Institutions play a critical role in enabling communities to manage common-pool resources and avert tragedies of the commons. However, a fundamental issue arises: Individuals typically perceive participation as advantageous only after an institution is established, creating a paradox: How can institutions form if no one will join before a critical mass exists? We term this conundrum the institution bootstrapping problem and propose that misperception, specifically, agents' erroneous belief that an institution already exists, could resolve this paradox. By integrating well-documented psychological phenomena, including cognitive biases, probability distortion, and perceptual noise, into a game-theoretic framework, we demonstrate how these factors collectively mitigate the bootstrapping problem. Notably, unbiased perceptual noise (e.g., noise arising from agents' heterogeneous physical or social contexts) drastically reduces the critical mass of cooperators required for institutional emergence. This effect intensifies with greater diversity of perceptions. We explain this counter-intuitive result through asymmetric boundary conditions: proportional underestimation of low-probability sanctions produces distinct outcomes compared to equivalent overestimation. Furthermore, the type of perceptual distortion, proportional versus absolute, yields qualitatively different evolutionary pathways. These findings challenge conventional assumptions about rationality in institutional design, highlighting how "noisy" cognition can paradoxically enhance cooperation. Finally, we contextualize these insights within broader discussions of multi-agent system design and collective action. Our analysis underscores the importance of incorporating human-like cognitive constraints, not just idealized rationality, into models of institutional emergence and resilience.

When has an agent converged? Standard models of the reinforcement learning problem give rise to a straightforward definition of convergence: An agent converges when its behavior or performance in each environment state stops changing. However, as we shift the focus of our learning problem from the environment's state to the agent's state, the concept of an agent's convergence becomes significantly less clear. In this paper, we propose two complementary accounts of agent convergence in a framing of the reinforcement learning problem that centers around bounded agents. The first view says that a bounded agent has converged when the minimal number of states needed to describe the agent's future behavior cannot decrease. The second view says that a bounded agent has converged just when the agent's performance only changes if the agent's internal state changes. We establish basic properties of these two definitions, show that they accommodate typical views of convergence in standard settings, and prove several facts about their nature and relationship. We take these perspectives, definitions, and analysis to bring clarity to a central idea of the field.

Löb's theorem and Gödel's theorem make predictions about the behavior of systems capable of self-reference with unbounded computational resources with which to write and evaluate proofs. However, in the real world, systems capable of self-reference will have limited memory and processing speed, so in this paper we introduce an effective version of Löb's theorem which is applicable given such bounded resources. These results have powerful implications for the game theory of bounded agents who are able to write proofs about themselves and one another, including the capacity to out-perform classical Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria, attaining mutually cooperative program equilibrium in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Previous cooperative program equilibria studied by Tennenholtz and Fortnow have depended on tests for program equality, a fragile condition, whereas "Löbian" cooperation is much more robust and agnostic of the opponent's implementation. Tennenholtz (2004) showed that cooperative equilibria exist in the Prisoner's Dilemma between agents with transparent source code.