Military weapon systems and command-and-control infrastructure augmented by artificial intelligence (AI) have seen rapid development and deployment in recent years. However, the sociotechnical impacts of AI on combat systems, military decision-making, and the norms of warfare have been understudied. We focus on a specific subset of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) that use AI for targeting or battlefield decisions. We refer to this subset as AI-powered lethal autonomous weapon systems (AI-LAWS) and argue that they introduce novel risks--including unanticipated escalation, poor reliability in unfamiliar environments, and erosion of human oversight--all of which threaten both military effectiveness and the openness of AI research. These risks cannot be addressed by high-level policy alone; effective regulation must be grounded in the technical behavior of AI models. We argue that AI researchers must be involved throughout the regulatory lifecycle. Thus, we propose a clear, behavior-based definition of AILAWS--systems that introduce unique risks through their use of modern AI--as a foundation for technically grounded regulation, given that existing frameworks do not distinguish them from conventional LAWS. Using this definition, we propose several technically-informed policy directions and invite greater participation from the AI research community in military AI policy discussions.

Why do AI models struggle with online hate speech detection? Hate speech that once circulated in person now travels farther and faster via anonymous online accounts behind a screen. As the United Nations marks the International Day for Countering Hate Speech on June 18, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has warned that social platforms are amplifying the threat. With artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly tasked with detecting and removing hate speech online, Al Jazeera looks at where these systems fall short compared with human judgement. How is hate speech defined?

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Artificial intelligence (AI) now permeates critical infrastructures and decisionmaking systems where failures produce social, economic, and democratic harm. This position paper challenges the entrenched belief that regulation and innovation are opposites. As evidenced by analogies from aviation, pharmaceuticals, and welfare systems and recent cases of synthetic misinformation, bias and unaccountable decision-making, the absence of well-designed regulation has already created immeasurable damage. Regulation, when thoughtful and adaptive, is not a brake on innovation--it is its foundation. The present position paper examines the EU AIAct as a model of risk-based, responsibility-driven regulation that addresses the Collingridge Dilemma: acting early enough to prevent harm, yet flexibly enough to sustain innovation. Its adaptive mechanisms--regulatory sandboxes, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) support, real-world testing, fundamental rights impact assessment (FRIA)--demonstrate how regulation can accelerate responsibly, rather than delay, technological progress. The position paper summarises how governance tools transform perceived burdens into tangible advantages: legal certainty, consumer trust, and ethical competitiveness.

AI systems are increasingly able to autonomously conduct realistic software engineering tasks, and may soon be deployed to automate machine learning (ML) R&D itself. Frontier AI systems may be deployed in safety-critical settings, including to help ensure the safety of future systems. Unfortunately, frontier and future systems may not be sufficiently trustworthy, and there is evidence that these systems may even be misaligned with their developers or users. Therefore, we investigate the capabilities of AI agents to act against the interests of their users when conducting ML engineering, by sabotaging ML models, sandbagging their performance, and subverting oversight mechanisms. First, we extend MLE-Bench, a benchmark for realistic ML tasks, with code-sabotage tasks such as implanting backdoors and purposefully causing generalisation failures.

Compound AI systems, comprising multiple interacting components such as LLMs, foundation models, and external tools, have demonstrated remarkable improvements compared to single models in various tasks. To ensure their effective deployment in real-world applications, aligning these systems with human preferences is crucial. However, aligning the compound system via policy optimization, unlike the alignment of a single model, is challenging for two main reasons: (i) non-differentiable interactions between components make end-to-end gradient-based optimization method inapplicable, and (ii) system-level preferences cannot be directly transformed into component-level preferences. To address these challenges, we first formulate compound AI systems as Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), explicitly modeling both component interactions and the associated data flows. Building on this formulation, we introduce SysDPO, a framework that extends Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to enable joint system-level alignment. We propose two variants, SysDPO-Direct and SysDPO-Sampling, tailored for scenarios depending on whether we construct a system-specific preference dataset. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach across two applications: the joint alignment of a language model and a diffusion model, and the joint alignment of an LLM collaboration system.

Despite rapid progress on AI benchmarks, the real-world meaning of benchmark performance remains unclear. To quantify the capabilities of AI systems in terms of human capabilities, we propose a new metric: 50%-task-completion time horizon. This is the time humans typically take to complete tasks that AI models can complete with 50% success rate. We first timed humans with relevant domain expertise on a combination of RE-Bench, HCAST, and 66 novel shorter tasks. On these tasks, current frontier AI models such as o3 have a 50% time horizon of around 110 minutes. Furthermore, frontier AI time horizon has been doubling approximately every seven months since 2019, though the trend may have accelerated since 2024. The increase in AI models' time horizons seems to be primarily driven by greater reliability and ability to adapt to mistakes, combined with better logical reasoning and tool use capabilities. We discuss the limitations of our results--including their degree of external validity--and the implications of increased autonomy for dangerous capabilities. If these results generalize to real-world software tasks, extrapolation of this trend predicts that within 5 years, AI systems will be capable of automating many software tasks that currently take humans a month.

AI systems must adapt to the evolving visual landscape, especially in domains where object appearance shifts over time. While prior work on time-aware vision models has primarily addressed commonsense-level categories, we introduce Car Models in Time (CaMiT).

With the rapid advancement of generative models, general-purpose generation has gained increasing attention as a promising approach to unify diverse tasks across modalities within a single system. Despite this progress, existing open-source frameworks often remain fragile and struggle to support complex real-world applications due to the lack of structured workflow planning and execution-level feedback. To address these limitations, we present ComfyMind, a collaborative AI system designed to enable robust and scalable general-purpose generation, built on the ComfyUI platform. ComfyMind introduces two core innovations: Semantic Workflow Interface (SWI) that abstracts low-level node graphs into callable functional modules described in natural language, enabling high-level composition and reducing structural errors; Search Tree Planning mechanism with localized feedback execution, which models generation as a hierarchical decision process and allows adaptive correction at each stage. Together, these components improve the stability and flexibility of complex generative workflows. We evaluate ComfyMind on three public benchmarks: ComfyBench, GenEval, and Reason-Edit, which span generation, editing, and reasoning tasks. Results show that ComfyMind consistently outperforms existing open-source baselines and achieves performance comparable to GPT-Image-1. ComfyMind paves a promising path for the development of open-source general-purpose generative AI systems.

The feedback that AI systems (e.g., recommender systems, chatbots) collect from user interactions is a crucial source of training data. While short-term feedback (e.g., clicks, engagement) is widely used for training, there is ample evidence that optimizing short-term feedback does not necessarily achieve the desired long-term objectives. Unfortunately, directly optimizing for long-term objectives is challenging, and we identify the disconnect in the timescales of short-term interventions (e.g., rankings) and the long-term feedback (e.g., user retention) as one of the key obstacles. To overcome this disconnect, we introduce the framework of MultiScale Policy Learning to contextually reconcile that AI systems need to act and optimize feedback at multiple interdependent timescales. Following a PAC-Bayes motivation, we show how the lower timescales with more plentiful data can provide a data-dependent hierarchical prior for faster learning at higher scales, where data is more scarce.