Generative search engines based on large language models (LLMs) are replacing traditional search, fundamentally changing how information providers are compensated. To sustain this ecosystem, we need fair mechanisms to attribute and compensate content providers based on their contributions to generated answers. We introduce MaxShapley, an efficient algorithm for fair attribution in generative search pipelines that use retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). MaxShapley is a special case of the celebrated Shapley value; it leverages a decomposable max-sum utility function to compute attributions with linear computation in the number of documents, as opposed to the exponential cost of Shapley values. We evaluate MaxShapley on three multi-hop QA datasets (HotPotQA, MuSiQUE, MS MARCO); MaxShapley achieves comparable attribution quality to exact Shapley computation, while consuming a fraction of its tokens--for instance, it gives up to an 8x reduction in resource consumption over prior state-of-the-art methods at the same attribution accuracy.

Is it possible to integrate a humanoid social robot into the work processes or customer care in an official environment, e.g. in municipal offices? If so, what could such an application scenario look like and what skills would the robot need to have when interacting with human customers? What are requirements for this kind of interactions? We have devised an application scenario for such a case, determined the necessary or desirable capabilities of the robot, developed a corresponding robot application and carried out initial tests and evaluations in a project together with the Kiel City Council. One of the most important insights gained in the project was that a humanoid robot with natural language processing capabilities based on large language models as well as human-like gestures and posture changes (animations) proved to be much more preferred by users compared to standard browser-based solutions on tablets for an information system in the City Council. Furthermore, we propose a connection of the ACT-R cognitive architecture with the robot, where an ACT-R model is used in interaction with the robot application to cognitively process and enhance a dialogue between human and robot.

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This paper studies the benefit for information providers in free public information disclosure in settings where the prospective information buyers are people. The underlying model, which applies to numerous real-life situations, considers a standard decision making setting where the decision maker is uncertain about the outcomes of her decision. The information provider can fully disambiguate this uncertainty and wish to maximize her profit from selling such information. We use a series of AMT-based experiments with people to test the benefit for the information provider from reducing some of the uncertainty associated with the decision maker's problem, for free. Free information disclosure of this kind can be proved to be ineffective when the buyer is a fully-rational agent. Yet, when it comes to people we manage to demonstrate that a substantial improvement in the information provider's profit can be achieved with such an approach. The analysis of the results reveals that the primary reason for this phenomena is people's failure to consider the strategic nature of the interaction with the information provider. Peoples' inability to properly calculate the value of information is found to be secondary in its influence.

With the increasing interest in the role information providers play in multi-agent systems, much effort has been dedicated to analyzing strategic information disclosure and signaling by such agents. This paper analyzes the problem in the context of auctions (specifically for second-price auctions). It provides an equilibrium analysis to the case where the information provider can use signaling according to some pre-committed scheme before introducing its regular (costly) information selling offering. The signal provided, publicly discloses (for free) some of the information held by the information provider. Providing the signaling is thus somehow counter intuitive as the information provider ultimately attempts to maximize her gain from selling the information she holds. Still, we show that such signaling capability can be highly beneficial for the information provider and even improve social welfare. Furthermore, the examples provided demonstrate various possible other beneficial behaviors available to the different players as well as to a market designer, such as paying the information provider to leave the system or commit to a specific signaling scheme. Finally, the paper provides an extension of the underlying model, related to the use of mixed signaling strategies.