We draw attention to an important, yet largely overlooked aspect of evaluating fairness for automated decision making systems--namely risk and welfare considerations.

We draw attention to an important, yet largely overlooked aspect of evaluating fairness for automated decision making systems--namely risk and welfare considerations.

Often in prediction tasks, the predictive model itself can influence the distribution of the target variable, a phenomenon termed performative prediction. Generally, this influence stems from strategic actions taken by stakeholders with a vested interest in predictive models. A key challenge that hinders the widespread adaptation of performative prediction in machine learning is that practitioners are generally unaware of the social impacts of their predictions. To address this gap, we propose a methodology for learning the distribution map that encapsulates the long-term impacts of predictive models on the population. Specifically, we model agents' responses as a cost-adjusted utility maximization problem and propose estimates for said cost. Our approach leverages optimal transport to align pre-model exposure (ex ante) and post-model exposure (ex post) distributions. We provide a rate of convergence for this proposed estimate and assess its quality through empirical demonstrations on a credit-scoring dataset.

Optimal allocation of agricultural water in the event of droughts is an important global problem. In addressing this problem, many aspects, including the welfare of farmers, the economy, and the environment, must be considered. Under this backdrop, our work focuses on several resource-matching problems accounting for agents with multi-crop portfolios, geographic constraints, and fairness. First, we address a matching problem where the goal is to maximize a welfare function in two-sided markets where buyers' requirements and sellers' supplies are represented by value functions that assign prices (or costs) to specified volumes of water. For the setting where the value functions satisfy certain monotonicity properties, we present an efficient algorithm that maximizes a social welfare function. When there are minimum water requirement constraints, we present a randomized algorithm which ensures that the constraints are satisfied in expectation. For a single seller--multiple buyers setting with fairness constraints, we design an efficient algorithm that maximizes the minimum level of satisfaction of any buyer. We also present computational complexity results that highlight the limits on the generalizability of our results. We evaluate the algorithms developed in our work with experiments on both real-world and synthetic data sets with respect to drought severity, value functions, and seniority of agents.

Group fairness definitions such as Demographic Parity and Equal Opportunity make assumptions about the underlying decision-problem that restrict them to classification problems. Prior work has translated these definitions to other machine learning environments, such as unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning, by implementing their closest mathematical equivalent. As a result, there are numerous bespoke interpretations of these definitions. This work aims to unify the shared aspects of each of these bespoke definitions, and to this end we provide a group fairness framework that generalizes beyond just classification problems. We leverage two fairness principles that enable this generalization. First, our framework measures outcomes in terms of utilities, rather than predictions, and does so for both the decision-maker and the individual. Second, our framework can consider counterfactual outcomes, rather than just observed outcomes, thus preventing loopholes where fairness criteria are satisfied through self-fulfilling prophecies. We provide concrete examples of how our utility fairness framework avoids these assumptions and thus naturally integrates with classification, clustering, and reinforcement learning fairness problems. We also show that many of the bespoke interpretations of Demographic Parity and Equal Opportunity fit nicely as special cases of our framework.

We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad class of coordination games, including the popular framework known as \textit{global games}. With the goal of studying the extent to which agents engaging in a stochastic coordination game indeed coordinate, we propose a new probabilistic measure of coordination efficiency. Then, we provide an universal information theoretic upper bound on the coordination efficiency as a function of the amount of noise in the observation channels. Finally, we revisit a large class of global games, and we illustrate that their Nash equilibrium policies may be less coordination efficient then certainty equivalent policies, despite of them providing better expected utility. This counter-intuitive result, establishes the existence of a nontrivial trade-offs between coordination efficiency and expected utility in coordination games.

Identifying the effects of causes and causes of effects is vital in virtually every scientific field. Often, however, the needed probabilities may not be fully identifiable from the data sources available. This paper shows how partial identifiability is still possible for several probabilities of causation. We term this epsilon-identifiability and demonstrate its usefulness in cases where the behavior of certain subpopulations can be restricted to within some narrow bounds. In particular, we show how unidentifiable causal effects and counterfactual probabilities can be narrowly bounded when such allowances are made. Often those allowances are easily measured and reasonably assumed. Finally, epsilon-identifiability is applied to the unit selection problem.

Applications such as employees sharing office spaces over a workweek can be modeled as problems where agents are matched to resources over multiple rounds. Agents' requirements limit the set of compatible resources and the rounds in which they want to be matched. Viewing such an application as a multi-round matching problem on a bipartite compatibility graph between agents and resources, we show that a solution (i.e., a set of matchings, with one matching per round) can be found efficiently if one exists. To cope with situations where a solution does not exist, we consider two extensions. In the first extension, a benefit function is defined for each agent and the objective is to find a multi-round matching to maximize the total benefit. For a general class of benefit functions satisfying certain properties (including diminishing returns), we show that this multi-round matching problem is efficiently solvable. This class includes utilitarian and Rawlsian welfare functions. For another benefit function, we show that the maximization problem is NP-hard. In the second extension, the objective is to generate advice to each agent (i.e., a subset of requirements to be relaxed) subject to a budget constraint so that the agent can be matched. We show that this budget-constrained advice generation problem is NP-hard. For this problem, we develop an integer linear programming formulation as well as a heuristic based on local search. We experimentally evaluate our algorithms on synthetic networks and apply them to two real-world situations: shared office spaces and matching courses to classrooms.

Probabilities of causation play a crucial role in modern decision-making. Pearl defined three binary probabilities of causation, the probability of necessity and sufficiency (PNS), the probability of sufficiency (PS), and the probability of necessity (PN). These probabilities were then bounded by Tian and Pearl using a combination of experimental and observational data. However, observational data are not always available in practice; in such a case, Tian and Pearl's Theorem provided valid but less effective bounds using pure experimental data. In this paper, we discuss the conditions that observational data are worth considering to improve the quality of the bounds. More specifically, we defined the expected improvement of the bounds by assuming the observational distributions are uniformly distributed on their feasible interval. We further applied the proposed theorems to the unit selection problem defined by Li and Pearl.

The unit selection problem is to identify a group of individuals who are most likely to exhibit a desired mode of behavior, for example, selecting individuals who would respond one way if incentivized and a different way if not. The unit selection problem consists of evaluation and search subproblems. Li and Pearl defined the "benefit function" to evaluate the average payoff of selecting a certain individual with given characteristics. The search subproblem is then to design an algorithm to identify the characteristics that maximize the above benefit function. The hardness of the search subproblem arises due to the large number of characteristics available for each individual and the sparsity of the data available in each cell of characteristics. In this paper, we present a machine learning framework that uses the bounds of the benefit function that are estimable from the finite population data to learn the bounds of the benefit function for each cell of characteristics. Therefore, we could easily obtain the characteristics that maximize the benefit function.