (GANs) evolved into one of the most successful unsupervised techniques for generating realistic images. Even though it has recently been shown that GAN training converges, GAN models often end up in local Nash equilibria that are associated with mode collapse or otherwise fail to model the target distribution. We introduce Coulomb GANs, which pose the GAN learning problem as a potential field of charged particles, where generated samples are attracted to training set samples but repel each other. The discriminator learns a potential field while the generator decreases the energy by moving its samples along the vector (force) field determined by the gradient of the potential field. Through decreasing the energy, the GAN model learns to generate samples according to the whole target distribution and does not only cover some of its modes. We prove that Coulomb GANs possess only one Nash equilibrium which is optimal in the sense that the model distribution equals the target distribution. We show the efficacy of Coulomb GANs on a variety of image datasets. On LSUN and celebA, Coulomb GANs set a new state of the art and produce a previously unseen variety of different samples.