Autonomous inspection tasks necessitate effective path-planning mechanisms to efficiently gather observations from points of interest (POI). However, localization errors commonly encountered in urban environments can introduce execution uncertainty, posing challenges to the successful completion of such tasks. To tackle these challenges, we present IRIS-under uncertainty (IRIS-U^2), an extension of the incremental random inspection-roadmap search (IRIS) algorithm, that addresses the offline planning problem via an A*-based approach, where the planning process occurs prior the online execution. The key insight behind IRIS-U^2 is transforming the computed localization uncertainty, obtained through Monte Carlo (MC) sampling, into a POI probability. IRIS-U^2 offers insights into the expected performance of the execution task by providing confidence intervals (CI) for the expected coverage, expected path length, and collision probability, which becomes progressively tighter as the number of MC samples increase. The efficacy of IRIS-U^2 is demonstrated through a case study focusing on structural inspections of bridges. Our approach exhibits improved expected coverage, reduced collision probability, and yields increasingly-precise CIs as the number of MC samples grows. Furthermore, we emphasize the potential advantages of computing bounded sub-optimal solutions to reduce computation time while still maintaining the same CI boundaries.

Attacker-Defender Stackelberg security games (SSGs) have emerged as an important research area in multi-agent systems. However, existing SSGs models yield fixed, static, schedules which fail in dynamic domains where defenders face execution uncertainty, i.e., in domains where defenders may face unanticipated disruptions of their schedules. A concrete example is an application involving checking fares on trains, where a defender's schedule is frequently interrupted by fare evaders, making static schedules useless. To address this shortcoming, this paper provides four main contributions. First, we present a novel general Bayesian Stackelberg game model for security resource allocation in dynamic uncertain domains. In this new model, execution uncertainty is handled by using a Markov decision process (MDP) for generating defender policies. Second, we study the problem of computing a Stackelberg equilibrium for this game and exploit problem structure to reduce it to a polynomial-sized optimization problem. Shifting to evaluation, our third contribution shows, in simulation, that our MDP-based policies overcome the failures of previous SSG algorithms. In so doing, we can now build a complete system, that enables handling of schedule interruptions and, consequently, to conduct some of the first controlled experiments on SSGs in the field.