As multimodal foundational models start being deployed experimentally in Self-Driving cars, a reasonable question we ask ourselves is how similar to humans do these systems respond in certain driving situations -- especially those that are out-of-distribution? To study this, we create the Robusto-1 dataset that uses dashcam video data from Peru, a country with one of the worst (aggressive) drivers in the world, a high traffic index, and a high ratio of bizarre to non-bizarre street objects likely never seen in training. In particular, to preliminarly test at a cognitive level how well Foundational Visual Language Models (VLMs) compare to Humans in Driving, we move away from bounding boxes, segmentation maps, occupancy maps or trajectory estimation to multi-modal Visual Question Answering (VQA) comparing both humans and machines through a popular method in systems neuroscience known as Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA). Depending on the type of questions we ask and the answers these systems give, we will show in what cases do VLMs and Humans converge or diverge allowing us to probe on their cognitive alignment. We find that the degree of alignment varies significantly depending on the type of questions asked to each type of system (Humans vs VLMs), highlighting a gap in their alignment.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have garnered significant attention for their strong visual-semantic understanding. Most existing chart benchmarks evaluate MLLMs' ability to parse information from charts to answer questions. However, they overlook the inherent output biases of MLLMs, where models rely on their parametric memory to answer questions rather than genuinely understanding the chart content. To address this limitation, we introduce a novel Chart Hypothetical Question Answering (HQA) task, which imposes assumptions on the same question to compel models to engage in counterfactual reasoning based on the chart content. Furthermore, we introduce HAI, a human-AI interactive data synthesis approach that leverages the efficient text-editing capabilities of LLMs alongside human expert knowledge to generate diverse and high-quality HQA data at a low cost. Using HAI, we construct Chart-HQA, a challenging benchmark synthesized from publicly available data sources. Evaluation results on 18 MLLMs of varying model sizes reveal that current models face significant generalization challenges and exhibit imbalanced reasoning performance on the HQA task.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.