Recently, Language Models (LMs) have demonstrated complex reasoning capacities even without any finetuning.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called $\alpha$-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or $\alpha$-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

Recently, Language Models (LMs) have demonstrated complex reasoning capacities even without any finetuning.

Making decisions in the presence of a strategic opponent requires one to take into account the opponent's ability to actively mask its intended objective. To describe such strategic situations, we introduce the non-cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (N-CIRL) formalism. The N-CIRL formalism consists of two agents with completely misaligned objectives, where only one of the agents knows the true objective function.

Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main technical results that lift this conclusion to games of incomplete information, a.k.a., Bayesian games. First, near-optimal welfare in Bayesian games follows directly from the smoothness-based proof of near-optimal welfare in the same game when the private information is public.

While existing benchmarks probe the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) across diverse domains, they predominantly assess passive reasoning, providing models with all the information needed to reach a solution. By contrast, active reasoning-where an LLM must interact with external systems to acquire missing evidence or data-has received little systematic attention. To address this shortfall, we present AR-Bench, a novel benchmark designed explicitly to evaluate an LLM's active reasoning skills. AR-Bench comprises three task families-detective cases, situation puzzles, and guessing numbers-that together simulate real-world, agentic scenarios and measure performance across commonsense, logical, and symbolic reasoning challenges. Empirical evaluation on AR-Bench demonstrates that contemporary LLMs exhibit pronounced difficulties with active reasoning: they frequently fail to acquire or leverage the information needed to solve tasks. This gap highlights a stark divergence between their passive and active reasoning abilities. Moreover, ablation studies indicate that even advanced strategies, such as tree-based searching or post-training approaches, yield only modest gains and fall short of the levels required for real-world deployment. Collectively, these findings highlight the critical need to advance methodology for active reasoning, e.g., incorporating interactive learning, real-time feedback loops, and environment-aware objectives for training. The benchmark is publicly available at: https://github.com/tmlr-group/AR-Bench.

This paper examines the significance of weak permissions in criminal trials (\emph{judicial permission}). It introduces a dialogue game model to systematically address judicial permissions, considering different standards of proof and argumentation semantics.

Online Federated Learning (OFL) is a real-time learning paradigm that sequentially executes parameter aggregation immediately for each random arriving client. To motivate clients to participate in OFL, it is crucial to offer appropriate incentives to offset the training resource consumption. However, the design of incentive mechanisms in OFL is constrained by the dynamic variability of Two-sided Incomplete Information (TII) concerning resources, where the server is unaware of the clients' dynamically changing computational resources, while clients lack knowledge of the real-time communication resources allocated by the server. To incentivize clients to participate in training by offering dynamic rewards to each arriving client, we design a novel Dynamic Bayesian persuasion pricing for online Federated learning (DaringFed) under TII. Specifically, we begin by formulating the interaction between the server and clients as a dynamic signaling and pricing allocation problem within a Bayesian persuasion game, and then demonstrate the existence of a unique Bayesian persuasion Nash equilibrium. By deriving the optimal design of DaringFed under one-sided incomplete information, we further analyze the approximate optimal design of DaringFed with a specific bound under TII. Finally, extensive evaluation conducted on real datasets demonstrate that DaringFed optimizes accuracy and converges speed by 16.99%, while experiments with synthetic datasets validate the convergence of estimate unknown values and the effectiveness of DaringFed in improving the server's utility by up to 12.6%.

In this paper, we address the problem of a two-player linear quadratic differential game with incomplete information, a scenario commonly encountered in multi-agent control, human-robot interaction (HRI), and approximation methods for solving general-sum differential games. While solutions to such linear differential games are typically obtained through coupled Riccati equations, the complexity increases when agents have incomplete information, particularly when neither is aware of the other's cost function. To tackle this challenge, we propose a model-based Peer-A ware Cost Estimation (P ACE) framework for learning the cost parameters of the other agent. In P ACE, each agent treats its peer as a learning agent rather than a stationary optimal agent, models their learning dynamics, and leverages this dynamic to infer the cost function parameters of the other agent. This approach enables agents to infer each other's objective function in real time based solely on their previous state observations and dynamically adapt their control policies. Furthermore, we provide a theoretical guarantee for the convergence of parameter estimation and the stability of system states in P ACE. Additionally, in our numerical studies, we demonstrate how modeling the learning dynamics of the other agent benefits P ACE, compared to approaches that approximate the other agent as having complete information, particularly in terms of stability and convergence speed.