When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the underlying assessment rule is deliberately kept secret to avoid gaming and maintain competitive advantage. The resulting opacity forces the decision subjects to rely on incomplete information when making strategic feature modifications. We capture such settings as a game of Bayesian persuasion, in which the decision maker offers a form of recourse to the decision subject by providing them with an action recommendation (or signal) to incentivize them to modify their features in desirable ways. We show that when using persuasion, the decision maker and decision subject are never worse off in expectation, while the decision maker can be significantly better off. While the decision maker's problem of finding the optimal Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) signaling policy takes the form of optimization over infinitely many variables, we show that this optimization can be cast as a linear program over finitely-many regions of the space of possible assessment rules. While this reformulation simplifies the problem dramatically, solving the linear program requires reasoning about exponentially-many variables, even in relatively simple cases. Motivated by this observation, we provide a polynomial-time approximation scheme that recovers a near-optimal signaling policy. Finally, our numerical simulations on semi-synthetic data empirically demonstrate the benefits of using persuasion in the algorithmic recourse setting.

We would like to thank the reviewers for their comments and suggestions. Figure 7 in Appendix F.3, and this is likely to increase their individual utility in the long term. We will clarify this in the revised version of the paper. We will fix the statement of Proposition 4. The "strategic setting" refers to a scenario in which individuals who are subject to (semi)-automated A counterfactual is a statement of how the world would have to be different for a desirable outcome to occur [13]. We will clarify this in the revised version of the paper.

This paper proposes and analyzes a model of strategic behavior under counterfactual explanations. In this model, a decision-maker chooses a policy and a small set of explanations that can be provided to decisions subjects who receive unfavorable decisions. In response, decision subjects follow the given explanation to improve their future outcomes. While doing so is NP Hard, the resulting formulation is shown to be submodular allowing for efficient approximations. This paper establishes an interesting connection between strategic behavior and explainability.

When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the underlying assessment rule is deliberately kept secret to avoid gaming and maintain competitive advantage. The resulting opacity forces the decision subjects to rely on incomplete information when making strategic feature modifications. We capture such settings as a game of Bayesian persuasion, in which the decision maker offers a form of recourse to the decision subject by providing them with an action recommendation (or signal) to incentivize them to modify their features in desirable ways. We show that when using persuasion, the decision maker and decision subject are never worse off in expectation, while the decision maker can be significantly better off.

We explore how an AI model's decision fairness affects people's engagement with and perceived fairness of the model if they are subject to its decisions, but could repeatedly and strategically respond to these decisions. Two types of strategic responses are considered -- people could determine whether to continue interacting with the model, and whether to invest in themselves to improve their chance of future favorable decisions from the model. Via three human-subject experiments, we found that in decision subjects' strategic, repeated interactions with an AI model, the model's decision fairness does not change their willingness to interact with the model or to improve themselves, even when the model exhibits unfairness on salient protected attributes. However, decision subjects still perceive the AI model to be less fair when it systematically biases against their group, especially if the difficulty of improving one's qualification for the favorable decision is larger for the lowly-qualified people.

As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes more prevalent there is a growing demand from regulators to accompany decisions made by such systems with explanations. However, a persistent gap exists between the need to execute a meaningful right to explanation vs. the ability of Machine Learning systems to deliver on such a legal requirement. The regulatory appeal towards "a right to explanation" of AI systems can be attributed to the significant role of explanations, part of the notion called reason-giving, in law. Therefore, in this work we examine reason-giving's purposes in law to analyze whether reasons provided by end-user Explainability can adequately fulfill them. We find that reason-giving's legal purposes include: (a) making a better and more just decision, (b) facilitating due-process, (c) authenticating human agency, and (d) enhancing the decision makers' authority. Using this methodology, we demonstrate end-user Explainabilty's inadequacy to fulfil reason-giving's role in law, given reason-giving's functions rely on its impact over a human decision maker. Thus, end-user Explainability fails, or is unsuitable, to fulfil the first, second and third legal function. In contrast we find that end-user Explainability excels in the fourth function, a quality which raises serious risks considering recent end-user Explainability research trends, Large Language Models' capabilities, and the ability to manipulate end-users by both humans and machines. Hence, we suggest that in some cases the right to explanation of AI systems could bring more harm than good to end users. Accordingly, this study carries some important policy ramifications, as it calls upon regulators and Machine Learning practitioners to reconsider the widespread pursuit of end-user Explainability and a right to explanation of AI systems.

In prediction-based decision-making systems, different perspectives can be at odds: The short-term business goals of the decision makers are often in conflict with the decision subjects' wish to be treated fairly. Balancing these two perspectives is a question of values. However, these values are often hidden in the technicalities of the implementation of the decision-making system. In this paper, we propose a framework to make these value-laden choices clearly visible. We focus on a setting in which we want to find decision rules that balance the perspective of the decision maker and of the decision subjects. We provide an approach to formalize both perspectives, i.e., to assess the utility of the decision maker and the fairness towards the decision subjects. In both cases, the idea is to elicit values from decision makers and decision subjects that are then turned into something measurable. For the fairness evaluation, we build on well-known theories of distributive justice and on the algorithmic literature to ask what a fair distribution of utility (or welfare) looks like. This allows us to derive a fairness score that we then compare to the decision maker's utility. As we focus on a setting in which we are given a trained model and have to choose a decision rule, we use the concept of Pareto efficiency to compare decision rules. Our proposed framework can both guide the implementation of a decision-making system and help with audits, as it allows us to resurface the values implemented in a decision-making system.

When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the underlying assessment rule is deliberately kept secret to avoid gaming and maintain competitive advantage. The resulting opacity forces the decision subjects to rely on incomplete information when making strategic feature modifications. We capture such settings as a game of Bayesian persuasion, in which the decision maker offers a form of recourse to the decision subject by providing them with an action recommendation (or signal) to incentivize them to modify their features in desirable ways. We show that when using persuasion, the decision maker and decision subject are never worse off in expectation, while the decision maker can be significantly better off. While the decision maker's problem of finding the optimal Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) signaling policy takes the form of optimization over infinitely-many variables, we show that this optimization can be cast as a linear program over finitely-many regions of the space of possible assessment rules. While this reformulation simplifies the problem dramatically, solving the linear program requires reasoning about exponentially-many variables, even in relatively simple cases. Motivated by this observation, we provide a polynomial-time approximation scheme that recovers a near-optimal signaling policy. Finally, our numerical simulations on semi-synthetic data empirically demonstrate the benefits of using persuasion in the algorithmic recourse setting.