Safe generalization in reinforcement learning requires not only that a learned policy acts capably in new situations, but also that it uses its capabilities towards the pursuit of the designer's intended goal. The latter requirement may fail when a proxy goal incentivizes similar behavior to the intended goal within the training environment, but not in novel deployment environments. This creates the risk that policies will behave as if in pursuit of the proxy goal, rather than the intended goal, in deployment -- a phenomenon known as goal misgeneralization. In this paper, we formalize this problem setting in order to theoretically study the possibility of goal misgeneralization under different training objectives. We show that goal misgeneralization is possible under approximate optimization of the maximum expected value (MEV) objective, but not the minimax expected regret (MMER) objective. We then empirically show that the standard MEV-based training method of domain randomization exhibits goal misgeneralization in procedurally-generated grid-world environments, whereas current regret-based unsupervised environment design (UED) methods are more robust to goal misgeneralization (though they don't find MMER policies in all cases). Our findings suggest that minimax expected regret is a promising approach to mitigating goal misgeneralization.

While reinforcement learning (RL) agents often perform well during training, they can struggle with distribution shift in real-world deployments. One particularly severe risk of distribution shift is goal misgeneralization, where the agent learns a proxy goal that coincides with the true goal during training but not during deployment. In this paper, we explore whether allowing an agent to ask for help from a supervisor in unfamiliar situations can mitigate this issue. We focus on agents trained with PPO in the CoinRun environment, a setting known to exhibit goal misgeneralization. We evaluate multiple methods for determining when the agent should request help and find that asking for help consistently improves performance. However, we also find that methods based on the agent's internal state fail to proactively request help, instead waiting until mistakes have already occurred. Further investigation suggests that the agent's internal state does not represent the coin at all, highlighting the importance of learning nuanced representations, the risks of ignoring everything not immediately relevant to reward, and the necessity of developing ask-for-help strategies tailored to the agent's training algorithm.

This paper explores the mechanistic interpretability of reinforcement learning (RL) agents through an analysis of a neural network trained on procedural maze environments. By dissecting the network's inner workings, we identified fundamental features like maze walls and pathways, forming the basis of the model's decision-making process. A significant observation was the goal misgeneralization, where the RL agent developed biases towards certain navigation strategies, such as consistently moving towards the top right corner, even in the absence of explicit goals. Using techniques like saliency mapping and feature mapping, we visualized these biases. We furthered this exploration with the development of novel tools for interactively exploring layer activations.

We introduce a method to address goal misgeneralization in reinforcement learning (RL), leveraging Large Language Model (LLM) feedback during training. Goal misgeneralization, a type of robustness failure in RL occurs when an agent retains its capabilities out-of-distribution yet pursues a proxy rather than the intended one. Our approach utilizes LLMs to analyze an RL agent's policies during training and identify potential failure scenarios. The RL agent is then deployed in these scenarios, and a reward model is learnt through the LLM preferences and feedback. This LLM-informed reward model is used to further train the RL agent on the original dataset. We apply our method to a maze navigation task, and show marked improvements in goal generalization, especially in cases where true and proxy goals are somewhat distinguishable and behavioral biases are pronounced. This study demonstrates how the LLM, despite its lack of task proficiency, can efficiently supervise RL agents, providing scalable oversight and valuable insights for enhancing goal-directed learning in RL through the use of LLMs.

AI alignment aims to make AI systems behave in line with human intentions and values. As AI systems grow more capable, so do risks from misalignment. To provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the alignment field, in this survey, we delve into the core concepts, methodology, and practice of alignment. First, we identify four principles as the key objectives of AI alignment: Robustness, Interpretability, Controllability, and Ethicality (RICE). Guided by these four principles, we outline the landscape of current alignment research and decompose them into two key components: forward alignment and backward alignment. The former aims to make AI systems aligned via alignment training, while the latter aims to gain evidence about the systems' alignment and govern them appropriately to avoid exacerbating misalignment risks. On forward alignment, we discuss techniques for learning from feedback and learning under distribution shift. On backward alignment, we discuss assurance techniques and governance practices. We also release and continually update the website (www.alignmentsurvey.com) which features tutorials, collections of papers, blog posts, and other resources.

We explore colour versus shape goal misgeneralization originally demonstrated by Di Langosco et al. (2022) in the Procgen Maze environment, where, given an ambiguous choice, the agents seem to prefer generalization based on colour rather than shape. After training over 1,000 agents in a simplified version of the environment and evaluating them on over 10 million episodes, we conclude that the behaviour can be attributed to the agents learning to detect the goal object through a specific colour channel. This choice is arbitrary. Additionally, we show how, due to underspecification, the preferences can change when retraining the agents using exactly the same procedure except for using a different random seed for the training run. Finally, we demonstrate the existence of outliers in out-of-distribution behaviour based on training random seed alone.

Rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked growing concerns among experts, policymakers, and world leaders regarding the potential for increasingly advanced AI systems to pose existential risks. This paper reviews the evidence for existential risks from AI via misalignment, where AI systems develop goals misaligned with human values, and power-seeking, where misaligned AIs actively seek power. The review examines empirical findings, conceptual arguments and expert opinion relating to specification gaming, goal misgeneralization, and power-seeking. The current state of the evidence is found to be concerning but inconclusive regarding the existence of extreme forms of misaligned power-seeking. Strong empirical evidence of specification gaming combined with strong conceptual evidence for power-seeking make it difficult to dismiss the possibility of existential risk from misaligned power-seeking. On the other hand, to date there are no public empirical examples of misaligned power-seeking in AI systems, and so arguments that future systems will pose an existential risk remain somewhat speculative. Given the current state of the evidence, it is hard to be extremely confident either that misaligned power-seeking poses a large existential risk, or that it poses no existential risk. The fact that we cannot confidently rule out existential risk from AI via misaligned power-seeking is cause for serious concern.

TL;DR: We give a threat model literature review, propose a categorization and describe a consensus threat model from some of DeepMind's AGI safety team. See our post for the detailed literature review. The DeepMind AGI Safety team has been working to understand the space of threat models for existential risk (X-risk) from misaligned AI. Our aim was to clarify the case for X-risk to enable better research project generation and prioritization. First, we conducted a literature review of existing threat models, discussed their strengths/weaknesses and then formed a categorization based on the technical cause of X-risk and the path that leads to X-risk.

The field of AI alignment is concerned with AI systems that pursue unintended goals. One commonly studied mechanism by which an unintended goal might arise is specification gaming, in which the designer-provided specification is flawed in a way that the designers did not foresee. However, an AI system may pursue an undesired goal even when the specification is correct, in the case of goal misgeneralization. Goal misgeneralization is a specific form of robustness failure for learning algorithms in which the learned program competently pursues an undesired goal that leads to good performance in training situations but bad performance in novel test situations. We demonstrate that goal misgeneralization can occur in practical systems by providing several examples in deep learning systems across a variety of domains. Extrapolating forward to more capable systems, we provide hypotheticals that illustrate how goal misgeneralization could lead to catastrophic risk. We suggest several research directions that could reduce the risk of goal misgeneralization for future systems.