This commentary extends the discussion by Parr et al. on memory and attention beyond individual cognitive systems. From the perspective of the Collective Predictive Coding (CPC) hypothesis -- a framework for understanding these faculties and the emergence of language at the group level -- we introduce a hypothetical idea: that language, with its embedded distributional semantics, serves as a collectively formed external representation. CPC generalises the concepts of individual memory and attention to the collective level. This offers a new perspective on how shared linguistic structures, which may embrace collective world models learned through next-word prediction, emerge from and shape group-level cognition.

Because we are highly motivated to be understood, we created public external representations -- mime, language, art -- to externalise our inner states. We argue that such external representations are a pre-condition for access consciousness, the global availability of information for reasoning. Yet the bandwidth of access consciousness is tiny compared with the richness of `raw experience', so no external representation can reproduce that richness in full. Ordinarily an explanation of experience need only let an audience `grasp' the relevant pattern, not relive the phenomenon. But our drive to be understood, and our low level sensorimotor capacities for `grasping' so rich, that the demand for an explanation of the feel of experience cannot be ``satisfactory''. That inflated epistemic demand (the preeminence of our expectation that we could be perfectly understood by another or ourselves) rather than an irreducible metaphysical gulf -- keeps the hard problem of consciousness alive. But on the plus side, it seems we will simply never give up creating new ways to communicate and think about our experiences. In this view, to be consciously aware is to strive to have one's agency understood by oneself and others.

This paper studies the problem of range analysis for feedforward neural networks, which is a basic primitive for applications such as robustness of neural networks, compliance to specifications and reachability analysis of neural-network feedback systems. Our approach focuses on ReLU (rectified linear unit) feedforward neural nets that present specific difficulties: approaches that exploit derivatives do not apply in general, the number of patterns of neuron activations can be quite large even for small networks, and convex approximations are generally too coarse. In this paper, we employ set-based methods and abstract interpretation that have been very successful in coping with similar difficulties in classical program verification. We present an approach that abstracts ReLU feedforward neural networks using tropical polyhedra. We show that tropical polyhedra can efficiently abstract ReLU activation function, while being able to control the loss of precision due to linear computations. We show how the connection between ReLU networks and tropical rational functions can provide approaches for range analysis of ReLU neural networks. We report on a preliminary evaluation of our approach using a prototype implementation.

This paper offers a perspective on Symbiotic Cognitive Systems that draws on Distributed Cognition. It argues that representations are the medium of cognition, and that the external representations that are one of the foci of Distributed Cognition are critical to supporting symbiosis. The paper analyzes an instance of a symbiotic cognitive system in which hundreds of human participants – with the support of a digital system – collectively optimize a program. It discusses the roles external representations play in symbiosis, and suggest that the design of external representations that are accessible and legible to both human and digital agents is a critical part of symbiotic cognitive systems.

In this position paper we discuss some general properties involved in high-level cognition in situated agents, and sketch an architecture relating sub-symbolic and symbolic information, in which the notion of perceptual inference plays a central role.