We present a novel adversarial model for authentication systems that use gait patterns recorded by the inertial measurement unit (IMU) built into smartphones. The attack idea is inspired by and named after the concept of a dictionary attack on knowledge (PIN or password) based authentication systems. In particular, this work investigates whether it is possible to build a dictionary of IMUGait patterns and use it to launch an attack or find an imitator who can actively reproduce IMUGait patterns that match the target's IMUGait pattern. Nine physically and demographically diverse individuals walked at various levels of four predefined controllable and adaptable gait factors (speed, step length, step width, and thigh-lift), producing 178 unique IMUGait patterns. Each pattern attacked a wide variety of user authentication models. The deeper analysis of error rates (before and after the attack) challenges the belief that authentication systems based on IMUGait patterns are the most difficult to spoof; further research is needed on adversarial models and associated countermeasures.

By focusing on immersive interaction among users, the burgeoning Metaverse can be viewed as a natural extension of existing social media. Similar to traditional online social networks, there are numerous security and privacy issues in the Metaverse (e.g., attacks on user authentication and impersonation). In this paper, we develop a holistic research agenda for zero-trust user authentication in social virtual reality (VR), an early prototype of the Metaverse. Our proposed research includes four concrete steps: investigating biometrics-based authentication that is suitable for continuously authenticating VR users, leveraging federated learning (FL) for protecting user privacy in biometric data, improving the accuracy of continuous VR authentication with multimodal data, and boosting the usability of zero-trust security with adaptive VR authentication. Our preliminary study demonstrates that conventional FL algorithms are not well suited for biometrics-based authentication of VR users, leading to an accuracy of less than 10%. We discuss the root cause of this problem, the associated open challenges, and several future directions for realizing our research vision.

Mouse dynamics is a potential means of authenticating users. Typically, the authentication process is based on classical machine learning techniques, but recently, deep learning techniques have been introduced for this purpose. Although prior research has demonstrated how machine learning and deep learning algorithms can be bypassed by carefully crafted adversarial samples, there has been very little research performed on the topic of behavioural biometrics in the adversarial domain. In an attempt to address this gap, we built a set of attacks, which are applications of several generative approaches, to construct adversarial mouse trajectories that bypass authentication models. These generated mouse sequences will serve as the adversarial samples in the context of our experiments. We also present an analysis of the attack approaches we explored, explaining their limitations. In contrast to previous work, we consider the attacks in a more realistic and challenging setting in which an attacker has access to recorded user data but does not have access to the authentication model or its outputs. We explore three different attack strategies: 1) statistics-based, 2) imitation-based, and 3) surrogate-based; we show that they are able to evade the functionality of the authentication models, thereby impacting their robustness adversely. We show that imitation-based attacks often perform better than surrogate-based attacks, unless, however, the attacker can guess the architecture of the authentication model. In such cases, we propose a potential detection mechanism against surrogate-based attacks.