The idea of using belief bases as formal semantics for multi-agent epistemic logic was first introduced in [26] and further developed in [27, 28]. This approach aligns with the sentential (or syntactic) perspective on knowledge representation [21, 13, 33, 20], which holds th at an agent's body of knowledge should be represented as a set of sentences in a formal language. The key novelty of belief base semantics, compared to traditional epistemic logic semantics based on multi-relational Kripke models [31, 12], lies in two main aspects. First, a possible world (or state) in a mo del is not treated as a primitive entity but is instead composed of the agents' belief bases and a valu ation of propositional atoms. Second, the agents' accessibility relations are not explicitly par t of the model but are determined a posteriori from their belief bases.

We introduce a novel language for reasoning about agents' cognitive attitudes of both epistemic and motivational type. We interpret it by means of a computationally grounded semantics using belief bases. Our language includes five types of modal operators for implicit belief, complete attraction, complete repulsion, realistic attraction and realistic repulsion. We give an axiomatization and show that our operators are not mutually expressible and that they can be combined to represent a large variety of psychological concepts including ambivalence, indifference, being motivated, being demotivated and preference. We present a dynamic extension of the language that supports reasoning about the effects of belief change operations. Finally, we provide a succinct formulation of model checking for our languages and a PSPACE model checking algorithm relying on a reduction into TQBF. We present some experimental results for the implemented algorithm on computation time in a concrete example.

In belief revision, agents typically modify their beliefs when they receive some new piece of information that is in conflict with them. The guiding principle behind most belief revision frameworks is that of minimalism, which advocates minimal changes to existing beliefs. However, minimalism may not necessarily capture the nuanced ways in which human agents reevaluate and modify their beliefs. In contrast, the explanatory hypothesis indicates that people are inherently driven to seek explanations for inconsistencies, thereby striving for explanatory coherence rather than minimal changes when revising beliefs. Our contribution in this paper is two-fold. Motivated by the explanatory hypothesis, we first present a novel, yet simple belief revision operator that, given a belief base and an explanation for an explanandum, it revises the belief bases in a manner that preserves the explanandum and is not necessarily minimal. We call this operator explanation-based belief revision. Second, we conduct two human-subject studies to empirically validate our approach and investigate belief revision behavior in real-world scenarios. Our findings support the explanatory hypothesis and provide insights into the strategies people employ when resolving inconsistencies.

Cognitive agent abstractions can help to engineer intelligent systems across mobile devices. On smartphones, the data obtained from onboard sensors can give valuable insights into the user's current situation. Unfortunately, today's cognitive agent frameworks cannot cope well with the challenging characteristics of sensor data. Sensor data is located on a low abstraction level and the individual data elements are not meaningful when observed in isolation. In contrast, cognitive agents operate on high-level percepts and lack the means to effectively detect complex spatio-temporal patterns in sequences of multiple percepts. In this paper, we present a stream-based perception approach that enables the agents to perceive meaningful situations in low-level sensor data streams. We present a crowdshipping case study where autonomous, self-interested agents collaborate to deliver parcels to their destinations. We show how situations derived from smartphone sensor data can trigger and guide auctions, which the agents use to reach agreements. Experiments with real smartphone data demonstrate the benefits of stream-based agent perception.

We present a novel semantics for the language of multi-agent only believing exploiting belief bases, and show how to use it for automatically checking formulas of this language and of its dynamic extension with private belief expansion operators. We provide a PSPACE algorithm for model checking relying on a reduction to QBF and alternative dedicated algorithm relying on the exploration of the state space. We present an implementation of the QBF-based algorithm and some experimental results on computation time in a concrete example.

In this paper, we investigate inductive inference with system W from conditional belief bases with respect to syntax splitting. The concept of syntax splitting for inductive inference states that inferences about independent parts of the signature should not affect each other. This was captured in work by Kern-Isberner, Beierle, and Brewka in the form of postulates for inductive inference operators expressing syntax splitting as a combination of relevance and independence; it was also shown that c-inference fulfils syntax splitting, while system P inference and system Z both fail to satisfy it. System W is a recently introduced inference system for nonmonotonic reasoning that captures and properly extends system Z as well as c-inference. We show that system W fulfils the syntax splitting postulates for inductive inference operators by showing that it satisfies the required properties of relevance and independence. This makes system W another inference operator besides c-inference that fully complies with syntax splitting, while in contrast to c-inference, also extending rational closure.

A strong intuition for AGM belief change operations, Gärdenfors suggests, is that formulas that are independent of a change should remain intact. Based on this intuition, Fariñas and Herzig axiomatize a dependence relation w.r.t. a belief set, and formalize the connection between dependence and belief change. In this paper, we introduce base dependence as a relation between formulas w.r.t. a belief base. After an axiomatization of base dependence, we formalize the connection between base dependence and a particular belief base change operation, saturated kernel contraction. Moreover, we prove that base dependence is a reversible generalization of Fariñas and Herzig's dependence. That is, in the special case when the underlying belief base is deductively closed (i.e., it is a belief set), base dependence reduces to dependence. Finally, an intriguing feature of Fariñas and Herzig's formalism is that it meets other criteria for dependence, namely, Keynes' conjunction criterion for dependence (CCD) and Gärdenfors' conjunction criterion for independence (CCI). We show that our base dependence formalism also meets these criteria. More interestingly, we offer a more specific criterion that implies both CCD and CCI, and show our base dependence formalism also meets this new criterion.

Activation-based conditional inference applies conditional reasoning to ACT-R, a cognitive architecture developed to formalize human reasoning. The idea of activation-based conditional inference is to determine a reasonable subset of a conditional belief base in order to draw inductive inferences in time. Central to activation-based conditional inference is the activation function which assigns to the conditionals in the belief base a degree of activation mainly based on the conditional's relevance for the current query and its usage history.

The AGM postulates by Alchourr\'{o}n, G\"{a}rdenfors, and Makinson continue to represent a cornerstone in research related to belief change. We generalize the approach of Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) for characterizing AGM base revision from propositional logic to the setting of (multiple) base revision in arbitrary monotonic logics. Our core result is a representation theorem using the assignment of total - yet not transitive - "preference" relations to belief bases. We also provide a characterization of all logics for which our result can be strengthened to preorder assignments (as in KM's original work).

In this paper we study a kind of operator --known as credibility-limited base revisions-- which addresses two of the main issues that have been pointed out to the AGM model of belief change. Indeed, on the one hand, these operators are defined on belief bases (rather than belief sets) and, on the other hand, they are constructed with the underlying idea that not all new information is accepted. We propose twenty different classes of credibilitylimited base revision operators and obtain axiomatic characterizations for each of them. Additionally we thoroughly investigate the interrelations (in the sense of inclusion) among all those classes. More precisely, we analyse whether each one of those classes is or is not (strictly) contained in each of the remaining ones.