We consider matroid allocation problems under opportunity fairness constraints: resources need to be allocated to a set of agents under matroid constraints (which include classical problems such as bipartite matching). Agents are divided into C groups according to a sensitive attribute, and an allocation is opportunity-fair if each group receives the same share proportional to the maximum feasible allocation it could achieve in isolation. We study the Price of Fairness (PoF), i.e., the ratio between maximum size allocations and maximum size opportunity-fair allocations. We first provide a characterization of the PoF leveraging the underlying polymatroid structure of the allocation problem. Based on this characterization, we prove bounds on the PoF in various settings from fully adversarial (worst-case) to fully random. Notably, one of our main results considers an arbitrary matroid structure with agents randomly divided into groups. In this setting, we prove a PoF bound as a function of the (relative) size of the largest group. Our result implies that, as long as there is no dominant group (i.e., the largest group is not too large), opportunity fairness constraints do not induce any loss of social welfare (defined as the allocation size). Overall, our results give insights into which aspects of the problem's structure affect the trade-off between opportunity fairness and social welfare.

We consider matroid allocation problems under \textit{opportunity fairness} constraints: resources need to be allocated to a set of agents under matroid constraints (which includes classical problems such as bipartite matching). Agents are divided into $C$ groups according to a sensitive attribute, and an allocation is opportunity-fair if each group receives the same share proportional to the maximum feasible allocation it could achieve in isolation. We study the Price of Fairness (PoF), i.e., the ratio between maximum size allocations and maximum size opportunity-fair allocations. We first provide a characterization of the PoF leveraging the underlying polymatroid structure of the allocation problem. Based on this characterization, we prove bounds on the PoF in various settings from fully adversarial (worst-case) to fully random. Notably, one of our main results considers an arbitrary matroid structure with agents randomly divided into groups. In this setting, we prove a PoF bound as a function of the (relative) size of the largest group. Our result implies that, as long as there is no dominant group (i.e., the largest group is not too large), opportunity fairness constraints do not induce any loss of social welfare (defined as the allocation size). Overall, our results give insights into which aspects of the problem's structure affect the trade-off between opportunity fairness and social welfare.

Online allocation problems have been widely studied due to their numerous practical applications (particularly to Internet advertising), as well as considerable theoretical interest. The main challenge in such problems is making assignment decisions in the face of uncertainty about future input; effective algorithms need to predict which constraints are most likely to bind, and learn the balance between short-term gain and the value of long-term resource availability. In many important applications, the algorithm designer is faced with multiple objectives to optimize. In particular, in online advertising it is fairly common to optimize multiple metrics, such as clicks, conversions, and impressions, as well as other metrics which may be largely uncorrelated such as'share of voice', and'buyer surplus'. While there has been considerable work on multi-objective offline optimization (when the entire input is known in advance), very little is known about the online case, particularly in the case of adversarial input. In this paper, we give the first results for bi-objective online submodular optimization, providing almost matching upper and lower bounds for allocating items to agents with two submodular value functions. We also study practically relevant special cases of this problem related to Internet advertising, and obtain improved results. All our algorithms are nearly best possible, as well as being efficient and easy to implement in practice.

However, an emerging issue in allocation problems is data privacy.

Resource allocation remains NP-hard due to combinatorial complexity. While deep reinforcement learning (DRL) methods, such as the Rainbow Deep Q-Network (DQN), improve scalability through prioritized replay and distributional heads, classical function approximators limit their representational power. We introduce Variational Quantum Rainbow DQN (VQR-DQN), which integrates ring-topology variational quantum circuits with Rainbow DQN to leverage quantum superposition and entanglement. We frame the human resource allocation problem (HRAP) as a Markov decision process (MDP) with combinatorial action spaces based on officer capabilities, event schedules, and transition times. On four HRAP benchmarks, VQR-DQN achieves 26.8% normalized makespan reduction versus random baselines and outperforms Double DQN and classical Rainbow DQN by 4.9-13.4%. These gains align with theoretical connections between circuit expressibility, entanglement, and policy quality, demonstrating the potential of quantum-enhanced DRL for large-scale resource allocation. Our implementation is available at: https://github.com/Analytics-Everywhere-Lab/qtrl/.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating sequentially arriving items to a set of individuals. For this problem, the recently-introduced P ACE algorithm leverages the dual averaging algorithm to approximate competitive equilibria and thus generate online fair allocations. P ACE is simple, distributed, and parameter-free, making it appealing for practical use in large-scale systems. However, current performance guarantees for P ACE require i.i.d.

In addition to this matching distribution constraint, we also require that the recipient's