discrete logarithm
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Intractability of Learning the Discrete Logarithm with Gradient-Based Methods
Takhanov, Rustem, Tezekbayev, Maxat, Pak, Artur, Bolatov, Arman, Kadyrsizova, Zhibek, Assylbekov, Zhenisbek
The discrete logarithm problem is a fundamental challenge in number theory with significant implications for cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we investigate the limitations of gradient-based methods for learning the parity bit of the discrete logarithm in finite cyclic groups of prime order. Our main result, supported by theoretical analysis and empirical verification, reveals the concentration of the gradient of the loss function around a fixed point, independent of the logarithm's base used. This concentration property leads to a restricted ability to learn the parity bit efficiently using gradient-based methods, irrespective of the complexity of the network architecture being trained. Our proof relies on Boas-Bellman inequality in inner product spaces and it involves establishing approximate orthogonality of discrete logarithm's parity bit functions through the spectral norm of certain matrices. Empirical experiments using a neural network-based approach further verify the limitations of gradient-based learning, demonstrating the decreasing success rate in predicting the parity bit as the group order increases.
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On the (In)Security of ElGamal in OpenPGP
Let G be a group and g G a generator. To create a key pair (sk, pk), pick a random integer x, compute the element X gx, and output (sk, pk): (x, X). Given pk, to encrypt a message M, pick an ephemeral random integer y, compute the elements Y gy and Z Xy gxy, and output C (C1, C2): (Y, M · Z) as the ciphertext. Given sk, to decrypt C, first recover element Z from C1 as per Z Yx gyx and then use C2, Z to recover M C2/Z. To instantiate the scheme, the following details have to be fixed: Which group G shall be used?
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Partially Encrypted Machine Learning using Functional Encryption
Ryffel, Theo, Dufour-Sans, Edouard, Gay, Romain, Bach, Francis, Pointcheval, David
Machine learning on encrypted data has received a lot of attention thanks to recent breakthroughs in homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation. It allows outsourcing computation to untrusted servers without sacrificing privacy of sensitive data. We propose a practical framework to perform partially encrypted and privacy-preserving predictions which combines adversarial training and functional encryption. We first present a new functional encryption scheme to efficiently compute quadratic functions so that the data owner controls what can be computed but is not involved in the calculation: it provides a decryption key which allows one to learn a specific function evaluation of some encrypted data. We then show how to use it in machine learning to partially encrypt neural networks with quadratic activation functions at evaluation time, and we provide a thorough analysis of the information leaks based on indistinguishability of data items of the same label. Last, since most encryption schemes cannot deal with the last thresholding operation used for classification, we propose a training method to prevent selected sensitive features from leaking, which adversarially optimizes the network against an adversary trying to identify these features. This is interesting for several existing works using partially encrypted machine learning as it comes with little reduction on the model's accuracy and significantly improves data privacy.