What can contemporary machine learning (ML) models do? Given the proliferation of ML models in society, answering this question matters to a variety of stakeholders, both public and private. The evaluation of models' capabilities is rapidly emerging as a key subfield of modern ML, buoyed by regulatory attention and government grants. Despite this, the notion of an ML model possessing a capability has not been interrogated: what are we saying when we say that a model is able to do something? And what sorts of evidence bear upon this question? In this paper, we aim to answer these questions, using the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) as a running example. Drawing on the large philosophical literature on abilities, we develop an account of ML models' capabilities which can be usefully applied to the nascent science of model evaluation. Our core proposal is a conditional analysis of model abilities (CAMA): crudely, a machine learning model has a capability to X just when it would reliably succeed at doing X if it 'tried'. The main contribution of the paper is making this proposal precise in the context of ML, resulting in an operationalisation of CAMA applicable to LLMs. We then put CAMA to work, showing that it can help make sense of various features of ML model evaluation practice, as well as suggest procedures for performing fair inter-model comparisons.

Over the last years, many 'explainable artificial intelligence' (xAI) approaches have been developed, but these have not always been objectively evaluated. To evaluate the quality of heatmaps generated by various saliency methods, we developed a framework to generate artificial data with synthetic lesions and a known ground truth map. Using this framework, we evaluated two data sets with different backgrounds, Perlin noise and 2D brain MRI slices, and found that the heatmaps vary strongly between saliency methods and backgrounds. We strongly encourage further evaluation of saliency maps and xAI methods using this framework before applying these in clinical or other safety-critical settings.

Perceived personality traits attributed to an individual do not have to correspond to their actual personality traits and may be determined in part by the context in which one encounters a person. These apparent traits determine, to a large extent, how other people will behave towards them. Deep neural networks are increasingly being used to perform automated personality attribution (e.g., job interviews). It is important that we understand the driving factors behind the predictions, in humans and in deep neural networks. This paper explicitly studies the effect of the image background on apparent personality prediction while addressing two important confounds present in existing literature; overlapping data splits and including facial information in the background. Surprisingly, we found no evidence that background information improves model predictions for apparent personality traits. In fact, when background is explicitly added to the input, a decrease in performance was measured across all models.

We introduce the notion of Morton-style factorial coding and illustrate how it may help understand information integration and perceptual coding in the brain. We show that by focusing on average responses one may miss the existence of factorial coding mechanisms that become only apparent when analyzing spike count histograms. We show evidence suggesting that the classical/nonclassical receptive field organization in the cortex effectively enforces the development of Morton-style factorial codes. This may provide some cues to help understand perceptual coding in the brain and to develop new unsupervised learning algorithms. While methods like ICA (Bell & Sejnowski, 1997) develop independent codes, in Morton-style coding the goal is to make two or more external aspects of the world become independent when conditioning on internal representations.

We introduce the notion of Morton-style factorial coding and illustrate how it may help understand information integration and perceptual coding in the brain. We show that by focusing on average responses one may miss the existence of factorial coding mechanisms that become only apparent when analyzing spike count histograms. We show evidence suggesting that the classical/nonclassical receptive field organization in the cortex effectively enforces the development of Morton-style factorial codes. This may provide some cues to help understand perceptual coding in the brain and to develop new unsupervised learning algorithms. While methods like ICA (Bell & Sejnowski, 1997) develop independent codes, in Morton-style coding the goal is to make two or more external aspects of the world become independent when conditioning on internal representations.

We introduce the notion of Morton-style factorial coding and illustrate how it may help understand information integration and perceptual coding inthe brain. We show that by focusing on average responses one may miss the existence of factorial coding mechanisms that become only apparent when analyzing spike count histograms. We show evidence suggesting that the classical/nonclassical receptive field organization in the cortex effectively enforces the development of Morton-style factorial codes. This may provide some cues to help understand perceptual coding inthe brain and to develop new unsupervised learning algorithms. While methods like ICA (Bell & Sejnowski, 1997) develop independent codes, in Morton-style coding the goal is to make two or more external aspects of the world become independent when conditioning on internal representations.