Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences.

In this context, our work rigorously addresses the critical concern: Does egalitarian fairness lead to instability?

In this context, our work rigorously addresses the critical concern: Does egalitarian fairness lead to instability?

In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), agents typically form a single grand coalition based on credit assignment to tackle a composite task, often resulting in suboptimal performance. This paper proposed a nucleolus-based credit assignment grounded in cooperative game theory, enabling the autonomous partitioning of agents into multiple small coalitions that can effectively identify and complete subtasks within a larger composite task. Specifically, our designed nucleolus Q-learning could assign fair credits to each agent, and the nucleolus Q-operator provides theoretical guarantees with interpretability for both learning convergence and the stability of the formed small coalitions. Through experiments on Predator-Prey and StarCraft scenarios across varying difficulty levels, our approach demonstrated the emergence of multiple effective coalitions during MARL training, leading to faster learning and superior performance in terms of win rate and cumulative rewards especially in hard and super-hard environments, compared to four baseline methods. Our nucleolus-based credit assignment showed the promise for complex composite tasks requiring effective subteams of agents.

In strategic multi-agent sequential interactions, detecting dynamic coalition structures is crucial for understanding how self-interested agents coordinate to influence outcomes. However, natural-language-based interactions introduce unique challenges to coalition detection due to ambiguity over intents and difficulty in modeling players' subjective perspectives. We propose a new method that leverages recent advancements in large language models and game theory to predict dynamic multilateral coalition formation in Diplomacy, a strategic multi-agent game where agents negotiate coalitions using natural language. The method consists of two stages. The first stage extracts the set of agreements discussed by two agents in their private dialogue, by combining a parsing-based filtering function with a fine-tuned language model trained to predict player intents. In the second stage, we define a new metric using the concept of subjective rationalizability from hypergame theory to evaluate the expected value of an agreement for each player. We then compute this metric for each agreement identified in the first stage by assessing the strategic value of the agreement for both players and taking into account the subjective belief of one player that the second player would honor the agreement. We demonstrate that our method effectively detects potential coalition structures in online Diplomacy gameplay by assigning high values to agreements likely to be honored and low values to those likely to be violated. The proposed method provides foundational insights into coalition formation in multi-agent environments with language-based negotiation and offers key directions for future research on the analysis of complex natural language-based interactions between agents.

Coalition structure generation (CSG), i.e. the problem of optimally partitioning a set of agents into coalitions to maximize social welfare, is a fundamental computational problem in multiagent systems. This problem is important for many applications where small run times are necessary, including transportation and disaster response. In this paper, we develop SALDAE, a multiagent path finding algorithm for CSG that operates on a graph of coalition structures. Our algorithm utilizes a variety of heuristics and strategies to perform the search and guide it. It is an anytime algorithm that can handle large problems with hundreds and thousands of agents. We show empirically on nine standard value distributions, including disaster response and electric vehicle allocation benchmarks, that our algorithm enables a rapid finding of high-quality solutions and compares favorably with other state-of-the-art methods.

Coalition formation is a key capability in multi-agent systems. An important problem in coalition formation is coalition structure generation: partitioning agents into coalitions to optimize the social welfare. This is a challenging problem that has been the subject of active research for the past three decades. In this paper, we present a novel algorithm, SMART, for the problem based on a hybridization of three innovative techniques. Two of these techniques are based on dynamic programming, where we show a powerful connection between the coalitions selected for evaluation and the performance of the algorithms. These algorithms use offline phases to optimize the choice of coalitions to evaluate. The third one uses branch-and-bound and integer partition graph search to explore the solution space. Our techniques bring a new way of approaching the problem and a new level of precision to the field. In experiments over several common value distributions, we show that the hybridization of these techniques in SMART is faster than the fastest prior algorithms (ODP-IP, BOSS) in generating optimal solutions across all the value distributions.

With the rapid advancement of UAV technology, the problem of UAV coalition formation has become a hotspot. Therefore, designing task-driven multi-UAV coalition formation mechanism has become a challenging problem. However, existing coalition formation mechanisms suffer from low relevance between UAVs and task requirements, resulting in overall low coalition utility and unstable coalition structures. To address these problems, this paper proposed a novel multi-UAV coalition network collaborative task completion model, considering both coalition work capacity and task-requirement relationships. This model stimulated the formation of coalitions that match task requirements by using a revenue function based on the coalition's revenue threshold. Subsequently, an algorithm for coalition formation based on marginal utility was proposed. Specifically, the algorithm utilized Shapley value to achieve fair utility distribution within the coalition, evaluated coalition values based on marginal utility preference order, and achieved stable coalition partition through a limited number of iterations. Additionally, we theoretically proved that this algorithm has Nash equilibrium solution. Finally, experimental results demonstrated that the proposed algorithm, compared to currently classical algorithms, not only forms more stable coalitions but also further enhances the overall utility of coalitions effectively.

We study a setting in which a community wishes to identify a strongly supported proposal from a space of alternatives, in order to change the status quo. We describe a deliberation process in which agents dynamically form coalitions around proposals that they prefer over the status quo. We formulate conditions on the space of proposals and on the ways in which coalitions are formed that guarantee deliberation to succeed, that is, to terminate by identifying a proposal with the largest possible support. Our results provide theoretical foundations for the analysis of deliberative processes such as the ones that take place in online systems for democratic deliberation support. Earlier versions of this article have been accepted for presentation at the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI-21 [Elkind et al., 2021] and at the 8th International Workshop on Computational Social Choice, COMSOC-21.