Fox News chief political anchor Bret Baier investigates concerns that artificial intelligence is becoming too advanced on'Special Report.' Many companies now rely on AI to handle parts of the hiring process. Bots screen resumes, filter candidates, and manage preliminary communication before a human steps in. McDonald's utilizes an AI-powered hiring platform called McHire, which is powered by Paradox.ai's While AI brings convenience, it also comes with data privacy risks.

Customer data is often stored as records in Customer Relations Management systems (CRMs). Data which is manually entered into such systems by one of more users over time leads to data replication, partial duplication or fuzzy duplication. This in turn means that there no longer a single source of truth for customers, contacts, accounts, etc. Downstream business processes become increasing complex and contrived without a unique mapping between a record in a CRM and the target customer. Current methods to detect and de-duplicate records use traditional Natural Language Processing techniques known as Entity Matching. In this paper we show how using the latest advancements in Large Language Models and Generative AI can vastly improve the identification and repair of duplicated records. On common benchmark datasets we find an improvement in the accuracy of data de-duplication rates from 30 percent using NLP techniques to almost 60 percent using our proposed method.

Models can expose sensitive information about their training data. In an attribute inference attack, an adversary has partial knowledge of some training records and access to a model trained on those records, and infers the unknown values of a sensitive feature of those records. We study a fine-grained variant of attribute inference we call \emph{sensitive value inference}, where the adversary's goal is to identify with high confidence some records from a candidate set where the unknown attribute has a particular sensitive value. We explicitly compare attribute inference with data imputation that captures the training distribution statistics, under various assumptions about the training data available to the adversary. Our main conclusions are: (1) previous attribute inference methods do not reveal more about the training data from the model than can be inferred by an adversary without access to the trained model, but with the same knowledge of the underlying distribution as needed to train the attribute inference attack; (2) black-box attribute inference attacks rarely learn anything that cannot be learned without the model; but (3) white-box attacks, which we introduce and evaluate in the paper, can reliably identify some records with the sensitive value attribute that would not be predicted without having access to the model. Furthermore, we show that proposed defenses such as differentially private training and removing vulnerable records from training do not mitigate this privacy risk. The code for our experiments is available at \url{https://github.com/bargavj/EvaluatingDPML}.