Argument mining is natural language processing technology aimed at identifying arguments in text. Furthermore, the approach is being developed to identify the premises and claims of those arguments, and to identify the relationships between arguments including support and attack relationships. In this paper, we assume that an argument map contains the premises and claims of arguments, and support and attack relationships between them, that have been identified by argument mining. So from a piece of text, we assume an argument map is obtained automatically by natural language processing. However, to understand and to automatically analyse that argument map, it would be desirable to instantiate that argument map with logical arguments. Once we have the logical representation of the arguments in an argument map, we can use automated reasoning to analyze the argumentation (e.g. check consistency of premises, check validity of claims, and check the labelling on each arc corresponds with thw logical arguments). We address this need by using classical logic for representing the explicit information in the text, and using default logic for representing the implicit information in the text. In order to investigate our proposal, we consider some specific options for instantiation.

Defeasible reasoning is a kind of reasoning where some generalisations may not be valid in all circumstances, that is general conclusions may fail in some cases. Various formalisms have been developed to model this kind of reasoning, which is characteristic of common-sense contexts. However, it is not easy for a modeller to choose among these systems the one that better fits its domain from an ontological point of view. In this paper we first propose a framework based on the notions of exceptionality and defeasibility in order to be able to compare formalisms and reveal their ontological commitments. Then, we apply this framework to compare four systems, showing the differences that may occur from an ontological perspective.

Only-knowing was originally introduced by Levesque to capture the beliefs of an agent in the sense that its knowledge base is all the agent knows. When a knowledge base contains defaults Levesque also showed an exact correspondence between only-knowing and autoepistemic logic. Later these results were extended by Lakemeyer and Levesque to also capture a variant of autoepistemic logic proposed by Konolige and Reiter's default logic. One of the benefits of such an approach is that various nonmonotonic formalisms can be compared within a single monotonic logic leading, among other things, to the first axiom system for default logic. In this paper, we will bring another large class of nonmonotonic systems, which were first studied by McDermott and Doyle, into the only-knowing fold. Among other things, we will provide the first possible-world semantics for such systems, providing a new perspective on the nature of modal approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning.

Reiter's original proposal for default logic is unsatisfactory for open default theories because of Skolemization and grounding. In this paper, we reconsider this long-standing problem and propose a new world view semantics for first-order default logic. Roughly speaking, a world view of a first-order default theory is a maximal collection of structures satisfying the default theory where the default part is fixed by the world view itself. We show how this semantics generalizes classical first-order logic and first-order answer set programming, and we discuss its connections to Reiter's semantics and other related semantics. We also argue that first-order default logic under the world view semantics provides a rich framework for integrating classical logic based and rule based formalisms in the first-order case.

Argumentation is a non-monotonic process. This reflects the fact that argumentation involves uncertain information, and so new information can cause a change in the conclusions drawn. However, the base logic does not need to be non-monotonic. Indeed, most proposals for structured argumentation use a monotonic base logic (e.g. some form of modus ponens with a rule-based language, or classical logic). Nonetheless, there are issues in capturing defeasible reasoning in argumentation including choice of base logic and modelling of defeasible knowledge. And there are insights and tools to be harnessed for research in non-monontonic logics. We consider some of these issues in this paper.

Once the topic has become well enough understood that it can be explained easily to paying customers, and stable enough that anyone teaching it is not likely to have to update his/her teaching materials every few months as new developments are reported, it can be considered to have arrived. Another reasonable indicator of the maturity of a subject, a milestone along the road to academic respectability, is the publication of a really good book on the subject--not another research monograph but a book that consolidates what is already known, surveys and relates existing ideas, and maybe even unifies some of them. Grigoris Antoniou's Nonmonotonic Reasoning is just such a milestone--well written, informative, and a good source of information on an important and complex subject. Neither is it surprising nor unreasonable that he devotes a lot of space to Reiter's (1980) default logic, which, along with Mc-Carthy's (1980) circumscription and Moore's (1985) autoepistemic logic, is one of the holy trinity of nonmonotonic reasoning. AI Magazine Volume 20 Number 3 (1999) ( AAAI) and it has been the basis of a number of different variants, all with their own strengths and weaknesses.

Clearly, the second approach is more cautious. Intuitively, it demands that there is a specific argument for τ that is contained in each rational stance a reasoner can take given Γ, DRules, and SRules. The first option doesn't bind the acceptability of τ to a specific argument: it is sufficient if according to each rational stance there is some argument for τ. In Default Logic, the main representational tool is that of a default rule, or simply a default.

This paper describes a natural framework for rules, based on belief functions, which includes a repre- sentation of numerical rules, default rules and rules allowing and rules not allowing contraposition. In particular it justifies the use of the Dempster-Shafer Theory for representing a particular class of rules, Belief calculated being a lower probability given certain independence assumptions on an underlying space. It shows how a belief function framework can be generalised to other logics, including a general Monte-Carlo algorithm for calculating belief, and how a version of Reiter's Default Logic can be seen as a limiting case of a belief function formalism.

Default logic encounters some conceptual difficulties in representing common sense reasoning tasks. We argue that we should not try to formulate modular default rules that are presumed to work in all or most circumstances. We need to take into account the importance of the context which is continuously evolving during the reasoning process. Sequential thresholding is a quantitative counterpart of default logic which makes explicit the role context plays in the construction of a non-monotonic extension. We present a semantic characterization of generic non-monotonic reasoning, as well as the instantiations pertaining to default logic and sequential thresholding. This provides a link between the two mechanisms as well as a way to integrate the two that can be beneficial to both.

Only-knowing was originally introduced by Levesque to capture the beliefs of an agent in the sense that its knowledge base is all the agent knows. When a knowledge base contains defaults Levesque also showed an exact correspondence between only-knowing and autoepistemic logic. Later these results were extended by Lakemeyer and Levesque to also capture a variant of autoepistemic logic proposed by Konolige and Reiter's default logic. One of the benefits of such an approach is that various nonmonotonic formalisms can be compared within a single monotonic logic leading, among other things, to the first axiom system for default logic. In this paper, we will bring another large class of nonmonotonic systems, which were first studied by McDermott and Doyle, into the only-knowing fold. Among other things, we will provide the first possible-world semantics for such systems, providing a new perspective on the nature of modal approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning.