Designing incentives for a multi-agent system to induce a desirable Nash equilibrium is both a crucial and challenging problem appearing in many decision-making domains, especially for a large number of agents $N$. Under the exchangeability assumption, we formalize this incentive design (ID) problem as a parameterized mean-field game (PMFG), aiming to reduce complexity via an infinite-population limit. We first show that when dynamics and rewards are Lipschitz, the finite-$N$ ID objective is approximated by the PMFG at rate $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})$. Moreover, beyond the Lipschitz-continuous setting, we prove the same $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})$ decay for the important special case of sequential auctions, despite discontinuities in dynamics, through a tailored auction-specific analysis. Built on our novel approximation results, we further introduce our Adjoint Mean-Field Incentive Design (AMID) algorithm, which uses explicit differentiation of iterated equilibrium operators to compute gradients efficiently. By uniting approximation bounds with optimization guarantees, AMID delivers a powerful, scalable algorithmic tool for many-agent (large $N$) ID. Across diverse auction settings, the proposed AMID method substantially increases revenue over first-price formats and outperforms existing benchmark methods.

Incentive design deals with interaction between a principal and an agent where the former can shape the latter's utility through a policy commitment. It is well known that the principal faces an information rent when dealing with an agent that has informational advantage. In this work, we embark on a systematic study of the effect of information asymmetry in incentive design games. Specifically, we first demonstrate that it is in principal's interest to decrease this information asymmetry. To mitigate this uncertainty, we let the principal gather information either by letting the agent shape her belief (aka Information Design), or by paying to acquire it. Providing solutions to all these cases we show that while introduction of uncertainty increases the principal's cost, letting the agent shape its belief can be advantageous. We study information asymmetry and information acquisition in both matrix games and quadratic Gaussian game setups.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a $\tilde{\mathcal{O}} (\sqrt{KT})$ regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Energy game-theoretic frameworks have emerged to be a successful strategy to encourage energy efficient behavior in large scale by leveraging human-in-the-loop strategy. A number of such frameworks have been introduced over the years which formulate the energy saving process as a competitive game with appropriate incentives for energy efficient players. However, prior works involve an incentive design mechanism which is dependent on knowledge of utility functions for all the players in the game, which is hard to compute especially when the number of players is high, common in energy game-theoretic frameworks. Our research proposes that the utilities of players in such a framework can be grouped together to a relatively small number of clusters, and the clusters can then be targeted with tailored incentives. The key to above segmentation analysis is to learn the features leading to human decision making towards energy usage in competitive environments. We propose a novel graphical lasso based approach to perform such segmentation, by studying the feature correlations in a real-world energy social game dataset. To further improve the explainability of the model, we perform causality study using grangers causality. Proposed segmentation analysis results in characteristic clusters demonstrating different energy usage behaviors. We also present avenues to implement intelligent incentive design using proposed segmentation method.

Quantum Computing (QC) is a disruptive technology that may not be too far ahead in the horizon. Small proof-of-concept quantum computers have already been built [1] and major obstacles to large-scale quantum computing are being heavily researched [2] . Among its potential uses, QC will allow breaking classical cryptographic codes, simulate large quantum systems and faster search and optimization [3] . This last use case is of particular interest to Artificial Intelligence (AI) Strategy. In particular, variants of the Grover algorithm can be exploited to gain a quadratic speedup in search problems, and some recent Quantum Machine Learning (QML) developments have led to exponential gains in certain Machine Learning tasks [4] (though with important caveats which may invalidate their practical use [5]). These ideas have the potential to exert a transformative effect on research in AI (as noted in [6], for example). Furthermore the technical aspects of QC, which put some physical limits on the observation of the inner workings of a quantum machine and hinder the verification of quantum computations [7], may pose an additional challenge for AI Alignment concerns. In this short article we introduce a heuristic model of quantum computing that captures the most relevant characteristics of QC for technical AI Alignment research.

A generalized gamification framework is introduced as a form of smart infrastructure with potential to improve sustainability and energy efficiency by leveraging humans-in-the-loop strategy. The proposed framework enables a Human-Centric Cyber-Physical System using an interface to allow building managers to interact with occupants. The interface is designed for occupant engagement-integration supporting learning of their preferences over resources in addition to understanding how preferences change as a function of external stimuli such as physical control, time or incentives. Towards intelligent and autonomous incentive design, a noble statistical learning algorithm performing occupants energy usage behavior segmentation is proposed. We apply the proposed algorithm, Graphical Lasso, on energy resource usage data by the occupants to obtain feature correlations--dependencies. Segmentation analysis results in characteristic clusters demonstrating different energy usage behaviors. The features--factors characterizing human decision-making are made explainable.