This leads to a single optimal decision, or a set of optimal decisions all of which are equivalent. In the theory of imprecise probabilities, where multiple probabilistic models are considered simultaneously, this decision rule can be generalised in multiple ways; Troffaes [1] provides a nice overview. A typical feature of the resulting decision rules is that they will not always yield a single optimal decision, as a decision that is optimal in one probability model may for example be suboptimal in another. We here take this generalisation yet another step further by adopting the theory of choice functions: a mathematical framework for decision-making that incorporates several (imprecise) decision rules as special cases, including the classical approach of maximising expected utility [2, 3, 4]. An important feature of this framework of choice functions is that it allows one to impose axioms directly on the decisions that are represented by such a choice function [3, 4, 5].

We identify the logic behind the recent theory of coherent sets of desirable (sets of) things, which generalise desirable (sets of) gambles and coherent choice functions, and show that this identification allows us to establish various representation results for such coherent models in terms of simpler ones.

Teddy Seidenfeld has been arguing for quite a long time that binary preference models are not powerful enough to deal with a number of crucial aspects of imprecision and indeterminacy in uncertain inference and decision making. It is at his insistence that we initiated our study of so-called sets of desirable option sets, which we have argued elsewhere provides an elegant and powerful approach to dealing with general, binary as well as non-binary, decision-making under uncertainty. We use this approach here to explore an interesting notion of irrelevance (and independence), first suggested by Seidenfeld in an example intended as a criticism of a number of specific decision methodologies based on (convex) binary preferences. We show that the consequences of making such an irrelevance or independence assessment are very strong, and might be used to argue for the use of so-called mixing choice functions, and E-admissibility as the resulting decision scheme.

We study how to infer new choices from previous choices in a conservative manner. To make such inferences, we use the theory of choice functions: a unifying mathematical framework for conservative decision making that allows one to impose axioms directly on the represented decisions. We here adopt the coherence axioms of De Bock and De Cooman (2019). We show how to naturally extend any given choice assessment to such a coherent choice function, whenever possible, and use this natural extension to make new choices. We present a practical algorithm to compute this natural extension and provide several methods that can be used to improve its scalability.

Decision making under uncertainty is typically carried out by combining an uncertainty model with a decision rule. If uncertainty is modelled by a probability measure, the by far most popular such decision rule is maximising expected utility, where one chooses the option--or makes the decision--whose expected utility with respect to this probability measure is the highest. Uncertainty can also be modelled in various other ways though. The theory of imprecise probabilities, for example, offers a wide range of extensions of probability theory that provide more flexible modelling possibilities, such as differentiating between stochastic uncertainty and model uncertainty. The most straightforward such extension is to consider a set of probability measures instead of a single one, but one can also use interval probabilities, coherent lower previsions, sets of desirable gambles, belief functions, to name only a few. For all these different types of uncertainty models, various decision rules have been developed, making the total number of possible combinations rather daunting. Choosing which combination of uncertainty model and decision rule to use is therefore difficult and often dealt with in a pragmatic fashion, by using a combination that one is familiar with, that is convenient or that is computationaly advantageous.

I introduce and study a new notion of Archimedeanity for binary and non-binary choice between options that live in an abstract Banach space, through a very general class of choice models, called sets of desirable option sets. In order to be able to bring horse lottery options into the fold, I pay special attention to the case where these linear spaces do not include all `constant' options. I consider the frameworks of conservative inference associated with Archimedean (and coherent) choice models, and also pay quite a lot of attention to representation of general (non-binary) choice models in terms of the simpler, binary ones. The representation theorems proved here provide an axiomatic characterisation of, amongst other choice methods, Levi's E-admissibility and Walley--Sen maximality.

Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that appear in imprecise-probabilistic decision making. We provide these choice functions with a clear interpretation in terms of desirability, use this interpretation to derive a set of basic coherence axioms, and show that this notion of coherence leads to a representation in terms of sets of strict preference orders. By imposing additional properties such as totality, the mixing property and Archimedeanity, we obtain representation in terms of sets of strict total orders, lexicographic probability systems, coherent lower previsions or linear previsions.