Out-of-Distribution (OoD) detection is vital for the reliability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs).

In this work, we propose an innovative test-time poisoned sample detection framework that hinges on the in-terpretability of model predictions, grounded in the semantic meaning of inputs. We contend that triggers (e.g., infrequent words) are not supposed to fundamentally alter the underlying semantic meanings of poisoned samples as they want to

Feature attribution is the dominant paradigm for explaining deep neural networks. However, most existing methods only loosely reflect the model's prediction-making process, thereby merely white-painting the black box. We argue that explanatory alignment is a key aspect of trustworthiness in prediction tasks: explanations must be directly linked to predictions, rather than serving as post-hoc rationalizations. We present model readability as a design principle enabling alignment, and PiNets as a modeling framework to pursue it in a deep learning context. PiNets are pseudo-linear networks that produce instance-wise linear predictions in an arbitrary feature space, making them linearly readable. We illustrate their use on image classification and segmentation tasks, demonstrating how PiNets produce explanations that are faithful across multiple criteria in addition to alignment.

The conventional approaches treat it as a simple binary classification task without statistical guarantees. A recent approach is designed to control the false discovery rate (FDR), but its guarantees rely on strong, easily violated assumptions. In this paper, we introduce Provable Training Data Identification (PTDI), a rigorous method that identifies a set of training data with strict false discovery rate (FDR) control. Specifically, our method computes p-values for each data point using a set of known unseen data, and then constructs a conservative estimator for the data usage proportion of the test set, which allows us to scale these p-values. Our approach then selects the final set of training data by identifying all points whose scaled p-values fall below a data-dependent threshold. This entire procedure enables the discovery of training data with provable, strict FDR control and significantly boosted power. Extensive experiments across a wide range of models (LLMs and VLMs), and datasets demonstrate that PTDI strictly controls the FDR and achieves higher power. These concerns raise the importance of identifying a specific, well-defined set of data allegedly used in training. To resolve such high-stakes disputes, claims must be supported by credible evidence that strictly controls the risk of false positives. This underscores the need for methods that provide rigorous statistical guarantees for identifying training data.

Out-of-Distribution (OoD) detection is vital for the reliability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs).

Leaderboards for large reasoning models (LRMs) have turned evaluation into a competition, incentivizing developers to optimize directly on benchmark suites. A shortcut to achieving higher rankings is to incorporate evaluation benchmarks into the training data, thereby yielding inflated performance, known as benchmark contamination. Despite that numerous contamination detection approaches have been proposed, surprisingly, our studies find that evading contamination detections for LRMs is alarmingly easy. We focus on the two scenarios where contamination may occur in practice: (I) when the base model evolves into LRM via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL), we find that contamination during SFT can be originally identified by contamination detection methods. Y et, even a brief Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) training can markedly conceal contamination signals that most detection methods rely on. Further empirical experiments and theoretical analysis indicate that Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) style importance sampling and clipping objectives are the root cause of this detection concealment, indicating that a broad class of RL methods may inherently exhibit similar concealment capability; (II) when SFT contamination with CoT is applied to advanced LRMs as the final stage, most contamination detection methods perform near random guesses. Without exposure to non-members, contaminated LRMs would still have more confidence when responding to those unseen samples that share similar distributions to the training set, and thus, evade existing memorization-based detection methods. Together, our findings reveal the unique vulnerability of LRMs evaluations: Model developers could easily contaminate LRMs to achieve inflated leaderboards performance while leaving minimal traces of contamination, thereby strongly undermining the fairness of evaluation and threatening the integrity of public leaderboards. This underscores the urgent need for advanced contamination detection methods and trustworthy evaluation protocols tailored to LRMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/ASTRAL-Group/ Competition among model developers has intensified as Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in various real-world tasks (Achiam et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024). The leaderboards for performance are becoming a competitive arena for all state-of-the-art (SOT A) LLMs. However, inadvertently, benchmark samples may appear during LLMs' pre-training due to vast amounts of web-scraped training data. In addition, in the pursuit of publicity, some model developers may even deliberately incorporate benchmark data into their training sets (Sun et al., 2025), resulting in inflated benchmark performance and leaderboard rankings. We refer to this as the benchmark contamination problem in LLMs (Xu et al., 2024; Balloccu et al., 2024).