The development of AI agents based on large, open-domain language models (LLMs) has paved the way for the development of general-purpose AI assistants that can support human in tasks such as writing, coding, graphic design, and scientific research. A major challenge with such agents is that, by necessity, they are trained by observing relatively short-term interactions with humans. Such models can fail to generalize to long-term interactions, for example, interactions where a user has repeatedly corrected mistakes on the part of the agent. In this work, we argue that these challenges can be overcome by explicitly modeling humans' social intelligence, that is, their ability to build and maintain long-term relationships with other agents whose behavior cannot always be predicted. By mathematically modeling the strategies humans use to communicate and reason about one another over long periods of time, we may be able to derive new game theoretic objectives against which LLMs and future AI agents may be optimized.

Artificially intelligent agents deployed in the real-world will require the ability to reliably \textit{cooperate} with humans (as well as other, heterogeneous AI agents). To provide formal guarantees of successful cooperation, we must make some assumptions about how partner agents could plausibly behave. Any realistic set of assumptions must account for the fact that other agents may be just as adaptable as our agent is. In this work, we consider the problem of cooperating with a \textit{population} of agents in a finitely-repeated, two player general-sum matrix game with private utilities. Two natural assumptions in such settings are that: 1) all agents in the population are individually rational learners, and 2) when any two members of the population are paired together, with high-probability they will achieve at least the same utility as they would under some Pareto efficient equilibrium strategy. Our results first show that these assumptions alone are insufficient to ensure \textit{zero-shot} cooperation with members of the target population. We therefore consider the problem of \textit{learning} a strategy for cooperating with such a population using prior observations its members interacting with one another. We provide upper and lower bounds on the number of samples needed to learn an effective cooperation strategy. Most importantly, we show that these bounds can be much stronger than those arising from a "naive'' reduction of the problem to one of imitation learning.