In collective decision making, members of a group need to coordinate their actions in order to achieve a desirable outcome. When there is no direct communication between group members, one should decide based on inferring others' intentions from their actions. The inference of others' intentions is called theory of mind and can involve different levels of reasoning, from a single inference on a hidden variable to considering others partially or fully optimal and reasoning about their actions conditioned on one's own actions (levels of "theory of mind"). In this paper, we present a new Bayesian theory of collective decision making based on a simple yet most commonly observed behavior: conformity. We show that such a Bayesian framework allows one to achieve any level of theory of mind in collective decision making. The viability of our framework is demonstrated on two different experiments, a consensus task with 120 subjects and a volunteer's dilemma task with 29 subjects, each with multiple conditions.

In collective decision making, members of a group need to coordinate their actions in order to achieve a desirable outcome. When there is no direct communication between group members, one should decide based on inferring others' intentions from their actions. The inference of others' intentions is called "theory of mind" and can involve different levels of reasoning, from a single inference on a hidden variable to considering others partially or fully optimal and reasoning about their actions conditioned on one's own actions (levels of "theory of mind"). In this paper, we present a new Bayesian theory of collective decision making based on a simple yet most commonly observed behavior: conformity. We show that such a Bayesian framework allows one to achieve any level of theory of mind in collective decision making.

This paper extends Bayesian probability theory by developing a multidimensional space of events (MDSE) theory that accounts for mutual influences between events and hypotheses sets. While traditional Bayesian approaches assume conditional independence between certain variables, real-world systems often exhibit complex interdependencies that limit classical model applicability. Building on established probabilistic foundations, our approach introduces a mathematical formalism for modeling these complex relationships. We developed the MDSE theory through rigorous mathematical derivation and validated it using three complementary methodologies: analytical proofs, computational simulations, and case studies drawn from diverse domains. Results demonstrate that MDSE successfully models complex dependencies with 15-20% improved prediction accuracy compared to standard Bayesian methods when applied to datasets with high interdimensionality. This theory particularly excels in scenarios with over 50 interrelated variables, where traditional methods show exponential computational complexity growth while MDSE maintains polynomial scaling. Our findings indicate that MDSE provides a viable mathematical foundation for extending Bayesian reasoning to complex systems while maintaining computational tractability. This approach offers practical applications in engineering challenges including risk assessment, resource optimization, and forecasting problems where multiple interdependent factors must be simultaneously considered.

This paper introduces a Bayesian formulation of Theory of Mind with a focus on conformity. The model is able to represent multi-level reasoning processes in multi round games. The experimental results confirmed that the model provides a better fit to data compared to previous works. The manuscript is very well written and it was a pleasure read. The ideas are well described and motivated (except one section which is mentioned below) and the experiments are well conducted.

In collective decision making, members of a group need to coordinate their actions in order to achieve a desirable outcome. When there is no direct communication between group members, one should decide based on inferring others' intentions from their actions. The inference of others' intentions is called "theory of mind" and can involve different levels of reasoning, from a single inference on a hidden variable to considering others partially or fully optimal and reasoning about their actions conditioned on one's own actions (levels of "theory of mind"). In this paper, we present a new Bayesian theory of collective decision making based on a simple yet most commonly observed behavior: conformity. We show that such a Bayesian framework allows one to achieve any level of theory of mind in collective decision making.

To facilitate the development of new models to bridge the gap between machine and human social intelligence, the recently proposed Baby Intuitions Benchmark (arXiv:2102.11938) provides a suite of tasks designed to evaluate commonsense reasoning about agents' goals and actions that even young infants exhibit. Here we present a principled Bayesian solution to this benchmark, based on a hierarchically Bayesian Theory of Mind (HBToM). By including hierarchical priors on agent goals and dispositions, inference over our HBToM model enables few-shot learning of the efficiency and preferences of an agent, which can then be used in commonsense plausibility judgements about subsequent agent behavior. This approach achieves near-perfect accuracy on most benchmark tasks, outperforming deep learning and imitation learning baselines while producing interpretable human-like inferences, demonstrating the advantages of structured Bayesian models of human social cognition.

In the moment between reading a phone number and punching it into your phone, you may find that the digits have mysteriously gone astray--even if you've seared the first ones into your memory, the last ones may still blur unaccountably. Was the 6 before the 8 or after it? Maintaining such scraps of information long enough to act on them draws on an ability called visual working memory. For years, scientists have debated whether working memory has space for only a few items at a time or if it just has limited room for detail: Perhaps our mind's capacity is spread across either a few crystal-clear recollections or a multitude of more dubious fragments. Original story reprinted with permission from Quanta Magazine, an editorially independent publication of the Simons Foundation whose mission is to enhance public understanding of science by covering research developments and trends in mathematics and the physical and life sciences.

When inferring the goals that others are trying to achieve, people intuitively understand that others might make mistakes along the way. This is crucial for activities such as teaching, offering assistance, and deciding between blame or forgiveness. However, Bayesian models of theory of mind have generally not accounted for these mistakes, instead modeling agents as mostly optimal in achieving their goals. As a result, they are unable to explain phenomena like locking oneself out of one's house, or losing a game of chess. Here, we extend the Bayesian Theory of Mind framework to model boundedly rational agents who may have mistaken goals, plans, and actions. We formalize this by modeling agents as probabilistic programs, where goals may be confused with semantically similar states, plans may be misguided due to resource-bounded planning, and actions may be unintended due to execution errors. We present experiments eliciting human goal inferences in two domains: (i) a gridworld puzzle with gems locked behind doors, and (ii) a block-stacking domain. Our model better explains human inferences than alternatives, while generalizing across domains. These findings indicate the importance of modeling others as bounded agents, in order to account for the full richness of human intuitive psychology.

Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence have produced agents that can beat human world champions at games like Go, Starcraft, and Dota2. However, most of these models do not seem to play in a human-like manner: People infer others' intentions from their behaviour, and use these inferences in scheming and strategizing. Here, using a Bayesian Theory of Mind (ToM) approach, we investigated how much an explicit representation of others' intentions improves performance in a cooperative game. We compared the performance of humans playing with optimal-planning agents with and without ToM, in a cooperative game where players have to flexibly cooperate to achieve joint goals. We find that teams with ToM agents significantly outperform non-ToM agents when collaborating with all types of partners: non-ToM, ToM, as well as human players, and that the benefit of ToM increases the more ToM agents there are. These findings have implications for designing better cooperative agents.

In collective decision making, members of a group need to coordinate their actions in order to achieve a desirable outcome. When there is no direct communication between group members, one should decide based on inferring others' intentions from their actions. The inference of others' intentions is called "theory of mind" and can involve different levels of reasoning, from a single inference on a hidden variable to considering others partially or fully optimal and reasoning about their actions conditioned on one's own actions (levels of "theory of mind"). In this paper, we present a new Bayesian theory of collective decision making based on a simple yet most commonly observed behavior: conformity. We show that such a Bayesian framework allows one to achieve any level of theory of mind in collective decision making.