audio input
IFEval-Audio: Benchmarking Instruction-Following Capability in Audio-based Large Language Models
Gao, Yiming, Wang, Bin, Wei, Chengwei, Sun, Shuo, Aw, AiTi
Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong instruction-following capabilities in text-based tasks. However, this ability often deteriorates in multimodal models after alignment with non-text modalities such as images or audio. While several recent efforts have investigated instruction-following performance in text and vision-language models, instruction-following in audio-based large language models remains largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, we introduce IFEval-Audio, a novel evaluation dataset designed to assess the ability to follow instructions in an audio LLM. IFEval-Audio contains 280 audio-instruction-answer triples across six diverse dimensions: Content, Capitalization, Symbol, List Structure, Length, and Format. Each example pairs an audio input with a text instruction, requiring the model to generate an output that follows a specified structure. We benchmark state-of-the-art audio LLMs on their ability to follow audio-involved instructions. The dataset is released publicly to support future research in this emerging area.
JALMBench: Benchmarking Jailbreak Vulnerabilities in Audio Language Models
Peng, Zifan, Liu, Yule, Sun, Zhen, Li, Mingchen, Luo, Zeren, Zheng, Jingyi, Dong, Wenhan, He, Xinlei, Wang, Xuechao, Xue, Yingjie, Xu, Shengmin, Huang, Xinyi
Audio Language Models (ALMs) have made significant progress recently. These models integrate the audio modality directly into the model, rather than converting speech into text and inputting text to Large Language Models (LLMs). While jailbreak attacks on LLMs have been extensively studied, the security of ALMs with audio modalities remains largely unexplored. Currently, there is a lack of an adversarial audio dataset and a unified framework specifically designed to evaluate and compare attacks and ALMs. In this paper, we present JALMBench, a comprehensive benchmark to assess the safety of ALMs against jailbreak attacks. JALMBench includes a dataset containing 11,316 text samples and 245,355 audio samples with over 1,000 hours. It supports 12 mainstream ALMs, 4 text-transferred and 4 audio-originated attack methods, and 5 defense methods. Using JALMBench, we provide an in-depth analysis of attack efficiency, topic sensitivity, voice diversity, and architecture. Additionally, we explore mitigation strategies for the attacks at both the prompt level and the response level.
LLaSO: A Foundational Framework for Reproducible Research in Large Language and Speech Model
Sun, Yirong, Geng, Yizhong, Wei, Peidong, Chen, Yanjun, Yang, Jinghan, Chen, Rongfei, Zhang, Wei, Shen, Xiaoyu
The development of Large Speech-Language Models (LSLMs) has been slowed by fragmented architectures and a lack of transparency, hindering the systematic comparison and reproducibility of research. Unlike in the vision-language domain, the LSLM field suffers from the common practice of releasing model weights without their corresponding training data and configurations. To address these critical gaps, we introduce LLaSO, the first fully open, end-to-end framework for large-scale speech-language modeling. LLaSO provides the community with three essential resources: (1) LLaSO-Align, a 12M-instance speech-text alignment corpus; (2) LLaSO-Instruct, a 13.5M-instance multi-task instruction-tuning dataset; and (3) LLaSO-Eval, a reproducible benchmark for standardized evaluation. To validate our framework, we build and release LLaSO-Base, a 3.8B-parameter reference model trained exclusively on our public data. It achieves a normalized score of 0.72, establishing a strong, reproducible baseline that surpasses comparable models. Our analysis reveals that while broader training coverage enhances performance, significant generalization gaps persist on unseen tasks, particularly in pure audio scenarios. By releasing the complete stack of data, benchmarks, and models, LLaSO establishes a foundational open standard to unify research efforts and accelerate community-driven progress in LSLMs. We release the code, dataset, pretrained models, and results in https://github.com/EIT-NLP/LLaSO.
A Code
We convert all images to grayscale and resize to 84x84. It is a convolutional neural network with fixed random weights. In Atari, we use 128 parallel environments, and in Habitat, we use 1 environment, as it does not support multithreading. We use the same hyperparameters as in large scale curiosity: a learning rate of 0.0001 for all models, a discount factor Future prediction and multimodal association can be complementary forms of curiosity. Further work could explore other ways of combining intrinsic rewards, such as switching between the complementary forms.
Seeing Soundscapes: Audio-Visual Generation and Separation from Soundscapes Using Audio-Visual Separator
Recent audio-visual generative models have made substantial progress in generating images from audio. However, existing approaches focus on generating images from single-class audio and fail to generate images from mixed audio. To address this, we propose an Audio-Visual Generation and Separation model (AV-GAS) for generating images from soundscapes (mixed audio containing multiple classes). Our contribution is threefold: First, we propose a new challenge in the audio-visual generation task, which is to generate an image given a multi-class audio input, and we propose a method that solves this task using an audio-visual separator. Second, we introduce a new audio-visual separation task, which involves generating separate images for each class present in a mixed audio input. Lastly, we propose new evaluation metrics for the audio-visual generation task: Class Representation Score (CRS) and a modified R@K. Our model is trained and evaluated on the VGGSound dataset. We show that our method outperforms the state-of-the-art, achieving 7% higher CRS and 4% higher R@2* in generating plausible images with mixed audio.
Multilingual and Multi-Accent Jailbreaking of Audio LLMs
Roh, Jaechul, Shejwalkar, Virat, Houmansadr, Amir
Large Audio Language Models (LALMs) have significantly advanced audio understanding but introduce critical security risks, particularly through audio jailbreaks. While prior work has focused on English-centric attacks, we expose a far more severe vulnerability: adversarial multilingual and multi-accent audio jailbreaks, where linguistic and acoustic variations dramatically amplify attack success. In this paper, we introduce Multi-AudioJail, the first systematic framework to exploit these vulnerabilities through (1) a novel dataset of adversarially perturbed multilingual/multi-accent audio jailbreaking prompts, and (2) a hierarchical evaluation pipeline revealing that how acoustic perturbations (e.g., reverberation, echo, and whisper effects) interacts with cross-lingual phonetics to cause jailbreak success rates (JSRs) to surge by up to +57.25 percentage points (e.g., reverberated Kenyan-accented attack on MERaLiON). Crucially, our work further reveals that multimodal LLMs are inherently more vulnerable than unimodal systems: attackers need only exploit the weakest link (e.g., non-English audio inputs) to compromise the entire model, which we empirically show by multilingual audio-only attacks achieving 3.1x higher success rates than text-only attacks. We plan to release our dataset to spur research into cross-modal defenses, urging the community to address this expanding attack surface in multimodality as LALMs evolve.
Audio Is the Achilles' Heel: Red Teaming Audio Large Multimodal Models
Yang, Hao, Qu, Lizhen, Shareghi, Ehsan, Haffari, Gholamreza
Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have demonstrated the ability to interact with humans under real-world conditions by combining Large Language Models (LLMs) and modality encoders to align multimodal information (visual and auditory) with text. However, such models raise new safety challenges of whether models that are safety-aligned on text also exhibit consistent safeguards for multimodal inputs. Despite recent safety-alignment research on vision LMMs, the safety of audio LMMs remains under-explored. In this work, we comprehensively red team the safety of five advanced audio LMMs under three settings: (i) harmful questions in both audio and text formats, (ii) harmful questions in text format accompanied by distracting non-speech audio, and (iii) speech-specific jailbreaks. Our results under these settings demonstrate that open-source audio LMMs suffer an average attack success rate of 69.14% on harmful audio questions, and exhibit safety vulnerabilities when distracted with non-speech audio noise. Our speech-specific jailbreaks on Gemini-1.5-Pro achieve an attack success rate of 70.67% on the harmful query benchmark. We provide insights on what could cause these reported safety-misalignments. Warning: this paper contains offensive examples.
GPT-4o System Card
OpenAI, null, :, null, Hurst, Aaron, Lerer, Adam, Goucher, Adam P., Perelman, Adam, Ramesh, Aditya, Clark, Aidan, Ostrow, AJ, Welihinda, Akila, Hayes, Alan, Radford, Alec, Mądry, Aleksander, Baker-Whitcomb, Alex, Beutel, Alex, Borzunov, Alex, Carney, Alex, Chow, Alex, Kirillov, Alex, Nichol, Alex, Paino, Alex, Renzin, Alex, Passos, Alex Tachard, Kirillov, Alexander, Christakis, Alexi, Conneau, Alexis, Kamali, Ali, Jabri, Allan, Moyer, Allison, Tam, Allison, Crookes, Amadou, Tootoochian, Amin, Tootoonchian, Amin, Kumar, Ananya, Vallone, Andrea, Karpathy, Andrej, Braunstein, Andrew, Cann, Andrew, Codispoti, Andrew, Galu, Andrew, Kondrich, Andrew, Tulloch, Andrew, Mishchenko, Andrey, Baek, Angela, Jiang, Angela, Pelisse, Antoine, Woodford, Antonia, Gosalia, Anuj, Dhar, Arka, Pantuliano, Ashley, Nayak, Avi, Oliver, Avital, Zoph, Barret, Ghorbani, Behrooz, Leimberger, Ben, Rossen, Ben, Sokolowsky, Ben, Wang, Ben, Zweig, Benjamin, Hoover, Beth, Samic, Blake, McGrew, Bob, Spero, Bobby, Giertler, Bogo, Cheng, Bowen, Lightcap, Brad, Walkin, Brandon, Quinn, Brendan, Guarraci, Brian, Hsu, Brian, Kellogg, Bright, Eastman, Brydon, Lugaresi, Camillo, Wainwright, Carroll, Bassin, Cary, Hudson, Cary, Chu, Casey, Nelson, Chad, Li, Chak, Shern, Chan Jun, Conger, Channing, Barette, Charlotte, Voss, Chelsea, Ding, Chen, Lu, Cheng, Zhang, Chong, Beaumont, Chris, Hallacy, Chris, Koch, Chris, Gibson, Christian, Kim, Christina, Choi, Christine, McLeavey, Christine, Hesse, Christopher, Fischer, Claudia, Winter, Clemens, Czarnecki, Coley, Jarvis, Colin, Wei, Colin, Koumouzelis, Constantin, Sherburn, Dane, Kappler, Daniel, Levin, Daniel, Levy, Daniel, Carr, David, Farhi, David, Mely, David, Robinson, David, Sasaki, David, Jin, Denny, Valladares, Dev, Tsipras, Dimitris, Li, Doug, Nguyen, Duc Phong, Findlay, Duncan, Oiwoh, Edede, Wong, Edmund, Asdar, Ehsan, Proehl, Elizabeth, Yang, Elizabeth, Antonow, Eric, Kramer, Eric, Peterson, Eric, Sigler, Eric, Wallace, Eric, Brevdo, Eugene, Mays, Evan, Khorasani, Farzad, Such, Felipe Petroski, Raso, Filippo, Zhang, Francis, von Lohmann, Fred, Sulit, Freddie, Goh, Gabriel, Oden, Gene, Salmon, Geoff, Starace, Giulio, Brockman, Greg, Salman, Hadi, Bao, Haiming, Hu, Haitang, Wong, Hannah, Wang, Haoyu, Schmidt, Heather, Whitney, Heather, Jun, Heewoo, Kirchner, Hendrik, Pinto, Henrique Ponde de Oliveira, Ren, Hongyu, Chang, Huiwen, Chung, Hyung Won, Kivlichan, Ian, O'Connell, Ian, O'Connell, Ian, Osband, Ian, Silber, Ian, Sohl, Ian, Okuyucu, Ibrahim, Lan, Ikai, Kostrikov, Ilya, Sutskever, Ilya, Kanitscheider, Ingmar, Gulrajani, Ishaan, Coxon, Jacob, Menick, Jacob, Pachocki, Jakub, Aung, James, Betker, James, Crooks, James, Lennon, James, Kiros, Jamie, Leike, Jan, Park, Jane, Kwon, Jason, Phang, Jason, Teplitz, Jason, Wei, Jason, Wolfe, Jason, Chen, Jay, Harris, Jeff, Varavva, Jenia, Lee, Jessica Gan, Shieh, Jessica, Lin, Ji, Yu, Jiahui, Weng, Jiayi, Tang, Jie, Yu, Jieqi, Jang, Joanne, Candela, Joaquin Quinonero, Beutler, Joe, Landers, Joe, Parish, Joel, Heidecke, Johannes, Schulman, John, Lachman, Jonathan, McKay, Jonathan, Uesato, Jonathan, Ward, Jonathan, Kim, Jong Wook, Huizinga, Joost, Sitkin, Jordan, Kraaijeveld, Jos, Gross, Josh, Kaplan, Josh, Snyder, Josh, Achiam, Joshua, Jiao, Joy, Lee, Joyce, Zhuang, Juntang, Harriman, Justyn, Fricke, Kai, Hayashi, Kai, Singhal, Karan, Shi, Katy, Karthik, Kavin, Wood, Kayla, Rimbach, Kendra, Hsu, Kenny, Nguyen, Kenny, Gu-Lemberg, Keren, Button, Kevin, Liu, Kevin, Howe, Kiel, Muthukumar, Krithika, Luther, Kyle, Ahmad, Lama, Kai, Larry, Itow, Lauren, Workman, Lauren, Pathak, Leher, Chen, Leo, Jing, Li, Guy, Lia, Fedus, Liam, Zhou, Liang, Mamitsuka, Lien, Weng, Lilian, McCallum, Lindsay, Held, Lindsey, Ouyang, Long, Feuvrier, Louis, Zhang, Lu, Kondraciuk, Lukas, Kaiser, Lukasz, Hewitt, Luke, Metz, Luke, Doshi, Lyric, Aflak, Mada, Simens, Maddie, Boyd, Madelaine, Thompson, Madeleine, Dukhan, Marat, Chen, Mark, Gray, Mark, Hudnall, Mark, Zhang, Marvin, Aljubeh, Marwan, Litwin, Mateusz, Zeng, Matthew, Johnson, Max, Shetty, Maya, Gupta, Mayank, Shah, Meghan, Yatbaz, Mehmet, Yang, Meng Jia, Zhong, Mengchao, Glaese, Mia, Chen, Mianna, Janner, Michael, Lampe, Michael, Petrov, Michael, Wu, Michael, Wang, Michele, Fradin, Michelle, Pokrass, Michelle, Castro, Miguel, de Castro, Miguel Oom Temudo, Pavlov, Mikhail, Brundage, Miles, Wang, Miles, Khan, Minal, Murati, Mira, Bavarian, Mo, Lin, Molly, Yesildal, Murat, Soto, Nacho, Gimelshein, Natalia, Cone, Natalie, Staudacher, Natalie, Summers, Natalie, LaFontaine, Natan, Chowdhury, Neil, Ryder, Nick, Stathas, Nick, Turley, Nick, Tezak, Nik, Felix, Niko, Kudige, Nithanth, Keskar, Nitish, Deutsch, Noah, Bundick, Noel, Puckett, Nora, Nachum, Ofir, Okelola, Ola, Boiko, Oleg, Murk, Oleg, Jaffe, Oliver, Watkins, Olivia, Godement, Olivier, Campbell-Moore, Owen, Chao, Patrick, McMillan, Paul, Belov, Pavel, Su, Peng, Bak, Peter, Bakkum, Peter, Deng, Peter, Dolan, Peter, Hoeschele, Peter, Welinder, Peter, Tillet, Phil, Pronin, Philip, Tillet, Philippe, Dhariwal, Prafulla, Yuan, Qiming, Dias, Rachel, Lim, Rachel, Arora, Rahul, Troll, Rajan, Lin, Randall, Lopes, Rapha Gontijo, Puri, Raul, Miyara, Reah, Leike, Reimar, Gaubert, Renaud, Zamani, Reza, Wang, Ricky, Donnelly, Rob, Honsby, Rob, Smith, Rocky, Sahai, Rohan, Ramchandani, Rohit, Huet, Romain, Carmichael, Rory, Zellers, Rowan, Chen, Roy, Chen, Ruby, Nigmatullin, Ruslan, Cheu, Ryan, Jain, Saachi, Altman, Sam, Schoenholz, Sam, Toizer, Sam, Miserendino, Samuel, Agarwal, Sandhini, Culver, Sara, Ethersmith, Scott, Gray, Scott, Grove, Sean, Metzger, Sean, Hermani, Shamez, Jain, Shantanu, Zhao, Shengjia, Wu, Sherwin, Jomoto, Shino, Wu, Shirong, Shuaiqi, null, Xia, null, Phene, Sonia, Papay, Spencer, Narayanan, Srinivas, Coffey, Steve, Lee, Steve, Hall, Stewart, Balaji, Suchir, Broda, Tal, Stramer, Tal, Xu, Tao, Gogineni, Tarun, Christianson, Taya, Sanders, Ted, Patwardhan, Tejal, Cunninghman, Thomas, Degry, Thomas, Dimson, Thomas, Raoux, Thomas, Shadwell, Thomas, Zheng, Tianhao, Underwood, Todd, Markov, Todor, Sherbakov, Toki, Rubin, Tom, Stasi, Tom, Kaftan, Tomer, Heywood, Tristan, Peterson, Troy, Walters, Tyce, Eloundou, Tyna, Qi, Valerie, Moeller, Veit, Monaco, Vinnie, Kuo, Vishal, Fomenko, Vlad, Chang, Wayne, Zheng, Weiyi, Zhou, Wenda, Manassra, Wesam, Sheu, Will, Zaremba, Wojciech, Patil, Yash, Qian, Yilei, Kim, Yongjik, Cheng, Youlong, Zhang, Yu, He, Yuchen, Zhang, Yuchen, Jin, Yujia, Dai, Yunxing, Malkov, Yury
GPT-4o is an autoregressive omni model that accepts as input any combination of text, audio, image, and video, and generates any combination of text, audio, and image outputs. It's trained end-to-end across text, vision, and audio, meaning all inputs and outputs are processed by the same neural network. GPT-4o can respond to audio inputs in as little as 232 milliseconds, with an average of 320 milliseconds, which is similar to human response time in conversation. It matches GPT-4 Turbo performance on text in English and code, with significant improvement on text in non-English languages, while also being much faster and 50\% cheaper in the API. GPT-4o is especially better at vision and audio understanding compared to existing models. In line with our commitment to building AI safely and consistent with our voluntary commitments to the White House, we are sharing the GPT-4o System Card, which includes our Preparedness Framework evaluations. In this System Card, we provide a detailed look at GPT-4o's capabilities, limitations, and safety evaluations across multiple categories, focusing on speech-to-speech while also evaluating text and image capabilities, and measures we've implemented to ensure the model is safe and aligned. We also include third-party assessments on dangerous capabilities, as well as discussion of potential societal impacts of GPT-4o's text and vision capabilities.
MoWE-Audio: Multitask AudioLLMs with Mixture of Weak Encoders
Zhang, Wenyu, Sun, Shuo, Wang, Bin, Zou, Xunlong, Liu, Zhuohan, He, Yingxu, Lin, Geyu, Chen, Nancy F., Aw, Ai Ti
The rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced natural language processing capabilities, facilitating the development of AudioLLMs that process and understand speech and audio inputs alongside text. Existing AudioLLMs typically combine a pre-trained audio encoder with a pre-trained LLM, which are subsequently finetuned on specific audio tasks. However, the pre-trained audio encoder has constrained capacity to capture features for new tasks and datasets. To address this, we propose to incorporate mixtures of `weak' encoders (MoWE) into the AudioLLM framework. MoWE supplements a base encoder with a pool of relatively light weight encoders, selectively activated based on the audio input to enhance feature extraction without significantly increasing model size. Our empirical results demonstrate that MoWE effectively improves multi-task performance, broadening the applicability of AudioLLMs to more diverse audio tasks.
Evaluating Voice Command Pipelines for Drone Control: From STT and LLM to Direct Classification and Siamese Networks
Simões, Lucca Emmanuel Pineli, Rodrigues, Lucas Brandão, Silva, Rafaela Mota, da Silva, Gustavo Rodrigues
The integration of automation and voice control in drone systems has received significant attention in recent research, driven by the need for more intuitive and efficient human-machine interaction [4, 1]. This project focuses on developing a voice command system for the Tello drone, utilizing speech recognition and deep learning models to translate voice commands into precise drone actions. The primary challenge addressed by this project is the accurate and efficient translation of voice commands into specific drone operations. This is particularly crucial in scenarios where traditional control interfaces are impractical or where operators require hands-free operation [10, 5]. To address this challenge, we developed and evaluated three distinct pipelines. The first pipeline uses a traditional Speech-to-Text (STT) model followed by a Large Language Model (LLM) for command interpretation [11]. The second pipeline involves a direct mapping model that predicts drone commands from audio inputs without intermediate text conversion. The third pipeline employs a Siamese neural network to generalize new commands by comparing audio inputs to pre-trained examples [8]. Each pipeline was designed to balance performance, flexibility, and ease of maintenance.