The concept of "ideal semantics" has been promoted as an alternative basis for skeptical reasoning within abstract argumentation settings. Informally, ideal acceptance not only requires an argument to be skeptically accepted in the traditional sense but further insists that the argument is in an admissible set all of whose arguments are also skeptically accepted. The original proposal was couched in terms of the so-called preferred semantics for abstract argumentation. We argue, in this paper, that the notion of "deal acceptability'' is applicable to arbitrary semantics and justify this claim by showing that standard properties of classical ideal semantics, e.g. unique status, continue to hold in any "reasonable" extension-based semantics. We categorise the relationship between the divers concepts of "ideal extension wrt semantics s" that arise and we present a comprehensive analysis of algorithmic and complexity-theoretic issues.

Logic programming has developed as a rich field, built over a logical substratum whose main constituent is a nonclassical form of negation, sometimes coexisting with classical negation. The field has seen the advent of a number of alternative semantics, with Kripke-Kleene semantics, the well-founded semantics, the stable model semantics, and the answer-set semantics standing out as the most successful. We show that all aforementioned semantics are particular cases of a generic semantics, in a framework where classical negation is the unique form of negation and where the literals in the bodies of the rules can be `marked' to indicate that they can be the targets of hypotheses. A particular semantics then amounts to choosing a particular marking scheme and choosing a particular set of hypotheses. When a literal belongs to the chosen set of hypotheses, all marked occurrences of that literal in the body of a rule are assumed to be true, whereas the occurrences of that literal that have not been marked in the body of the rule are to be derived in order to contribute to the firing of the rule. Hence the notion of hypothetical reasoning that is presented in this framework is not based on making global assumptions, but more subtly on making local, contextual assumptions, taking effect as indicated by the chosen marking scheme on the basis of the chosen set of hypotheses. Our approach offers a unified view on the various semantics proposed in logic programming, classical in that only classical negation is used, and links the semantics of logic programs to mechanisms that endow rule-based systems with the power to harness hypothetical reasoning.