epistemic space
Who is Afraid of Minimal Revision?
Baccini, Edoardo, Christoff, Zoé, Gierasimczuk, Nina, Verbrugge, Rineke
The principle of minimal change in belief revision theory requires that, when accepting new information, one keeps one's belief state as close to the initial belief state as possible. This is precisely what the method known as minimal revision does. However, unlike less conservative belief revision methods, minimal revision falls short in learning power: It cannot learn everything that can be learned by other learning methods. We begin by showing that, despite this limitation, minimal revision is still a successful learning method in a wide range of situations. Firstly, it can learn any problem that is finitely identifiable. Secondly, it can learn with positive and negative data, as long as one considers finitely many possibilities. We then characterize the prior plausibility assignments (over finitely many possibilities) that enable one to learn via minimal revision, and do the same for conditioning and lexicographic upgrade. Finally, we show that not all of our results still hold when learning from possibly erroneous information.
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Credibility-Limited Revision for Epistemic Spaces
We consider credibility-limited revision in the framework of belief change for epistemic spaces, permitting inconsistent belief sets and inconsistent beliefs. In this unrestricted setting, the class of credibility-limited revision operators does not include any AGM revision operators. We extend the class of credibility-limited revision operators in a way that all AGM revision operators are included while keeping the original spirit of credibility-limited revision. Extended credibility-limited revision operators are defined axiomatically. A semantic characterization of extended credibility-limited revision operators that employ total preorders on possible worlds is presented.
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The Realizability of Revision and Contraction Operators in Epistemic Spaces
Sauerwald, Kai, Thimm, Matthias
This paper studies the realizability of belief revision and belief contraction operators in epistemic spaces. We observe that AGM revision and AGM contraction operators for epistemic spaces are only realizable in precisely determined epistemic spaces. We define the class of linear change operators, a special kind of maxichoice operator. When AGM revision, respectively, AGM contraction, is realizable, linear change operators are a canonical realization.
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Cognitive Bias and Belief Revision
Papadamos, Panagiotis, Gierasimczuk, Nina
Cognitive bias is a systematic human thought pattern connected with the distortion of received information, that usually leads to deviation from rationality (for a recent analysis see [18]). Such biases are specific not only to human intelligence, they can be also ascribed to artificial agents, algorithms and programs. For instance, confirmation bias can be seen as stubbornness against new information which contradicts the previously adopted view. In some cases such confirmation bias can be implemented into a system purposefully. Take as an example an authentication algorithm and a malicious user who is trying to break into an email account.
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