We study the regret in stochastic Multi-Armed Bandits (MAB) with multiple agents that communicate over an arbitrary connected communication graph. We analyzed a variant of Cooperative Successive Elimination algorithm, $\texttt{Coop-SE}$, and show an individual regret bound of ${O}(\mathcal{R} / m + A^2 + A \sqrt{\log T})$ and a nearly matching lower bound. Here $A$ is the number of actions, $T$ the time horizon, $m$ the number of agents, and $\mathcal{R} = \sum_{\Delta_i > 0}\log(T)/\Delta_i$ is the optimal single agent regret, where $\Delta_i$ is the sub-optimality gap of action $i$. Our work is the first to show an individual regret bound in cooperative stochastic MAB that is independent of the graph's diameter. When considering communication networks there are additional considerations beyond regret, such as message size and number of communication rounds. First, we show that our regret bound holds even if we restrict the messages to be of logarithmic size. Second, for logarithmic number of communication rounds, we obtain a regret bound of ${O}(\mathcal{R} / m+A \log T)$.

Double Auction enables decentralized transfer of goods between multiple buyers and sellers, thus underpinning functioning of many online marketplaces. Buyers and sellers compete in these markets through bidding, but do not often know their own valuation a-priori. As the allocation and pricing happens through bids, the profitability of participants, hence sustainability of such markets, depends crucially on learning respective valuations through repeated interactions. We initiate the study of Double Auction markets under bandit feedback on both buyers' and sellers' side. We show with confidence bound based bidding, and'Average Pricing' there is an efficient price discovery among the participants.

Recent work on deriving O(log T) anytime regret bounds for stochastic dueling bandit problems has considered mostly Condorcet winners, which do not always exist, and more recently, winners defined by the Copeland set, which do always exist. In this work, we consider a broad notion of winners defined by tournament solutions in social choice theory, which include the Copeland set as a special case but also include several other notions of winners such as the top cycle, uncovered set, and Banks set, and which, like the Copeland set, always exist. We develop a family of UCB-style dueling bandit algorithms for such general tournament solutions, and show O(log T) anytime regret bounds for them. Experiments confirm the ability of our algorithms to achieve low regret relative to the target winning set of interest.

However, a theoretical understanding of their success in practice is still a mystery. Moreover, recent advances [34] on fast convergence in games are limited to no-regret algorithms such as online mirror descent, which satisfy stability.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

We show with confidence bound based bidding, and'Average Pricing' there

We study agents communicating over an underlying network by exchanging messages, in order to optimize their individual regret in a common nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problem. We derive regret minimization algorithms that guarantee for each agent $v$ an individual expected regret of $\widetilde{O}\left(\sqrt{\left(1+\frac{K}{\left|\mathcal{N}\left(v\right)\right|}\right)T}\right)$, where $T$ is the number of time steps, $K$ is the number of actions and $\mathcal{N}\left(v\right)$ is the set of neighbors of agent $v$ in the communication graph. We present algorithms both for the case that the communication graph is known to all the agents, and for the case that the graph is unknown. When the graph is unknown, each agent knows only the set of its neighbors and an upper bound on the total number of agents. The individual regret between the models differs only by a logarithmic factor.

Decentralized cooperative multi-agent multi-armed bandits (DeCMA2B) considers how multiple agents collaborate in a decentralized multi-armed bandit setting. Though this problem has been extensively studied in previous work, most existing methods remain susceptible to various adversarial attacks. In this paper, we first study DeCMA2B with adversarial corruption, where an adversary can corrupt reward observations of all agents with a limited corruption budget. We propose a robust algorithm, called DeMABAR, which ensures that each agent's individual regret suffers only an additive term proportional to the corruption budget. Then we consider a more realistic scenario where the adversary can only attack a small number of agents. Our theoretical analysis shows that the DeMABAR algorithm can also almost completely eliminate the influence of adversarial attacks and is inherently robust in the Byzantine setting, where an unknown fraction of the agents can be Byzantine, i.e., may arbitrarily select arms and communicate wrong information. We also conduct numerical experiments to illustrate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed method.

In two-player zero-sum games, the learning dynamic based on optimistic Hedge achieves one of the best-known regret upper bounds among strongly-uncoupled learning dynamics. With an appropriately chosen learning rate, the social and individual regrets can be bounded by $O(\log(mn))$ in terms of the numbers of actions $m$ and $n$ of the two players. This study investigates the optimality of the dependence on $m$ and $n$ in the regret of optimistic Hedge. To this end, we begin by refining existing regret analysis and show that, in the strongly-uncoupled setting where the opponent's number of actions is known, both the social and individual regret bounds can be improved to $O(\sqrt{\log m \log n})$. In this analysis, we express the regret upper bound as an optimization problem with respect to the learning rates and the coefficients of certain negative terms, enabling refined analysis of the leading constants. We then show that the existing social regret bound as well as these new social and individual regret upper bounds cannot be further improved for optimistic Hedge by providing algorithm-dependent individual regret lower bounds. Importantly, these social regret upper and lower bounds match exactly including the constant factor in the leading term. Finally, building on these results, we improve the last-iterate convergence rate and the dynamic regret of a learning dynamic based on optimistic Hedge, and complement these bounds with algorithm-dependent dynamic regret lower bounds that match the improved bounds.