This study investigates the cognitive plausibility of a pretrained multimodal model, CLIP, in recognizing emotions evoked by abstract visual art. We employ a dataset comprising images with associated emotion labels and textual rationales of these labels provided by human annotators. We perform linguistic analyses of rationales, zero-shot emotion classification of images and rationales, apply similarity-based prediction of emotion, and investigate color-emotion associations. The relatively low, yet above baseline, accuracy in recognizing emotion for abstract images and rationales suggests that CLIP decodes emotional complexities in a manner not well aligned with human cognitive processes. Furthermore, we explore color-emotion interactions in images and rationales. Expected color-emotion associations, such as red relating to anger, are identified in images and texts annotated with emotion labels by both humans and CLIP, with the latter showing even stronger interactions. Our results highlight the disparity between human processing and machine processing when connecting image features and emotions.

Subword tokenization has become the de-facto standard for tokenization, although comparative evaluations of subword vocabulary quality across languages are scarce. Existing evaluation studies focus on the effect of a tokenization algorithm on the performance in downstream tasks, or on engineering criteria such as the compression rate. We present a new evaluation paradigm that focuses on the cognitive plausibility of subword tokenization. We analyze the correlation of the tokenizer output with the response time and accuracy of human performance on a lexical decision task. We compare three tokenization algorithms across several languages and vocabulary sizes. Our results indicate that the UnigramLM algorithm yields less cognitively plausible tokenization behavior and a worse coverage of derivational morphemes, in contrast with prior work.

Language models (LMs) have been used in cognitive modeling as well as engineering studies -- they compute information-theoretic complexity metrics that simulate humans' cognitive load during reading. This study highlights a limitation of modern neural LMs as the model of choice for this purpose: there is a discrepancy between their context access capacities and that of humans. Our results showed that constraining the LMs' context access improved their simulation of human reading behavior. We also showed that LM-human gaps in context access were associated with specific syntactic constructions; incorporating syntactic biases into LMs' context access might enhance their cognitive plausibility.

This article is part of "the philosophy of artificial intelligence," a series of posts that explore the ethical, moral, and social implications of AI today and in the future. Is AI about the brain? The answer is often, but not always. Many insiders and most outsiders believe that if a solution looks like a brain, it might act as the brain. If a solution acts like a brain, then the solution will solve other problems like humans solve other problems.