annual computer poker competition
Successful Nash Equilibrium Agent for a 3-Player Imperfect-Information Game
Ganzfried, Sam, Nowak, Austin, Pinales, Joannier
Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, but no guarantees in non-zero-sum games or in games with more than two players. We describe an agent that is able to defeat a variety of realistic opponents using an exact Nash equilibrium strategy in a 3-player imperfect-information game. This shows that, despite a lack of theoretical guarantees, agents based on Nash equilibrium strategies can be successful in multiplayer games after all.
The Annual Computer Poker Competition
Bard, Nolan (University of Alberta) | Hawkin, John (Verafin) | Rubin, Jonathan (PARC) | Zinkevich, Martin (Google)
Now entering its eighth year, the Annual Computer Poker Competition (ACPC) is the premier event within the field of computer poker. With both academic and nonacademic competitors from around the world, the competition provides an open and international venue for benchmarking computer poker agents. We describe the competition’s origins and evolution, current events, and winning techniques.