Mechanistic interpretability methods summarize a transformer component by a single importance score, conflating two distinct roles: a component may matter because it transports task-relevant content, or because the forward computation degrades when its contribution is removed. We introduce \emph{Interchange-Group Sobol Decomposition} (IGSD), a paired-intervention framework that compares matched activation replacement with zero ablation on the same component, estimates two Sobol-style variance indices, and uses their signed difference to separate the two roles, with intervention validity monitored by a symmetric off-manifold diagnostic $\widehat{\mathrm{ST}}>1$. In factual recall, IGSD identifies an early-layer content channel in both GPT-2 small and Qwen2.5-1.5B that standard importance methods underestimate. A controlled subject and relation donor design shows that the early channel transports relation-frame content while late attention transports subject-retrieval content, refining at head granularity to the known $\mathrm{Attn}_{L9H8}$ head. Late-layer clamping confirms that the early signal is expressed through downstream transformations rather than residual pass-through. These results show that replacement and deletion are not interchangeable controls and their divergence provides a practical statistical diagnostic for content transport in transformer components.

In this work, we prove that agents capable of adapting to distribution shifts must have learned the causal model of their environment even in the presence of mediation. This term describes situations where an agent's actions affect its environment, a dynamic common to most real-world settings. For example, a robot in an industrial plant might interact with tools, move through space, and transform products to complete its task. We introduce an algorithm for eliciting causal knowledge from robust agents using optimal policy oracles, with the flexibility to incorporate prior causal knowledge. We further demonstrate its effectiveness in mediated singleagent scenarios and multi-agent environments. We identify conditions under which the presence of a single robust agent is sufficient to recover the full causal model and derive optimal policies for other agents in the same environment. Finally, we show how to apply these results to sequential decision-making tasks modeled as Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs).

The exponential mechanism is a general method to construct a randomized estimator that satisfies (ε,0)-differential privacy. Recently, Wang et al. showed that the Gibbs posterior, which is a data-dependent probability distribution that contains the Bayesian posterior, is essentially equivalent to the exponential mechanism under certain boundedness conditions on the loss function. While the exponential mechanism provides a way to build an (ε,0)-differential private algorithm, it requires boundedness of the loss function, which is quite stringent for some learning problems. In this paper, we focus on (ε,δ)-differential privacy of Gibbs posteriors with convex and Lipschitz loss functions. Our result extends the classical exponential mechanism, allowing the loss functions to have an unbounded sensitivity.

We focus on finding the Nash equilibrium of decision-dependent games in the bandit feedback setting.

We also provide examples where biased estimators outperform their unbiased counterparts or where unbiased versions are simply not available. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework through experimental results that validate our theoretical findings.

The following theorem is a more general version of Theorem 5.1. Assume that Assumptions 1 to 3 hold. Note that the only difference between Theorem B.1 and Theorem 5.1 lies in That is, the "oldest" response used to update By Jensen's inequality and L -smoothness, we have null f In order for the paper to be self-contained, we restate the proof here. The following lemma is slightly modified from Lemma 8 in [18]. By Lemma B.1, we have B Combining Appendix B.3.1 and Appendix B.3.2, we have B.4 Deriving the convergence bound In this subsection, we obtain Theorem B.1 based on the descent lemma.

We focus on finding the Nash equilibrium of decision-dependent games in the bandit feedback setting.