We initiate the study of behavioral information design through deep learning. In information design, a sender aims to persuade a receiver to take certain actions by strategically revealing information. We address scenarios in which the receiver might exhibit different behavior patterns other than the standard Bayesian rational assumption. We propose HAIDNet, a neural-network-based optimization framework for information design that can adapt to multiple representations of human behavior. Through extensive simulation, we show that HAIDNet can not only recover information policies that are near-optimal compared with known analytical solutions, but also can extend to designing information policies for settings that are computationally challenging (e.g., when there are multiple receivers) or for settings where there are no known solutions in general (e.g., when the receiver behavior does not follow the Bayesian rational assumption). We also conduct real-world human-subject experiments and demonstrate that our framework can capture human behavior from data and lead to more effective information policy for real-world human receivers.

To thrive in those environments, the agent needs to influence other agents so their actions become more helpful and less harmful. Research in computational economics distills two ways to influence others directly: by providing tangible goods ( mechanism design) and by providing information ( information design). This work investigates information design problems for a group of RL agents. The main challenges are two-fold. One is the information provided will immediately affect the transition of the agent trajectories, which introduces additional non-stationarity. The other is the information can be ignored, so the sender must provide information that the receiver is willing to respect.

To thrive in those environments, the agent needs to influence other agents so their actions become more helpful and less harmful. Research in computational economics distills two ways to influence others directly: by providing tangible goods ( mechanism design) and by providing information ( information design). This work investigates information design problems for a group of RL agents. The main challenges are two-fold. One is the information provided will immediately affect the transition of the agent trajectories, which introduces additional non-stationarity. The other is the information can be ignored, so the sender must provide information that the receiver is willing to respect.

We initiate the study of behavioral information design through deep learning.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is inspired by the way human infants and animals learn from the environment. The setting is somewhat idealized because, in actual tasks, other agents in the environment have their own goals and behave adaptively to the ego agent. To thrive in those environments, the agent needs to influence other agents so their actions become more helpful and less harmful. Research in computational economics distills two ways to influence others directly: by providing tangible goods (mechanism design) and by providing information (information design). This work investigates information design problems for a group of RL agents.

We initiate the study of $\textit{behavioral information design}$ through deep learning. In information design, a $\textit{sender}$ aims to persuade a $\textit{receiver}$ to take certain actions by strategically revealing information. We address scenarios in which the receiver might exhibit different behavior patterns other than the standard Bayesian rational assumption. We propose HAIDNet, a neural-network-based optimization framework for information design that can adapt to multiple representations of human behavior. Through extensive simulation, we show that HAIDNet can not only recover information policies that are near-optimal compared with known analytical solutions, but also can extend to designing information policies for settings that are computationally challenging (e.g., when there are multiple receivers) or for settings where there are no known solutions in general (e.g., when the receiver behavior does not follow the Bayesian rational assumption). We also conduct real-world human-subject experiments and demonstrate that our framework can capture human behavior from data and lead to more effective information policy for real-world human receivers.

To thrive in those environments, the agent needs to influence other agents so their actions become more helpful and less harmful. Research in computational economics distills two ways to influence others directly: by providing tangible goods ( mechanism design) and by providing information ( information design). This work investigates information design problems for a group of RL agents. The main challenges are two-fold. One is the information provided will immediately affect the transition of the agent trajectories, which introduces additional non-stationarity. The other is the information can be ignored, so the sender must provide information that the receiver is willing to respect.

To thrive in those environments, the agent needs to influence other agents so their actions become more helpful and less harmful. Research in computational economics distills two ways to influence others directly: by providing tangible goods ( mechanism design) and by providing information ( information design). This work investigates information design problems for a group of RL agents. The main challenges are two-fold. One is the information provided will immediately affect the transition of the agent trajectories, which introduces additional non-stationarity. The other is the information can be ignored, so the sender must provide information that the receiver is willing to respect.

-- In this work, we investigate a steering problem in a mediator-augmented two-player normal-form game, where the mediator aims to guide players toward a specific action profile through information and incentive design. We first characterize the games for which successful steering is possible. Moreover, we establish that steering players to any desired action profile is not always achievable with information design alone, nor when accompanied with sublinear payment schemes. Consequently, we derive a lower bound on the constant payments required per round to achieve this goal. T o address these limitations incurred with information design, we introduce an augmented approach that involves a one-shot information design phase before the start of the repeated game, transforming the prior interaction into a Stackelberg game. Finally, we theoretically demonstrate that this approach improves the convergence rate of players' action profiles to the target point by a constant factor with high probability, and support it with empirical results.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is inspired by the way human infants and animals learn from the environment. The setting is somewhat idealized because, in actual tasks, other agents in the environment have their own goals and behave adaptively to the ego agent. To thrive in those environments, the agent needs to influence other agents so their actions become more helpful and less harmful. Research in computational economics distills two ways to influence others directly: by providing tangible goods (mechanism design) and by providing information (information design). This work investigates information design problems for a group of RL agents.