Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Fair cost allocation in community microgrids remains a significant challenge due to the complex interactions between multiple participants with varying load profiles, distributed energy resources, and storage systems. Traditional cost allocation methods often fail to adequately address the dynamic nature of participant contributions and benefits, leading to inequitable distribution of costs and reduced participant satisfaction. This paper presents a novel framework integrating multi-objective optimization with cooperative game theory for fair and efficient microgrid operation and cost allocation. The proposed approach combines mixed-integer linear programming for optimal resource dispatch with Shapley value analysis for equitable benefit distribution, ensuring both system efficiency and participant satisfaction. The framework was validated using real-world data across six distinct operational scenarios, demonstrating significant improvements in both technical and economic performance. Results show peak demand reductions ranging from 7.8% to 62.6%, solar utilization rates reaching 114.8% through effective storage integration, and cooperative gains of up to $1,801.01 per day. The Shapley value-based allocation achieved balanced benefit-cost distributions, with net positions ranging from -16.0% to +14.2% across different load categories, ensuring sustainable participant cooperation.

We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function C is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be learned from samples drawn from a distribution, represented as tuples (S, C(S)), for different subsets S of players.

--In this paper, a transmission-distribution systems flexibility market is introduced, in which system operators (SOs) jointly procure flexibility from different systems to meet their needs (balancing and congestion management) using a common market. This common market is, then, formulated as a cooperative game aiming at identifying a stable and efficient split of costs of the jointly procured flexibility among the participating SOs to incentivize their cooperation. The non-emptiness of the core of this game is then mathematically proven, implying the stability of the game and the naturally-arising incentive for cooperation among the SOs. Several cost allocation mechanisms are then introduced, while characterizing their mathematical properties. Numerical results focusing on an interconnected system (composed of the IEEE 14-bus transmission system and the Matpower 18-bus, 69-bus, and 141-bus distributions systems) showcase the cooperation-induced reduction in system-wide flexibility procurement costs, and identifies the varying costs borne by different SOs under various cost allocations methods. The increasing integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) and electrification of the consumer energy space (e.g., transportation and heating) pose challenges for grid operation, due to the induced uncertainty and changing load patterns. In this respect, the introduction of market mechanisms for the procurement of flexibility from flexibility services provides (FSPs) has been increasingly recommended in policies [1], and has been the center of several recent works in the literature [2]-[7] and demonstration projects [8]. As FSPs could provide their flexibility as a service to different system operators (SOs), a major branch of the literature has focused on the SOs' joint procurement (i.e. In particular, a key focus has been shed on the need for coordination between SOs to achieve joint procurement, not only for optimization of economic efficiency but also to ensure that the activated flexibility meets grid operational constraints of all the grids involved [2]-[5], [9], [10]. The authors are with the Flemish Institute for Technological Research VITO/EnergyVille, Thor Park 8310, 3600 Genk, Belgium. The authors have equally contributed to this work. This work is supported by the EU's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 824414 - CoordiNet project. Flexibility is the ability to dynamically modify consumption and generation patterns providing, as a result, a service to system operators. Towards this end, we first introduce a novel flexibility market model including a TSO and multiple DSOs for jointly procuring congestion management and balancing services while explicitly accounting for grid constraints. This framework is developed by first introducing disjoint TSO and DSO level markets and joining them in a common market setting.

We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function C is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be learned from samples drawn from a distribution, represented as tuples (S, C(S)), for different subsets S of players. We formalize this approach, which we call statistical cost sharing, and consider the computation of the core and the Shapley value. Expanding on the work by Balcan et al, we give precise sample complexity bounds for computing cost shares that satisfy the core property with high probability for any function with a non-empty core. For the Shapley value, which has never been studied in this setting, we show that for submodular cost functions with curvature bounded curvature kappa it can be approximated from samples from the uniform distribution to a sqrt{1 - kappa} factor, and that the bound is tight. We then define statistical analogues of the Shapley axioms, and derive a notion of statistical Shapley value and that these can be approximated arbitrarily well from samples from any distribution and for any function.

We survey existing rules of thumb, propose novel methods, and comprehensively evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Cost to serve analysis has applications both strategically and operationally in transportation settings. The problem is formally modeled as the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative transferable utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The total cost to serve all locations in the TSP is the length of an optimal tour. An allocation divides the total cost among individual locations, thus providing the cost to serve each of them. As one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, the Shapley value gives a principled and fair allocation for a broad variety of games including the TSG. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and prove that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we survey six proxies for it that are each relatively easy to compute. Some of these proxies are rules of thumb and some are procedures international delivery companies use(d) as cost allocation methods. We perform an experimental evaluation using synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for scenarios involving fast-moving goods; where deliveries are made on a road network every day. We explore several computationally tractable allocation techniques that are good proxies for the Shapley value in problem instances of a size and complexity that is commercially relevant.

Many models and mechanisms in resource and cost allocation have been developed that are simple and abstract. By means of two case studies, I argue that it is now timely to consider richer models for the fair division of resources and for the allocation of costs. Such models should have features like asynchronicity which reflect more of the true complexity of many fair division and cost allocation problems met in the real world. I suggest that computation can be used in such models to increase both efficiency and fairness of the allocations. As a result, we may be able to do more with fewer resources and greater fairness.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a travelling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

How do we allocate scarce resources? How do we fairly allocate costs? These are two pressing challenges facing society today. I discuss two recent projects at NICTA concerning resource and cost allocation. In the first, we have been working with FoodBank Local, a social startup working in collaboration with food bank charities around the world to optimise the logistics of collecting and distributing donated food. Before we can distribute this food, we must decide how to allocate it to different charities and food kitchens. This gives rise to a fair division problem with several new dimensions, rarely considered in the literature. In the second, we have been looking at cost allocation within the distribution network of a large multinational company. This also has several new dimensions rarely considered in the literature.