Risk assessments for advanced AI systems require evaluating both the models themselves and their deployment contexts. We introduce the Societal Capacity Assessment Framework (SCAF), an indicators-based approach to measuring a society's vulnerability, coping capacity, and adaptive capacity in response to AI-related risks. SCAF adapts established resilience analysis methodologies to AI, enabling organisations to ground risk management in insights about country-level deployment conditions. It can also support stakeholders in identifying opportunities to strengthen societal preparedness for emerging AI capabilities. By bridging disparate literatures and the "context gap" in AI evaluation, SCAF promotes more holistic risk assessment and governance as advanced AI systems proliferate globally.

Complex adaptive systems (CASs), from ecosystems to economies, are open systems and inherently dependent on external conditions. While a system can transition from one state to another based on the magnitude of change in external conditions, the rate of change -- irrespective of magnitude -- may also lead to system state changes due to a phenomenon known as a rate-induced transition (RIT). This study presents a novel framework that captures RITs in CASs through a local model and a network extension where each node contributes to the structural adaptability of others. Our findings reveal how RITs occur at a critical environmental change rate, with lower-degree nodes tipping first due to fewer connections and reduced adaptive capacity. High-degree nodes tip later as their adaptability sources (lower-degree nodes) collapse. This pattern persists across various network structures. Our study calls for an extended perspective when managing CASs, emphasizing the need to focus not only on thresholds of external conditions but also the rate at which those conditions change, particularly in the context of the collapse of surrounding systems that contribute to the focal system's resilience. Our analytical method opens a path to designing management policies that mitigate RIT impacts and enhance resilience in ecological, social, and socioecological systems. These policies could include controlling environmental change rates, fostering system adaptability, implementing adaptive management strategies, and building capacity and knowledge exchange. Our study contributes to the understanding of RIT dynamics and informs effective management strategies for complex adaptive systems in the face of rapid environmental change.

Four articles, published across the March through May issues of Communications, highlight how people are the unique source of the adaptive capacity essential to incident response in modern Internet-facing software systems. While it's reasonable for software engineering and operations communities to focus on the intricacies of technology, there is not much attention given to the intricacies of how people do their work. Ultimately, it is human performance that makes modern business-critical systems robust and resilient. As business-critical software systems become more successful, they necessarily increase in complexity. Ironically, this complexity makes these systems inherently messy so that surprising incidents are part and parcel of the capability to provide services at larger scales and speeds.13

A large body of research describes the importance of adaptability for systems to be resilient in the face of disruptions. However, adaptive processes can be fallible, either because systems fail to adapt in situations requiring new ways of functioning, or because the adaptations themselves produce undesired consequences. A central question is then: how can systems better manage their capacity to adapt to perturbations, and constitute intelligent adaptive systems? Based on studies conducted in different high-risk domains (healthcare, mission control, military operations, urban firefighting), we have identified three basic patterns of adaptive failures or traps: (1) decompensation – when a system exhausts its capacity to adapt as disturbances and challenges cascade; (2) working at cross-purposes – when sub-systems or roles exhibit behaviors that are locally adaptive but globally maladaptive; (3) getting stuck in outdated behaviors – when a system over-relies on past successes although conditions of operation change. The identification of such basic patterns then suggests ways in which a work organization, as an example of a complex adaptive system, needs to behave in order to see and avoid or recognize and escape the corresponding failures. The paper will present how expert practitioners exhibit such resilient behaviors in high-risk situations, and how adverse events can occur when systems fail to do so. We will also explore how various efforts in research related to complex adaptive systems provide fruitful directions to advance both the necessary theoretical work and the development of concrete solutions for improving systems’ resilience.