Collective decision-making is vital for recent information and communications technologies. In our previous research, we mathematically derived conflict-free joint decision-making that optimally satisfies players' probabilistic preference profiles. However, two problems exist regarding the optimal joint decision-making method. First, as the number of choices increases, the computational cost of calculating the optimal joint selection probability matrix explodes. Second, to derive the optimal joint selection probability matrix, all players must disclose their probabilistic preferences. Now, it is noteworthy that explicit calculation of the joint probability distribution is not necessarily needed; what is necessary for collective decisions is sampling. This study examines several sampling methods that converge to heuristic joint selection probability matrices that satisfy players' preferences. We show that they can significantly reduce the above problems of computational cost and confidentiality. We analyze the probability distribution each of the sampling methods converges to, as well as the computational cost required and the confidentiality secured. In particular, we introduce two conflict-free joint sampling methods through quantum interference of photons. The first system allows the players to hide their choices while satisfying the players' preferences almost perfectly when they have the same preferences. The second system, where the physical nature of light replaces the expensive computational cost, also conceals their choices under the assumption that they have a trusted third party. This paper has been published in Phys. Rev. Applied 18, 064018 (2022) (DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.18.064018).

We all have preferences when multiple choices are available. If we insist on satisfying our preferences only, we may suffer a loss due to conflicts with other people's identical selections. Such a case applies when the choice cannot be divided into multiple pieces due to the intrinsic nature of the resources. Former studies, such as the top trading cycle, examined how to conduct fair joint decision-making while avoiding decision conflicts from the perspective of game theory when multiple players have their own deterministic preference profiles. However, in reality, probabilistic preferences can naturally appear in relation to the stochastic decision-making of humans. Here, we theoretically derive conflict-free joint decision-making that can satisfy the probabilistic preferences of all individual players. More specifically, we mathematically prove the conditions wherein the deviation of the resultant chance of obtaining each choice from the individual preference profile, which we call the loss, becomes zero, meaning that all players' satisfaction is perfectly appreciated while avoiding decision conflicts. Furthermore, even in situations where zero-loss conflict-free joint decision-making is unachievable, we show how to derive joint decision-making that accomplishes the theoretical minimum loss while ensuring conflict-free choices. Numerical demonstrations are also shown with several benchmarks.