exact verification
- North America > United States > Massachusetts > Middlesex County > Cambridge (0.04)
- North America > Canada > British Columbia > Metro Vancouver Regional District > Vancouver (0.04)
- Europe > United Kingdom > Wales > Swansea (0.04)
- Europe > Sweden > Stockholm > Stockholm (0.04)
Exact Verification of ReLU Neural Control Barrier Functions
Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) are a popular approach for safe control of nonlinear systems. In CBF-based control, the desired safety properties of the system are mapped to nonnegativity of a CBF, and the control input is chosen to ensure that the CBF remains nonnegative for all time. Recently, machine learning methods that represent CBFs as neural networks (neural control barrier functions, or NCBFs) have shown great promise due to the universal representability of neural networks. However, verifying that a learned CBF guarantees safety remains a challenging research problem. This paper presents novel exact conditions and algorithms for verifying safety of feedforward NCBFs with ReLU activation functions.
- North America > United States > Massachusetts > Middlesex County > Cambridge (0.14)
- Europe > Sweden > Stockholm > Stockholm (0.04)
- North America > Canada (0.04)
- Europe > United Kingdom > Wales > Swansea (0.04)
Exact Verification of ReLU Neural Control Barrier Functions
Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) are a popular approach for safe control of nonlinear systems. In CBF-based control, the desired safety properties of the system are mapped to nonnegativity of a CBF, and the control input is chosen to ensure that the CBF remains nonnegative for all time. Recently, machine learning methods that represent CBFs as neural networks (neural control barrier functions, or NCBFs) have shown great promise due to the universal representability of neural networks. However, verifying that a learned CBF guarantees safety remains a challenging research problem. This paper presents novel exact conditions and algorithms for verifying safety of feedforward NCBFs with ReLU activation functions.
Exploiting Verified Neural Networks via Floating Point Numerical Error
We show how to construct adversarial examples for neural networks with exactly verified robustness against $\ell_{\infty}$-bounded input perturbations by exploiting floating point error. We argue that any exact verification of real-valued neural networks must accurately model the implementation details of any floating point arithmetic used during inference or verification.
- North America > United States > Massachusetts > Middlesex County > Cambridge (0.04)
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- Europe > Italy > Calabria > Catanzaro Province > Catanzaro (0.04)
Training for Faster Adversarial Robustness Verification via Inducing ReLU Stability
Xiao, Kai Y., Tjeng, Vincent, Shafiullah, Nur Muhammad, Madry, Aleksander
We explore the concept of co-design in the context of neural network verification. Specifically, we aim to train deep neural networks that not only are robust to adversarial perturbations but also whose robustness can be verified more easily. To this end, we identify two properties of network models - weight sparsity and so-called ReLU stability - that turn out to significantly impact the complexity of the corresponding verification task. We demonstrate that improving weight sparsity alone already enables us to turn computationally intractable verification problems into tractable ones. Then, improving ReLU stability leads to an additional 4-13x speedup in verification times. An important feature of our methodology is its "universality," in the sense that it can be used with a broad range of training procedures and verification approaches.
- North America > United States > Massachusetts > Middlesex County > Cambridge (0.14)
- North America > United States > New York > New York County > New York City (0.04)
- North America > United States > District of Columbia > Washington (0.04)
- Europe > Sweden > Stockholm > Stockholm (0.04)